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Abstract
The first chapter introduces the thesis and reviews the literature on loss aversion, the en-
dowment effect and the willingness to pay/willingness to accept gap, and the effects of
experience.
The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch’s exchange of goods ex-
periment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment effect. The
experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects with experience of
consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The results are consistent with
earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed; however, the strength of the effect
is less than in earlier studies and differs between treatments. In particular, there is a signifi-
cantly stronger endowment effect in the treatments in which the endowment is acquired in
two steps rather than one step.
The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy and sell
lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and selling bids and prices
are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays under symmetric informa-
tion but persists under asymmetric information. Furthermore, there are spillover effects.
When the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric information, subjects do not
immediately adjust their behaviour. The results are interpreted as evidence that behaviour is
driven by heuristics.
The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects buy
and sell lotteries. How the lotteries’ odds are presented and whether the lottery gets resolved
after each trial vary between treatments. Among the findings is that the gap between buying
and selling bids decays when lotteries are not resolved each trial but persists when they are.
The final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments and identifies com-
mon patterns. Directions for future experimental and theoretical research are suggested.
Finally, implications for policy are discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
Which theory of choice best describes the decisions people actually make? How do
patterns in the choices people make change as people learn and gain experience? The
answer to these questions have wide ranging implications. For example, different
theories of choice give different answers to the following questions. When does a
New York taxi driver decide to finish working for the day? What factors affect the
price a house seller is willing to accept or the price of an impressionist painting at
auction? How do people adjust their saving and spending when they get good or bad
news about future income? How should a town council decide how many trees to
plant in a public park? How might U.S. policymakers have weighed the risks when
deciding how long to keep troops deployed in Vietnam and more recently Iraq.
In this chapter, I outline1 (a) the standard theory of choice used in economics and
(b) alternative theories that incorporate reference point effects including loss aver-
sion. Theories from these two classes typically give different answers to the ques-
tions above. I assess the experimental and field evidence for the two theories. There
1More detailed discussions of relevant theory will be presented in later chapters as is necessary to
motivate experiment designs.
1
is considerable evidence of replicable behavioural phenomena that are inconsistent
with standard preference theory, which I refer to as anomalies. Many anomalies are,
however, consistent with alternative theories of choice. I also consider the argument
that anomalies for the standard theory when they occur may be only transient effects
that are eliminated by experience.
Finally, I summarise what we know from the existing literature and what ques-
tions are left unanswered. It is these unanswered questions that motivate the new
experimental studies presented in this thesis.
1.2 Standard Theory
The standard assumption used in economics is that final states alone determine pre-
ferences. That is, preferences are independent of current entitlements. This allows
the textbook case where a person’s preferences over two goods are represented by
drawing indifference curves. A person chooses quantities of the two goods that puts
them on the highest indifference curve given their budget constraint. For a given
budget constraint, whatever combination of the two goods they are endowed with,
they will choose the same combination of the two goods.
1.3 Reference Point Effects and Loss Aversion
There is a growing body of evidence that contradicts the assumption that current
entitlements do not affect preferences and choices. The first evidence appears in the
psychology literature. For example, Brehm (1956) writes
Previous studies have found that when a person is given an object he
tends subsequently to see it as more desirable. This may be called the
effect of ownership.
2
The idea that preferences might depend on current entitlements was introduced into
the economics literature by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler (1980). When
a person makes a choice, their decision is often influenced by the reference point
from which they evaluate the options. This influence of the reference point follows
a regular pattern. Kahneman and Tversky write:
A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses
loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences in losing
a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with
gaining the same amount.
That is, losses relative to the reference point carry more weight than commensurate
gains. Kahneman and Tversky call this effect loss aversion.
1.3.1 Loss Aversion in Choice under Risk
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory is an alternative theory of choice
under risk to Expected Utility Theory. A theory of choice under risk gives pre-
ferences over lotteries. Consider the simple case of a lottery that pays one of n
possible monetary outcomes. The set of consequences, levels of monetary wealth,
can be written as X = (x1, ...,xn). Each consequence xi occurs with probability pi.
Note that pi ∈ [0,1] and ∑
n
i=1 pi = 1. Under Expected Utility Theory, the expected
utility of the lottery is ∑ni=1 piu(xi) where u(xi) is the utility from outcome xi. Under
Prospect Theory, the lottery’s value is ∑ni=1pi(pi)v(xi− r). There are two key dif-
ferences. First, probabilities are weighted by the function pi(pi) instead of entering
the value calculation directly (Kahneman and Tversky call the values that pi() maps
probability values to decision weights). The weighting function has an inverted S
shape. Typically, when p < 0.3, pi(p) > p; when p > 0.3, pi(p) < p. That is, small
probabilities are over-weighted; large ones, under weighted. Second, outcomes are
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assessed as losses and gains rather than levels of wealth. Losses and gains are calcu-
lated relative to a reference level of wealth, r. The reference point is usually assumed
to be the current level of wealth. The value function, v() is S shaped, as shown in fi-
gure 1.1. It is steeper in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains and kinked
at the origin. This feature captures loss aversion.
As well as this, the value function is concave in the domain of gains and convex
in the domain of losses. As a consequence, the theory predicts risk aversion in the
domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses.2
The original (1979) version of Prospect Theory has been refined by later studies.
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory changed the way de-
cision weights are handled so that the weights always add up to one. Sugden (2003)
presented a reference-dependent model of preferences with income effects and with
the possibility of risky reference points (but left out probability weights for simpli-
city). Schmidt et al. (2008) combined probability weighting, income effects, and the
possibility of risky reference points in a single model.
1.3.2 Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice
Prospect Theory is a theory of choice under risk. Tversky and Kahneman (1991)
take two of the key features of Prospect Theory, that the carriers of value are losses
and gains and loss aversion, and develop a reference dependent theory of riskless
choice. Consider figure 1.2. Under the standard theory of choice (the left hand
graph), preferences are independent of current entitlements. On the graph, the per-
2An implication of risk seeking behaviour in the domain of losses is when a person suffers a loss,
if they do not adjust their reference point to the new wealth level, they will exhibit more risk seeking
behaviour than before the loss occurred. Kahneman and Renshon (2007) argue that when things are
going badly in a conflict, cutting the losses and withdrawing appears less attractive to policy makers
than taking further risks. “U.S. policymakers faced this dilemma at many points in Vietnam and today
in Iraq. To withdraw now is to accept a sure loss, and that option is deeply unattractive. The option of
hanging on will therefore be relatively attractive, even if the chances of success are small and the cost
of delaying failure is high.” Another case of increased risk seeking over losses is observed by Rasiel
et al. (2005). They found that patients with life threatening conditions make more risky decisions as
their condition declines.
4
Figure 1.1: Prospect Theory’s S-Shaped Value Function
son is on a higher indifference curve at point B than at point A. Accordingly, if they
are faced with a choice between A and B, they will choose B no matter what combi-
nation of goods X and Y they hold at the time they make the choice. In contrast, if
preferences are reference dependent (the right hand graph), preferences over goods
X and Y vary with the allocation the decision maker holds. If the decision maker
holds allocation A, the reference point is A. At this reference point, the solid line
represents allocations that are just as attractive as A. A is preferred to all points be-
low this line and points above the line are preferred to A. Likewise, at point B their
preferences are represented by the dashed line. B is preferred to points below the
line and points above it are preferred to B. Notice that from reference point A, A is
preferred to B, but from reference point B, B is preferred to A. As a consequence,
someone given allocation A will not be willing to swap it for allocation B; someone
given B will not be willing to swap it for A. This is known as the endowment effect.
An important consequence of the endowment effect (valuing an item more once you
own it) is that willingness to accept compensation (WTA), the minimum amount of
money you would require to give up a good if you owned it, will exceed willingness
5
Figure 1.2: Alternative Models of Preferences over Two Goods
to pay (WTP), the maximum amount of money you would pay to obtain a good. This
disparity occurs because once you own a good, it becomes more valuable to you, so
the amount of money that has the same value to you has the good will be higher3.
An intuitive way to think about WTA and WTP in terms of buying and selling is as
follows. WTA is the minimum price we would be willing to sell an item we own
for; WTP is the maximum price we be willing to pay to buy an item.
1.3.3 WTA and WTP for Lotteries
How can we model WTA and WTP for lotteries? One option is to use the riskless
choice framework and let good Y be lotteries and good X be money. Alternatively,
we can use the one variable value function described in section 1.3.1. Consider
the lottery whose payout is determined by the colour of a ball drawn from an urn
containing ten balls, two red and eight black. If a red ball is drawn, it pays out £20;
otherwise, it pays out zero. If we omit probability weights for simplicity, we can
calculate WTP by solving the following.
3For a good, WTP is the same as the Hicksian compensating variation; WTA, equivalent variation.
Under the standard theory, as Willig (1976) argues, we should expect compensating and equivalent
variations to be approximately equal.
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v(0) = 0.2v(20−wtp)+0.8v(−wtp)
The solution to this equation, wtp, is the price for the lottery that would make us
indifferent between (a) buying and playing the lottery and (b) not trading.
When calculating WTA, we have two options. If we take the reference point to
be wealth before the lottery is played out, WTA is the solution to
v(wta) = 0.2v(20)+0.8v(0)
In this case wta, is the amount of money that is just as attractive as playing the
lottery.
Alternatively, we can allow uncertain reference points and take the reference
point to be playing the lottery. In this case, if we sell the lottery, we gain the price of
the lottery but lose what the lottery would have paid out to us. Accordingly, if a red
ball is drawn, our net loss is £20 less the amount we sold the lottery for; if a black
ball is drawn, we lose nothing and gain the amount we sold the lottery for. WTA is
the solution to
v(0) = 0.2v(wta−20)+0.8v(wta)
The solution, wta, is the amount of money that compensates for losing what we
would have received if we played the lottery.
1.3.4 Reference Dependent Theory and Risk Aversion
Reference dependent theories such as Prospect Theory can account for aversion to
gambles that have both positive and negative outcomes. For instance, Kahneman
and Tversky (1982) report that when faced with a 50-50 lose $100, win X gamble,
it is common for people to turn down the gamble unless X is $200 or more. This
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behaviour can be explained by Prospect Theory in terms of the value function being
steeper in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains.
Rabin (2000) argues that Expected Utility Theory with a concave utility of wealth
function cannot explain risk aversion over modest stakes without predicting implau-
sible degrees of risk aversion over large stakes. As a consequence, risk aversion over
small stakes is an anomaly for the standard theory. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) object
that Expected Utility Theory as developed by von Neumann andMorgenstern (1947)
does not specify the domain of the utility function (it could be wealth, income, or
vectors of commodities). Rabin’s critique applies to expected utility of wealth mo-
dels. They show that an Expected Utility of Income model can explain risk aversion
over small and large stakes. One might assume that since Expected Utility of In-
come models can give an account of risk aversion over small stakes, then it is not an
anomaly for the standard theory. I argue that this assumption would be a mistake.
Expected utility of income models are a departure from the standard theory since,
like Prospect Theory, they make preferences reference point dependent. As a conse-
quence, they can predict a range of phenomena that are anomalies for the standard
theory. In fact, the utility of income function Cox and Sadiraj use to demonstrate
risk aversion over small stakes without implausible risk aversion over large stakes
also predicts a WTA/WTP gap for lotteries, framing induced preference reversals,
and choice-value preference reversals (see appendix A).
1.4 Evidence from Surveys and Experiments
There is now a large body of evidence on the effects of reference points on prefe-
rences and behaviour. Brown and Gregory (1999), Horowitz and McConnell (2002),
Plott and Zeiler (2005), and Sayman and Onculer (2005) each provide useful reviews
and list many of the studies.
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Table 1.1: Studies Reporting Non Incentivised WTA/WTP Valuations
Study Good WTAa WTPa WTAWTP
Hammack and Brown 1974 Waterfowl hunting 1044 247 4.2
Banford et al. 1979 Fishing pier 120 43 2.8
Bishop and Heberlein 1979 Goose hunting permit 101 21 4.8
Brookshire et al. 1980 Elk hunting quality 69 13 5.4
Rowe et al. 1980 Air visibility 24 5 5.2
Adamowicz et al. 1993 Movie ticket 9.3 4.8 2.0
MacDonald and Bowker 1994 Industrial plant odour 735 105 7.0
This table is based on Brown and Gregory (1999).
a Valuations are in US dollars.
In the economics literature, the early empirical evidence of reference dependent
preferences comes from hypothetical valuation studies. In these studies participants
were typically asked to report WTA and WTP. Table 1.1 summarises these studies
that investigate WTA/WTP using surveys (as opposed to incentive compatible pro-
cedures where subjects have a incentive to give truthful answers). In all seven of the
studies, WTA valuations exceed WTP and the ratio WTAWTP ranges from 2 to 7. Under
standard theory, WTA and WTP should be approximately equal, so the results of
these studies are an anomaly for the standard theory.
More recent studies have mainly used incentive compatible elicitation mecha-
nisms instead of simply asking subjects to state valuations. In such studies subjects
have an incentive to reveal their true preferences and think carefully about their de-
cision since their payoff for participating depends on the decisions they make. The
simplest example of an incentivised study is the classic chocolate and mugs expe-
riment run by Knetsch (1989). One group of 76 students were given a coffee mug,
asked to complete a short questionnaire, then asked if they wanted to swap the mug
for a bar of Swiss chocolate. Another group of 87 students faced the same condi-
tions except that they were given chocolate in the first step and asked if they wanted
to swap it for the mug at the end. In the first group, 89 percent favoured the mug; in
the second group just 10 percent favoured the mug. Under the standard theory, pre-
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ferences do not depend on current assets, so there should be no difference between
these figures.
The gap between WTA and WTP has also been extensively studied in experi-
ments, which have used a range of incentive compatible mechanisms to elicit va-
luations. Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 respectively summarise one shot incentivised
WTA/WTP studies, studies using lotteries instead of goods, and studies with re-
peated markets. Eliciting sincere valuations is more difficult than eliciting sincere
choices. Obviously, if experiment participants are simply asked to state WTA and
WTP valuations and then allowed to trade at these prices then they can increase their
payout from the experiment by exaggerating WTA and understating WTP. To avoid
this problem researchers have used pricing mechanisms where the price at which a
given subject trades is not the value that the subject stated.
Most of the studies use one sided markets in the sense that subjects are buying
from the experimenter or selling to the experimenter rather than trading amongst
themselves. The most common mechanisms used in these studies are the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism (BDM) and versions of the Vickrey (1961)
auction. One notable exception is Brookshire and Coursey (1987) who use a Smith
(1980) auction to measure the value of a public good, the density of trees in a public
park. A few studies use two sided markets. Such markets have been implemented
in two ways. The first method is to divide the subjects into buyers and sellers, elicit
WTA and WTP valuations, set the price so that supply equals demand, and execute
trades that are consistent with the price. This method is used by Kahneman et al.
(1990) and Morrison (1997). The second method is to have subjects simultaneously
act as buyers and sellers. The method is used by Knez and Smith (1987) and Singh
(1991). Subjects are endowed with different quantities of a good, then asked to state
WTA to give up one unit and WTP to gain one unit, the price is set so that supply
equals demand and trades consistent with the price are executed.
10
Table 1.2: Studies Reporting One Shot Incentivised WTA/WTP Valuations
Study Good(s) Mechanism Ratio
Knetsch 1989, Test 2 Swiss chocolate BDM 2.0
Bateman et al. 1997 chocolate, coke BDM > 1.0
Franciosi et al. 1996 mugs TSM 2.4
Carmon and Ariely 2000 basketball game tickets TSM 14.5
Bateman et al. 2005 luxury chocolates MDC 1.9
In this and subsequent tables, the elicitation devices used in experiments are abbreviated as fol-
lows: MDC =multiple dichotomous choice; SPA = second price Vickrey auction; BDM=Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak mechanism; RNA = random nth-price Vickrey auction; MPA= median price
Vickrey auction; NPA = ninth price Vickrey auction; TSM = two sided market; DBA = double
bid auction; LSA = Laboratory Smith Auction.
1.5 Evidence from Field Studies
Loss aversion and Prospect Theory in general have also been studied in non expe-
rimental settings. See Camerer (1998) for a review. Loss aversion can explain the
extra return on stocks compared to bonds, the equity premium (Benartzi and Thaler,
1995). In the labour market, Camerer et al. (1997) found a tendency for New York
taxi drivers to work longer hours on low-wage days; Chou (2002) found evidence
of similar behaviour among taxi drivers in Singapore4. Goette et al. (2004) review
several studies on labour supply choices and find that a reference-dependent pre-
ferences model can explain all the data. Hardie et al. (1993) find that consumers
react asymmetrically to price increases and decreases: they react more to price in-
creases than cuts. Bowman et al. (1999) find that consumers react asymmetrically to
news about future income: they raise consumption following good news but fail to
cut it following bad news. Not every study testing for loss aversion in the field has
found positive results, however. For instance Beggs and Graddy (2005) analyse data
from Impressionist and Contemporary Art auctions and find evidence of reference
dependence effects but not loss aversion.
4Farber (2008) applies a more sophisticated econometric model to data on the labour supply of
NewYork City taxi drivers and concludes that there may be a reference level of income on a given day
that affects labour supply, but if there is, it varies from day to day giving the theory little predictive
power.
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Table 1.3: Studies Reporting on the WTA/WTP Gap for Lotteries
Study Lotteriesa Mechanismb Main Resultc
Knetsch and Sinden 1984, Test 5 {$70;?} binary choice 4.0
Harless 1989 6 binary lotteries SPA 1.6-1.5
Singh 1991 {$1, 0.5; $2, 0,5} TSM 1.1 to 1.57
Birnbaum et al. 1992 over 100 lotteries survey WTA>WTP
Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992, group 7 and 8 {$20,0.5;0,0.5} BDM 1.8-2.1
Mellers et al. 1992 36 binary lotteries incentivised surveyd WTA>WTP
Eisenberger and Weber 1995 {DM 10, ?;0, ?} BDM 1.5-2.3
Casey 1995 12 binary lotteries survey WTA>WTP
Shefrin and Caldwell 2001 hypothetical scenarios survey 2.6-18.8
Peters et al. 2003 {$100, 0.05} RNA 7.0
Loomes et al. 2003 {£12, 0.2; 0, 0.8},{£12,0.8;0,0.2} MPA 1.1-1.2
Schmidt and Traub 2006 lotteries: 56 risky, 2 uncertain BDM 1.9
Loomes et al. 2007 {£18, 0.19}, {£4, 0.81} MPA 1.1-1.4
Neilson et al. 2008 uncertain lotteries BDM WTA>WTP
a For studies that only used one or two lotteries, the actual lotteries are listed in the format {payoff, probability;...}. Where the probability is "?" it
means subjects were not told the probability.
b The abbreviations used here are defined on the note below table 1.2.
c The Main Result column reports the mean WTA/WTP ratio. Where there were several lotteries, several treatments, or repeated markets, the range
of the mean WTA/WTP ratio is reported. Where authors did not report the mean ratio, the relation between WTA and WTP is reported.
d Two of the 36 lotteries were randomly selected and the one assigned the higher price was played out.
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1.6 The Scope and Magnitude of Loss Aversion
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show that although a WTA/WTP gap is consistently observed, its
size varies considerably between studies. Several hypotheses have been advanced in
the literature concerning when loss aversion influences choices. Tversky and Kah-
neman (1991) posit that a reluctance to sell does not occur in routine commercial
transactions. They ran an experiment where subjects traded tokens that could be
exchanged for a fixed amount of money at the end of the experiment and found no
WTA/WTP gap. In contrast, when subjects traded pens, mugs, and binoculars using
the same market mechanism, there was a gap. Novemsky and Kahneman (2005)
report further evidence that supports this hypothesis. They find that while there is
loss aversion for goods, there is little or no loss aversion for money. Their interpre-
tation is that money is held for the purpose of exchange, so there is no loss aversion
when money is given up in exchange for goods. Bateman et al. (2005) also investi-
gate whether there is loss aversion when people exchange money for goods, but they
find evidence of loss aversion for money. The hypothesis has also been approached
theoretically by Koszegi and Rabin (2006). They develop a model of reference de-
pendent preferences where the reference point is not a person’s current endowment
but their rational expectation held in the recent past about what outcomes are going
to occur. Accordingly, when a person expects to make a trade, their reference point
will be the outcome where they make the trade and the money or goods given up
in the trade are not considered a loss. When they do not expect to trade, their refe-
rence point will be the outcome where they do not trade, so anything given up in the
potential trade will be considered a loss.
Another class of decision problems where loss aversion may not occur is when
one person is making decisions on behalf of a third party. Knetsch and Sinden
(1984) found an endowment effect using lotteries and money when people were
making decisions for themselves but not when they were advising others what to
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do in the same decision problem. Marshall et al. (1986) find more evidence that
WTA/WTP gaps occur when people are making decisions for themselves but the
gap is much smaller when people act as advisers to a third party. Furthermore, Arlen
et al. (2002) ran an experiment modelling an employee-employer relationship and
found the employee does not exhibit an endowment effect in this setup. The evidence
is not, however, universal. Birnbaum et al. (1992) conducted a survey based study
investigating how people value lotteries (not the effect of agency). Subjects were
asked to advise ’buyers’ and ’sellers’ how to price the lotteries. The study found
that the advised selling prices exceeded advised buying prices even though subjects
were acting as advisers.
There is also evidence that the type of good affects the degree of loss aversion.
Horowitz and McConnell (2002), reviewing the data from 45 WTA/WTP studies
conclude that “the farther a good is from being an ordinary private good, the higher
the ratio”. They find the WTA/WTP ratio is considerably higher for non-market
goods, public goods, and health and safety, than it is for private goods and lotteries.
1.7 The Discovered Preference Hypothesis
Does the behaviour of participants in the studies discussed actually reflect their pre-
ferences? Plott (1996) argues that rational behaviour emerges from a process of
reflecting, experience and practice. On this view, at least some of the behaviour
observed in experimental studies appears random and inconsistent with models of
preference because the participants have yet to fully appreciate what it is their best
interest to do. It is only when the choice problem is repeated with appropriate in-
centives and feedback that people develop stable strategies. Furthermore, it is only
when this has occurred and participants recognise and anticipate that other parti-
cipants in the decision problem are also rational that behaviour will reflect what
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economic theory predicts.
If Plott’s hypothesis is right, then we should expect anomalies for the standard
theory to go away when decision makers have had the chance to reflect, gain expe-
rience and practice. If this occurs, it should observable in the lab. The following
sections discuss evidence bearing on this. Further, note that even if Plott’s hypothe-
sis is right, it doe not mean anomalies for the standard theory are not economically
significant. Even if people do eventually discover their true preference, it does not
follow that they will have done so when they face economically important decisions.
1.8 Market Experience Gained in the Lab
Some of the evidence for a WTA/WTP gap and loss aversion comes from expe-
riments where subjects made one-off decisions in non market settings. If Plott’s
discovered preference hypothesis is right, we have reason to be skeptical of the re-
levance of the results of some studies. Binmore (1999) argues we should not expect
economic theory to predict behaviour in the laboratory unless (a) the problem sub-
jects face is not only reasonably simple in itself but also framed so that it seems
simple to the subjects, (b) incentives are adequate, and (c) the time allowed for trial
and adjustment is sufficient. On a similar note, Knez et al. (1985) responding to
early research on the WTA/WTP gap and other anomalies, write “we would urge
suspension of scientific judgement until this evidence has been further examined in
repetitive market-like environments.”
To address concerns such as the above, researchers have investigated WTA/WTP
in repeated market like environments. Table 1.4 summarises repeated experimental
market studies. In the majority of studies, the initial gap closes or reduces in repeated
markets. There are a number of exceptions, however.
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Table 1.4: Studies Reporting on the WTA/WTP Gap in Repeated Markets
Good(s) Mechanisma Trials Main Finding
Coursey et al. 1987 tasting a bitter liquid SPA 5-10 Gap reduces
Brookshire and Coursey 1987 trees in a public park LSA up to 5 Gap reduces
Harless 1989 6 resolved risky lotteries SPA 6 buying; 6 selling Small gap persists
Kahneman et al. 1990 induced value tokens TSM 1-3 No gap
pens, mugs, binoculars TSM 4-5 per good Gap persists
Singh 1991 unresolved risky lotteries DBA not reported Gap closes
Boyce et al. 1992 pine trees BDM 10 practise; 1 binding Gap persists
Shogren et al. 1994 chocolate and coffee mugs SPA 5 Gap closes
food safety SPA 20 Gap persists
Morrison 1997 coffee mugs TSM 5 Gap persists
chocolate bars TSM 5 No gap
List and Shogren 1999 chocolate bars SPA 4 Gap closes
food safety SPA 9-10 Gap reduces
Shogren et al. 2001 chocolate and coffee mugs BDM 10 Gap persists
chocolate and coffee mugs SPA 10 Gap closes
chocolate and coffee mugs RNA 10 Gap closes
Knetsch et al. 2001 coffee mugs SPA 6 Gap closes
coffee mugs NPA 6 Gap widens
Plott and Zeiler 2005 lotteries, mugs BDM 2 practise, 15 paid Gap closes
Loomes et al. 2003 2 unresolved risky lotteries MPA 6 Gap closes
Loomes et al. 2007 2 unresolved risky lotteries MPA 6 Gap closes
A risky lottery is one where the odds are know to experiment participants. A resolved lottery is resolved after each trial; an unresolved lottery is not resolved
until the end of the experiment.
a The abbreviations used here are defined on the note below table 1.2.
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1.9 Market Experience Gained in Naturally Occur-
ring Markets
An alternative way to study the effect of market experience on behavioural ano-
malies is recruiting experiment subjects with different levels of market experience
gained in naturally occurring markets and then comparing their behaviour. A po-
tential advantage of this approach is that it allows the effect of experience acquired
over a long time period to be investigated. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) suggest this
might be important for the following reason.
useful cognitive capital probably builds up slowly, over days of mental
fermentation or years of education rather than in the short-run of an
experiment (1-3 hours).
The effect of experience gained in naturally occurring markets on behaviour has
been investigated in three studies by John List. Two of the studies (List, 2003,
2004b) were run at a market places for (a) sports-cards and memorabilia and (b)
collector pins. The experiments involved trading unique pieces of memorabilia that
subjects would not have seen before. The main findings were that the magnitude
of the endowment effect decreases with the level of market experience and that the
most experienced traders did not exhibit an endowment effect while less experienced
ones did. Further, he found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that market
experience causes a reduction in the endowment effect rather than the alternative
that people with a disposition not to exhibit the endowment effect also tend to trade
more intensively and so have more market experience.
The third study (List, 2004a) was similar except that it involved trading every-
day consumer goods. This let him test whether experience of trading memorabilia
affected behaviour when trading everyday goods. One of the tests List ran was
a repetition of Knetsch’s chocolate and mugs exchange experiment with subjects
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recruited at the sports-card show instead of university students. Some of the sub-
jects were dealers (people who had rented a table to display their merchandise) and
some non dealers (regular attendees). The dealers typically had significantly more
experience of trading than non dealers. This allowed him to test whether market
experience eliminates the endowment effect in general. He found that among non
dealers, 77 percent of those endowed with the mug favoured the mug compared to
just 19 percent of those endowed with the chocolate. Among dealers, however, the
figures were 53 percent and 56 percent: the endowment effect was not observed.
The results followed the same pattern as List’s other studies: inexperienced traders
exhibited an endowment effect; experienced ones did not.
1.10 Heuristics
There is a large body of evidence that people use a number of simplifying heuristics
when making judgements and choices in the face of uncertainty.5 An illustrative
example (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) of a heuristic is judging distance based on
visual clarity. The more sharply an object is seen, the closer it appears to be. In
any given scene, the nearer objects are more sharp than the more distant ones, so
using the heuristic will produce reasonable estimates of distance. However, using
the heuristic will also produce predictable biases in judgements: distances will be
overestimated when visibility is poor because objects are seen blurred; distances will
be underestimated when visibility is good because objects are seen sharply. Tversky
and Kahneman argue that people use heuristics in a similar way when making jud-
gements in the face of uncertainty. They describe the following three heuristics
that explain some of the biases that are observed in the judgements people make
involving the likelihood of uncertain events. First, representativeness: people as-
5The collections edited by Kahneman et al. (1982) and Gilovich et al. (2002) provide overviews
and contain many of the key studies.
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sess the probability that object A belongs to class B based on the degree to which
A resembles B. For example, they will base their estimates of the likelihood that an
individual works as a librarian on the degree to which the individual corresponds
to the stereotypical librarian. Second, availability: people assess the frequency of a
class (or probability of an event) by the ease with which instances come to mind. For
example, one might assess the risk of heart attack by recalling occurrences among
ones acquaintances. Third, adjustment and anchoring: people make estimates by
adjusting an initial value and the adjustment is typically insufficient. For example,
in an experiment subjects were asked to guess whether the percentage of African
countries in the United Nations (N) was greater or less than X where X was a num-
ber between 1 and 100 determined by spinning a wheel of fortune, then they were
asked to estimate N. The estimates were not independent of X: instead, estimates of
N were higher when the wheel of fortune had produced higher values of X.
Studies investigating heuristics, such as representativeness, availability, adjust-
ment and anchoring, provide evidence that people take short cuts when making jud-
gements and choices. There is also some evidence that people use similar processes
when making WTA and WTP valuations. Braga and Starmer (2005) and Bateman
et al. (2005) argue that the observed WTA/WTP gaps may be a consequence of
people using a caution heuristic. Bateman et al. find evidence that a caution heu-
ristic in addition to loss aversion contributes to the WTA/WTP gap. The heuristic
is a tendency for people to overstate incoming valuations and understate outgoing
ones. An incoming valuation is where the subject states the minimum amount of a
good they are willing to receive (e.g. WTA); an outgoing one is where they state
the maximum amount they are willing to give up (e.g. WTP). In some environ-
ments, using this heuristic may be more advantageous than stating true valuations.
For instance, in bargaining over the price of a used car or negotiating a pay rise.
Furthermore, Heifetz and Segev (2004) argue such a heuristic may also be evolutio-
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nary viable. However, in experiments designed to make revealing true preferences
optimal, using the heuristic results in costly errors.
Another heuristic may also explain the evolution of WTA and WTP in repeated
markets. The convergence of WTA and WTP in many of the repeated market ex-
periments could be caused by subjects adjusting their bids towards observed market
prices. Loomes et al. (2003) call this effect shaping. This could explain the surpri-
sing result obtained by Knetsch et al. (2001). They found that the WTA/WTP gap
closed in repeated second price buying and selling Vickrey auctions but widened in
repeated ninth price Vickrey auctions. This results can be interpreted in terms of
shaping. When second price auctions are used, the buying price is drawn from the
top end of the distribution of bids (second highest) and the selling price from the
bottom end (second lowest). Accordingly, if subjects adjust their bids towards the
observed market price, they will tend to increase their bids in buying auctions but
decrease them in selling auctions. In contrast, when the ninth price versions of the
auctions are used with ten bidders, buying prices are drawn from the bottom end
of the distribution of bids and selling prices from the top end, so the reverse effect
occurs. Furthermore, in experiment designed to test for shaping, Loomes et al. find
further evidence that shaping effects do occur.
1.11 Summary
The literature to date establishes the following. (a) There is an endowment effect:
evidence comes from survey, experimental, and field studies. (b) The effect is not
uniform, it varies with the good used and class of decision problem. (c) The endow-
ment effect often but not always decays in repeated experimental markets. (d) People
with relatively intense market experience gained in naturally occurring markets tend
not to exhibit the endowment effect; people with less intense market experience do
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exhibit an endowment effect.
The following questions remain to be answered. (a) What aspects of the expe-
rience of repeated markets causes the decay in the WTA/WTP gap. (b) Why some
experience outside the lab causes people not to exhibit the endowment effect, and
why not everyone has this experience. (c) Why if experience of naturally occurring
markets can eliminate the endowment effect do we still observe the effect in some
field data.
1.12 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis presents three experimental studies that investigate how experience af-
fects loss aversion.
The second chapter reports an extended version of Knetsch’s exchange of goods
experiment to explore how different types of experience influence the endowment
effect. The experiment has four treatments, which compare the behaviour of subjects
with experience of consuming, owning, and choosing goods to a control group. The
results are consistent with earlier studies in that an endowment effect is observed;
however, the strength of the effect is less than in earlier studies and differs between
treatments. In particular, there is a significantly stronger endowment effect in the
treatments in which the endowment is acquired in two steps rather than one step.
The third chapter reports a repeated market experiment in which subjects buy
and sell lotteries under symmetric and asymmetric information. Buying and sel-
ling bids and prices are compared. A gap between buying and selling prices decays
under symmetric information but persists under asymmetric information. Further-
more, there are spillover effects. When the regime switches between symmetric and
asymmetric information, subjects do not immediately adjust their behaviour.
The fourth chapter reports another repeated market experiment in which subjects
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buy and sell lotteries. The information subjects receive about the lotteries’ odds and
whether the lottery gets resolved after each trial varies between treatments. Among
the findings is that the gap between buying and selling bids decays when lotteries
are not resolved each round but persists when they are.
The fifth and final chapter summarises the findings of the three experiments,
identifies common patterns, and concludes.
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Appendix A
Preference Reversals in Expected
Utility of Income Models
Cox and Sadiraj (2006) use the following utility function to show that an expec-
ted utility of income model can explain risk aversion over modest stakes without
implying absurd risk aversion over large stakes.
µ(y) =


0.9y+0.1 y < 1
y0.9 y≥ 1
(A.1)
where y is income (i.e. losses or gains in wealth). Figure A.1 shows a plot of the
utility function.
A.1 Reference Point Induced Preference Reversals
Imagine a person whose preferences are captured by the equation A.1 is given £200.
Then they are ask to choose between options A and B from table A.1. The sure
gain of £49 gives them a higher expected utility, so they choose A. What if instead
they had been given £400 and asked to choose between C and D? The risky option,
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Figure A.1: Cox-Sadiraj Expected Utility of Income Function
K100 K50 0 50 100
Utility (-)
Utility (+)
D, gives a higher expected utility, so they choose it. Notice, however, that option
A gives the same final wealth as C; B gives the same as D. Changing the reference
point from £200 to £400 has reversed their preference over the two outcomes defined
in terms of wealth.1
A.2 Reference-Dependent Valuations
Bateman et al. (1997) define four measures of value: willingness to accept (WTA),
willingness to pay (WTP), equivalent gain (EG), and equivalent loss (EL). They
argue that the standard theory while not predicting equality between WTA and WTP
does predict EG = WTA and EL = WTP. Bateman et al. write
If losses loom larger than gains, then, in the absence of income effects,
we should expect WTA ji to be greater than WTPji. EG ji, which ex-
presses an equivalence between gains on the two dimensions, and EL ji
1This example is a slight modification of one Kahneman and Tversky (1982) use. It shows how
the same decision problem can be framed in different ways and how different frames can lead people
to choose different options.
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Table A.1: The Effect of Framing on Decisions
Endowment Option Income Expected Utility Final Wealth
£200 A sure gain of £49 33.2 £249
£200 B 25% gain £200; 75% gain nothing 29.5 25% chance £400; 75% chance £200
£400 C sure loss of £151 −135.8 £249
£400 D 75% lose £200; 25% lose nothing −134.9 25% chance £400; 75% chance £200
The Expected Utility figures are calculated as ∑
n
i=1piµ(yi) where µ is the utility function in equation A.1 and the income yi and probability values
pi are whose specified in the Income column. Final Wealth is the sum of Endowment and Income.
Table A.2: How Lottery Valuations Depend on the Reference Point
WTA EL EG WTP
Equation
n
∑
i=1
piµ(WTA− yi) = µ(0)
n
∑
i=1
piµ(−yi) = µ(−EL)
n
∑
i=1
piµ(yi) = µ(EG)
n
∑
i=1
piµ(yi−WTP) = µ(0)
$-bet 478.2 323.0 268.7 189.3
P-bet 349.3 324.0 316.5 299.6
The $-bet is {1700, 0.19; 0, 0.81}; the P-bet, {0, 0.19; 400, 0.81}. The utility function µ is the one in equation A.1, n is the number of possible
outcomes (n = 2 for the $ and P bets), pi is the probability of the i
th outcome occurring and yi is the income from the outcome. The reported
figures are solutions to the equations for the relevant bet rounded to one decimal place. The values were calculated using the software package
Maple version 11.
2
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which expresses an equivalence between losses, should be expected to
take values intermediate betweenWTPji andWTA ji.
Table A.2 shows the result of using Cox and Sadiraj’s example utility of income
function to calculate the four measures for two lotteries. Notice that for both lotteries
(a) WTA exceeds WTP, (b) both EG 6=WTA and EL 6=WTP, and (c) the relative
size of the four measures fits the pattern predicted by loss aversion.
What are the consequences of the differences in valuations across the four mea-
sures? Imagine a variation of Knetsch’s (1989) chocolate and mugs experiment.
One group of subjects is given a $-bet and then asked if the want to swap it for an
amount of money, 400. Since for the $-bet, WTA > 400 they will refuse the trade.
But what if they had been endowed with 400 instead of the lottery, would they swap
it for the lottery? The WTP figure for the $-bet isWTP < 400 , so they would not
be willing to trade. We would observe an endowment effect.
A.3 Choice-Valuation Preference Reversals
Suppose the value of the P and $ bets in table A.2 are elicited as WTA valuations.
The figure for the $-bet is higher, suggesting the $-bet is preferred. Now suppose
the P and $ bets are offered in a straight choice, i.e. we have a choice between
gaining one or the other. From the table we see that EG figure is higher for the
P-bet suggesting that in a straight choice, the P-bet is preferred. The preference we
inferred from the WTA valuations is reversed.
A.4 Summary
Cox and Sadiraj (2006) argue that income and wealth can enter the utility function
used in Expected Utility Theory separately. I demonstrate that if they do enter se-
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parately, the resulting theory can predict preference reversals that are inconsistent
with standard rational model, therefore, Expected Utility of Income is not a model
of standard rational behaviour. But if under the standard model, income and wealth
can not enter the utility function separately, then Rabin’s critique applies and risk
aversion over modest stakes is an anomaly for the standard theory.
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Chapter 2
How Experience of Tasting, Choosing
and Owning Goods Influence the
Endowment Effect: The Crisps and
Lemonade Experiment
2.1 Introduction
The standard theory of preferences used in economics suggests there should be no
endowment effect. Thaler (1980) introduced the term ‘endowment effect’ to des-
cribe the tendency to under weigh opportunity costs relative to out of pocket costs.
It is so called because people seem to value a good more when it is incorporated
into their endowment. He illustrates the concept with several examples including
the following.
Mr. H mows his own lawn. His neighbour’s son would mow it for $8.
He wouldn’t mow his neighbour’s same-sized lawn for $20.
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In this example, the time Mr. H would gain (the opportunity cost) by not mowing
his own lawn is worth less to him than $8 (a potential out of pocket cost), but the
time he would lose (a potential out of pocket cost) if he mowed his neighbour’s lawn
is worth more to him than $20 (the opportunity cost). This phenomenon has been
repeatedly observed in experimental studies of choice and valuation (see chapter 1
for a summary of the studies). For example, Knetsch (1989) conducted an expe-
riment involving the exchange of goods. Subjects were endowed with either (a) a
coffee mug or (b) a bar of Swiss chocolate. Then they were asked if they wanted
to swap (a) for (b) or vice-versa. Regardless of whether they had been given (a) or
(b), they tended not to swap. It appears the loss of giving up an entitlement weighs
more heavily than the forgone gains of not obtaining an alternative entitlement. The
endowment effect has also been observed in valuation studies. People tend to assign
higher value to items when they own the items than when they do not. For example,
Bateman et al. (1997) elicited preferences between money and several consumption
goods using four valuation measures. The valuation figures they obtained suggested
losses carry more weight than gains. In both exchange of goods experiments and
valuation studies, the standard theory, as we will see in section 2.2.1, predicts there
will be no endowment effect.
At this stage, it might seem one has good reason to reject the standard theory.
Some studies, however, have suggested that the endowment effect may be a transient
phenomenon rather than a universal feature of choice and valuation. Plott and Zeiler
(2005) investigated the reported gap between ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘willingness
to accept’ valuations. They found that if certain controls (an incentive compatible
elicitation device, training, paid practice, and anonymity) were used together, then
a gap was not observed. Likewise, many of the other repeated market experiments
described in chapter 1 found that the endowment effect decayed in repeated markets.
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What is the significance of the apparent discrepancy between the findings des-
cribed above? First, the endowment effect and the related concept, loss-aversion
have been applied to problems in numerous branches of economics. For example,
Genesove and Mayer (2001) studied the Boston housing market in the 1990s and
found that loss aversion determines seller behaviour. Bowman et al. (1999) propose
a model of consumption and saving incorporating loss aversion and present empiri-
cal evidence from five countries that supports the novel predictions of their model. If
loss aversion only affects naive or inexperienced decision makers, there are clearly
implications for studies that explicitly invoke loss aversion such as the ones noted.
Second, the converse is also true. The status of loss aversion also has implications
for studies that invoke the assumptions of standard theory that are contradicted by
loss aversion. Third, there are also implications that are less obvious. Rabin (2000)
has forcefully argued that expected utility theory with any concave utility function
cannot provide a satisfactory empirical theory of choice under risk because calibra-
ting expected utility to what we know about risk aversion over modest stakes then
implies absurd degrees of risk aversion over larger stakes. If we accept Rabin’s
argument, we need an explanation of risk aversion over modest stakes and loss aver-
sion is a strong contender.1 The problem is that if loss aversion is eliminated by
experience, then we might expect risk aversion over modest stakes to disappear too.
If so, then there are implications for studies involving the concept of risk aversion.
Fourth, the status of the endowment effect also has policy implications such as as-
sessing the welfare implications of projects that have an environmental aspect, e.g.
1Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) could also explain risk aversion over small stakes.
Consider the option to play a 50-50 win £110, lose £100 gamble. Suppose that if you do not play the
gamble, you are not told what it would have paid out. If you play the gamble and win, you derive
utility from the extra £110 plus you gain pleasure from having made a decision that paid off (rejoice).
If you play the gamble and lose, you lose utility from giving up the £100 plus you lose utility due to
the feeling of regret following making a decision that made you worse off than you would otherwise
have been. If the potential regret outweighs the potential rejoice, you have potentially a reason to
turn down the gamble even if the utility loss from losing £100 is outweighed by the utility gain of
winning £110.
30
building a hydroelectric plant that will involve destruction of some natural habitat.
Contingent valuation studies, discussed in chapter 1, find that the value people as-
sign to environmental goods depends on whether they are paying for the good or
being compensated to give it up. If we understood how experience influences the
extent to which current entitlements affect preferences, then it may be possible to
develop elicitation procedures that minimise any biases caused by the endowment
effect.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Neoclassical Preferences
Neoclassical Theory (NT) predicts that when faced with the choice of whether or
not to swap one entitlement for another, a person picks the option that gives the best
outcome (the one that gives the highest utility). It is irrelevant which of the two
entitlements the person possessed when making the choice.
A swap decision can be modelled formally as follows2. There is a choice set
X = {x,y, ...}. Each item, x = (x1,x2) is a bundle of two goods. Bundle x comprises
x1 units of good 1 and x2 units of good 2, and x1,x2 ≥ 0. Preferences over X are
complete, reflexive, and transitive, and are captured by the utility function u : X 7−→
R (R is the set of real numbers). A theory of choice applied to a swap decision can
either (a) predict a person will swap, (b) predict they will stick with their endowment,
or (c) make no prediction. We can write the swap function for NT, fNT , that maps an
endowment e ∈ X and alternative entitlement a ∈ X to one of these three outcomes,
fNT : X×X 7→ {swaps, indeterminate, sticks}, as
2The same setup is used by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) to explain their model of loss aversion
in riskless choice
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fNT (e,a) =


swaps f or u(a) > u(e)
indeterminate f or u(a) = u(e)
sticks f or u(a) < u(e)
(2.1)
The equation says that a person swaps when the alternative allocation gives a
higher utility than the endowment.
2.2.2 Reference-Dependent Preferences
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Original Prospect Theory (OPT) was presented as
a theory of choice under risk not a theory of riskless choice, but it is significant be-
cause it was the first theory that formally incorporated loss aversion. What does OPT
predict will occur in the experiments described in the introduction? If it is changes
in welfare that determine decisions, then whether a person swaps one entitlement
for another surely depends on whether their welfare after swapping will be greater
than their welfare before. Hence, OPT appears to predict the same behaviour as NT.
In order to explain the endowment effect, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) pre-
sented an extended version of Prospect Theory with two (or more) dimensions of
value. This allows a potential swap to be modelled as a loss on the dimension of the
item being given up and a gain on the dimension of the item being received.
A simple way to model reference dependent preferences is as follows. Prefe-
rences over gains are captured by a utility function as they are under NT. Consider
the two good case described in section 2.2.1. There are three bundles of goods
x, e, a ∈ X which are illustrated in figure 2.1. A person endowed with allocation x
treats x as their reference point. Suppose they are then faced with a choice between
e and a. Both e and a offer more of good 1 and more of good 2 than bundle x, neither
option involves giving up goods relative to the reference point. Accordingly, they
choose the option that gives the highest utility. For instance, they will choose e if
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Figure 2.1: Modelling an Exchange as a Loss and a Gain
u(e) > u(a).
Now suppose they are endowed with e and have the option to swap their position
to a. Moving from e to a involves a loss on the dimension of good 2 represented
by e2− c2 and a gain in good 1 represented by a1− c1. Note, c ∈ X is the bundle
of goods that is common to endowment e and the alternative entitlement a. That
is, c = (min(a1,e1), min(a2,e2)). To model the choice, the swap is broken down
into two stages: giving up part of the endowment which causes a loss in utility and
gaining the alternative entitlement which causes a gain. The loss is u(e)−u(c) and
the gain is u(a)− u(c). The person swaps if λ (u(e)−u(c)) < u(a)− u(c). The
constant λ ≥ 1 is the coefficient of loss aversion3. It measures the weight assigned
to losses relative to gains when weighing options.
As done for NT, let fRDT be the swap function for Reference-Dependent Theory
(RDT) that maps an endowment e ∈ X and alternative entitlement a ∈ X to one
of three outcomes, fRDT : X ×X 7→ {swaps, indeterminate, sticks}. First, let κ be
3The coefficient of loss aversion is related to the steepness of the value function for losses relative
to gains. Appendix D shows how under original prospect theory loss aversion follows from aversion
to 50-50 bets and its implications.
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gain/loss ratio of utilities, i.e.
κ =
u(a)−u(c)
u(e)−u(c)
(2.2)
then the swap function is
fRDT (e,a) =


swaps κ > λ
indeterminate κ = λ
sticks κ < λ
(2.3)
The equation says that a person swaps when the gain/loss ratio exceeds the co-
efficient of loss aversion. NT is the special case where λ = 1.
2.3 The Experiment
2.3.1 Motivation
The experiments carried out by List (2004a), discussed in chapter 1, and Plott and
Zeiler (2005) suggest experience plays some role in determining whether an endow-
ment effect is observed. These studies do not, however, reveal what aspect or aspects
of experiences matter. The following design aims to address this question. The de-
sign is similar to Knetsch’s (1989) mugs and chocolate experiment in that subjects
are randomly given one of two allocations, then have the option to swap. The no-
vel features of the design is that the subjects are given different types of experience
(consuming, owning, and choosing goods) before the random allocation, and that
bundles of goods rather than single units of goods are used (the motivation for using
bundles is explained below).
Why might these types of experience matter? First, consider experience of
consuming. Suppose that the endowment effect arises when people are uncertain
about the nature of goods. As a rule of thumb, don’t trade items when you don’t
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know their value could be a good defence against being exploited by better informed
traders. Experience of consuming the goods gives you a better idea of their value
and, all else equal, could lead to higher trading rates. In addition, consuming the
goods might reveal that one of them was better or worse than expected, increasing
the likelihood of that good being favoured in spite of an endowment effect. Conver-
sely, consuming might reveal that the difference in attractiveness between the goods
was in fact less than expected, thus decreasing trading rates when combined with
an endowment effect.4 Finally, the act of consuming could cause a person to decide
which of two items they prefer. This could reduce the endowment effect if when
faced with a swap decision they recall what they preferred before the endowment
occurred.
Second, if you have already chosen between two items before being endowed
with one of them, it is plausible that you could avoid the influence of the endow-
ment effect by recalling your earlier choice, so experience of choosing would in-
crease trading. In addition, if you have made a choice between two particular goods
before, you might feel a psychological commitment to this prior choice, lessening
the influence of the endowment effect. In the psychology literature, there are many
studies investigating cognitive dissonance. The theory was developed by Festinger
(1957). The first experimental study that found evidence5 of the effect was run by
Brehm (1956), who summarises the theory as follows. After making a choice, a per-
son has consonant cognitive items (e.g. items of information) that favour the chosen
alternative and dissonant ones that favour the unchosen alternative. All else equal,
the greater the number of dissonant items (i.e. the greater the relative attractive-
4Coursey et al. (1987) ran an experiment investigating the WTA/WTP gap. For a commodity,
they used a bitter tasting liquid, sucrose octa-acetate (SOA). Subjects either paid to avoid or were
compensated for holding a one ounce cup of SOA in the mouth for 20 seconds. Subjects stated
valuations before and after tasting a small sample. The WTA/WTP gap widened after subjects tasted
the sample.
5Chen (2008) has recently questioned the methodology used by Brehm (1956) and many later
studies. He argues the methodology involves a mistake equivalent to the one people commonly make
in the three-door (or Monty- Hall) problem.
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ness of the unchosen item), the greater the level of dissonance a person experiences.
When dissonance exists, a person will attempt to reduce or eliminate it. They do
this by making the chosen alternative more desirable and the unchosen one less de-
sirable than before the choice. Furthermore, Brehm suggests the dissonance, and so
attempts to reduce it, will be greater the closer the alternative choices are to being
equally desirable.
If dissonance effects do occur, then a natural question is whether it is the act of
choosing which triggers the effects or whether the possibility of another outcome
occurring triggers them. That is, if a person is assigned one of two goods at random
and they know it was a random process that determined the assignment, will it create
the same dissonance effects as would have occurred if they had chosen one of the
two goods?
2.3.2 Design
The experiment6 is a modified version of Knetsch’s (1989) classic exchange of
goods experiment. Instead of using chocolate bars and coffee mugs, two edible
goods a and b of approximately equal value were used. Subjects were randomly
divided into four groups: a control group, tasters, choosers, and owners. All of the
treatments had the following basic structure consisting of three stages. In the first
stage, subjects (except those in the control group) gained different types of expe-
rience. In some treatments subjects gained a unit of one of the goods in this stage,
in other treatments they did not. In the second stage, the subjects received a random
endowment. If they had not received anything in stage one, they received aab7 or
6A version of the design described here was first used in a smaller experiment (Lindsay, 2004).
The experiment had two treatments, which correspond to the choosers and control group. Chocolate
bars and cans of coke were used as the two goods. There were 63 subjects: 33 in the control group
and 30 in the choosers group. In the control group the swap rate was 0.30; in the choosers group it
was 0.47. The endowment effect was statistically significant in the control group (p = 0.02) but not
in the choosers group.
7aab denotes two units of good a and one unit of good b.
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abb with equal probability. If they had received a unit of good a in stage one, they
received ab or bb with equal probability in addition to what they already had. If they
had received a unit of good b in stage one, they received aa or ab with equal pro-
bability in addition to what they already had. As a consequence, in all treatments,
subjects ended stage two either holding aab or abb. Furthermore, which of the two
positions they held was independent of which of the two goods, if any, they had ob-
tained in stage one. Finally, in stage three, those holding aab had the option to swap
to holding abb; those holding abb had the option to swap to aab. The differences
between treatments are described below with reference to figure 2.2.
Control Group The control treatment followed the left hand tree on figure 2.2.
They did not do anything in the experience stage (stage one) so began the
experiment at the node labelled R. They were randomly endowed with either
aab or abb (stage two). This took them to one of the nodes labelled P. Then
they had the option to swap the goods they were holding for the alternative
(stage three). That is swap aab for abb or swap abb for aab. At the end of the
experiment, their final allocation of goods was either aab or abb depending on
the choice they made at stage three.
Tasters The tasters treatment also followed the left hand tree on figure 2.2. In stage
one, at the point marked x the subjects tasted a small sample of the two goods.
Then they followed the same sequence as the control group: they received
a random endowment (stage two) and then had the option to swap it for the
alternative (stage three).
Choosers The choosers treatment followed the right hand tree on figure 2.2. In
stage one, at the node labelled y they made a choice between one unit of good
a and one unit of b. They received the good they chose, taking them to one
of the nodes labelled R. Note, at the moment subjects made the choice they
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knew the item they were choosing would be theirs to keep but they did not
know what was going to happen in the following stages. In stage two they
received a random endowment, which topped up the allocation of goods they
held at the end of stage one to either aab or abb. If they had chosen a in stage
one, their allocation was topped up with either ab or bb. If they had chosen b
in stage one, their allocation was topped up with either ab or aa. As a result,
at the end of stage two, they either held aab or abb. Finally, as with the other
treatments, they had the option to swap the goods they were holding for the
alternative (stage three).
Owners The owners treatment also followed the right hand tree on figure 2.2. The
treatment was the same as the choosers treatment except for the following
feature. In stage one, at the node labelled y instead of making a choice between
one unit of good a and one unit of b, they were randomly assigned either one
unit of good a and one unit of b. They received the good they were assigned,
taking them to one of the nodes labelled R, and proceeded following the same
scheme as the choosers.
For all treatments, the goods a subject holds when they make the decision to stick
or swap is independent of what happened in the first stage. The right hand inverted
tree shows the scheme for the choosers and owners. They acquire their endowment
in two steps in contrast to the tasters and control group who acquire it in one step.
Although the choosers and owners acquire the endowment in two steps, when they
are faced with the swap or stick decision, they are choosing between the same two
final allocations as the subjects in the one-step treatments. What is more, even in the
two step treatments, whether the subject has aab or abb when they are faced with
the stick or swap decision is solely determined by the output of the random device.
That is, their endowment after the second step is independent of what happened
in the first step. This feature of the design is made possible by using bundles of
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Figure 2.2: One-Step and Two-Step Treatments
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goods and is desirable for two reasons. First, it means that NT and RDT predict
different swap rates. This is because when the endowment is assigned at random,
NT predicts 50 percent will swap and RDT predicts less than 50 percent will do so
(this is explained in more detail below). Second, it allows meaningful comparisons
between treatments. The difference between the owners and choosers occurs at the
first node, marked y. For the owners, the random device determines whether they
receive a unit of a or b; for the choosers, the subject chooses a unit of a or b. The
difference between the control group and the tasters occurs at the point marked x on
the left hand tree. The control group do nothing; the tasters taste a sample of both
goods.
These four treatments allow several comparisons. Comparing the swap rates
for the tasters and control group will give a sharp test of whether experience of
consuming (tasting) influences the endowment effect. Comparing the swap rates for
the owners and choosers will give a sharp test of whether experience of choosing
rather than merely owning influences the endowment effect.
What do the two theories predict? Under NT, preferences are independent of
the random endowment. Let the proportion of subjects preferring abb to aab be
q ∈ [0,1]. The probability of being endowed with abb is 12 . The proportion of
subjects whose endowment is their preferred entitlement consists of those who prefer
abb and received abb plus those who prefer aab and received aab. Assuming none
of the subjects are indifferent between abb and aab, then the proportion who prefer
aab to abb will be 1−q.
Proportion swapping = 1−
1
2
q−
1
2
(1−q)
=
1
2
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This means that 50 percent will not receive their preferred entitlement, so we
would expect a swap rate of 50 percent. None of the differences between treatments
should affect the swap rate. Note, that experience of consuming might change the
value of q, since subjects expectation of the taste of the goods might be inaccurate;
however, the swap rate is independent of q, so experience of consuming should have
no effect on the swap rate.
Under RDT things are slightly more complex. Recall from section 2.2.2 that a
subject endowed with abb will swap if κ > λ . Conversely a subject endowed with
aab will swap if 1κ <
1
λ
. Hence, the proportion swapping will be
Proportion swapping = Pr(κ > λ ).Pr(abb)+Pr(
1
κ
<
1
λ
).Pr(aab)
=
1
2
[
Pr(κ > λ )+Pr(
1
κ
<
1
λ
)
]
If we assume κ is the same for all subjects, then the swap rate will be zero if
1
λ
< κ < λ and 12 if
1
λ
> κ or κ > λ . Now let us assume κ varies between subjects
and is distributed with mean µ and variance σ2 according to a distribution whose
density function is f (·) and whose distribution function is F(·).
Pr(
1
λ
< κ < λ ) = F(λ )−F(
1
λ
)
Proportion swapping =
1
2
[
1−F(λ )+F(
1
λ
)
]
If λ > 1, then 1−F(λ )+F( 1
λ
) < 1. It follows that the swap rate under RDT
will be less than 12 . Further, it follows that factors that affect µ and σ
2 can influence
the swap rate even when λ is constant. So RDT does not rule out experience of
consuming influencing the swap rate if the experience alters µ and σ2. It is plausible
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that the relative attractiveness of the two goods would change following tasting them.
Hence tasting could alter the swap rate.
2.3.3 Experimental Procedure
Subjects were recruited by email from a database of pre-registered volunteers from
the University of Nottingham student population. A total of 210 subjects took part
in the experiment. The two goods used were premium organic vegetable crisps
(100g packets) and handmade organic lemonade (75cl bottles). A photograph of
the crisps and lemonade is in appendix F. The unit retail price for both items was
approximately £2. The advantages of this pair of goods are as follows. (a) They are
edible, so can be tasted. (b) They were bought from specialist wholesalers and were
not available in local supermarkets, so most subjects are unlikely to have tasted
them before, so letting one group taste them will produce a real difference in the
experience of the goods between the subjects. (c) Since they were not available
in local supermarkets, this meant subjects were also uncertain of the retail price.
Furthermore, (d) subjects are unlikely to be intending to purchase either of the goods
in the near future, making them unlikely to view gains in either of the goods as
merely money saved.
As well as recording each subject’s treatment, endowment and swap decision,
some survey data was collected. Basic demographic information was collected bet-
ween the experience stage and the stage where the random endowment was assigned
or (in the case of choosers and owners) when the endowment was topped up. This
serves two purposes, first, it is of interest whether different demographic groups be-
have differently. There is already some evidence that demographics matter for risk
aversion8, maybe the same is true for loss aversion. Second, it allows the owners
and choosers to hold the first part of their endowment for a period of time before
8For example Dohmen et al. (2005) find heterogeneity in individual risk attitudes and that willin-
gness to take risks is negatively correlated with age and being female.
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they receive additional items. After subjects received their random endowment they
completed an attitude to risk survey. Again, this served two purposes, first to let
them keep the items they had been given for a period before they decided whether
or not to swap. Second, it was used to collect additional data.
The attitude to risk survey aimed to assess subject’s attitude to risk by asking
them to indicate whether they would accept or reject a series of hypothetical9 bets
and to specify the size of the prize that would be sufficient to tempt them to play ano-
ther series of bets. The motivation for this task is that, as noted in section 2.1 above,
Rabin (2000) has argued that risk aversion over modest stakes may be explained by
loss aversion. If this is true and loss aversion also explains the endowment effect,
then we might expect risk aversion and a propensity to exhibit the endowment effect
to be positively correlated.
At the end of the experiment the subjects completed a debrief survey. Here,
among other things, they were ask to specify a hypothetical willingness to pay figure
for one of the goods. This is used to shed light on whether tasting affects how
subjects value the two goods.
Subjects were invited to come at 5 minute intervals so there was a stream of
subjects who completed the experiment one at a time. The experiment was run by
two people: experimenter A and experimenter B.
The experiment was run in a room divided in to 3 areas in such a way that those in
one area could not see what people in other areas were doing. Upon arrival subjects
were instructed to take a seat in Area 1 and read through a set of paper instructions
for the experiment (Appendix C.1). The stages completed by subjects in each of
the treatments are shown in table 2.1. Experimenter A called subjects one-at-a-time
into Area 2 and assigned the subject at random to one of the four groups, then ran
9Given that the survey involves hypothetical payments, the results should be treated with some
caution. Subjects might behave differently when facing real and hypothetical payments. For instance,
Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) have found that there is no significant effect on the level of risk aversion
from increasing the stakes when payments are hypothetical but there is when payments are real.
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through stages 1.a to 2.b of the experiment (the script is in Appendix B.1). The
demographic survey and the two attitude to risk surveys are shown in Appendices
C.2, C.4, and C.3. After they had completed the attitude to risk surveys, the subject
carried their goods to area 3. Here, experimenter B ran through stages 3.a to 3.c of
the experiment with the subject. The option to swap was framed as follows. The
experimenter read one of the statements depending on which combination of goods
the subject possessed.
i You have two packets of crisps and one bottle of lemonade. If you want,
you can swap one of your packets of crisps for a bottle of lemonade.
ii You have two bottles of lemonade and one packet of crisps. If you want,
you can swap one of your bottles of lemonade for a packet of crisps.
The experimenter swapped the item if the subject wished to swap. The experimenter
recorded the swap decision, then asked the subject to complete the debrief survey
and receipt form. The debrief survey is shown in appendix C.5. Finally the experi-
menter gave the subject a plastic bag to carry their items. The plastic bags reduced
the risk of other subjects seeing what the subject leaving the experiment had been
given.
2.4 Primary Results
This section analyses the choices the 210 subjects made. A summary of the par-
ticipant’s demographics and further analysis of the survey responses is in section
2.6.
2.4.1 Pooled across Treatments
Result 2.1 Across the four treatments subjects tended to stick with their endowment.
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Table 2.1: The Procedure for Each of the Treatments
Stage Treatments
1-Step 2-Step
Control Taster Owners Choosers
1.a Taste items Allocated item Choose item
.b Complete demographics survey
2.a Allocated items Allocation topped-up
.b Complete attitude to risk surveys
3.a Given option to swap
.b Complete debrief survey
.c Complete receipt
The table shows the different steps completed by subjects in each of the four
treatments.
Table 2.2: Endowment Against Final Allocation for Pooled
Data
Final Allocation
Lemonade Rich Crisps Rich Total
Endowment
Lemonade Rich 73 37 110
Crisps Rich 40 60 100
Total 113 97 210
Lemonade Rich means two bottles of lemonade and one packet of crisps.
Crisps Rich means two packets of crisps and one bottle of lemonade. En-
dowment is what the subject held before deciding whether or not to swap.
Final Allocation is what they held after the decision.
Support. Table 2.2 shows what subjects were endowed with and their final alloca-
tion at the end of the experiment. We can see that the majority of subjects endowed
with lemonade 73110 stuck with lemonade whereas the majority endowed with crisps
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100 stuck with crisps. Running a 1-sided Fisher’s Exact test gives a p-value of less
than 0.001 of obtaining these results were final allocation independent of endow-
ment. NT predicts that endowment and final allocation will be independent whereas
RDT predicts that subjects will tend to stick with their endowment. This is strong
evidence in favour of some variant of RDT over NT.
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2.4.2 Comparisons between Treatments
RDT does not predict that there will be differences between treatments, but allows
experience of consuming to alter the swap rate. Table 2.3 shows the swap rates
broken down by treatment.
Result 2.2 There was little or no endowment effect in the control group.
Support. Table 2.3 shows the swap rate for the control group was 0.42 and that this
is not statistically different from 0.5, the swap rate predicted by the standard theory.
Result 2.3 Subjects who acquired their endowment in two steps are considerably
less likely to swap than those who acquired it in one step.
Support. Table 2.3 shows that the swap rate for treatments in which subjects acqui-
red their endowment in one step is 0.44 compared to 0.29 for treatments where the
endowment was acquired in two steps. This means that acquiring the endowment
in one step made subjects (0.440.28 − 1)× 100 = 57% more likely to trade. Table 2.4
shows the difference in trading is statistically significant.
Result 2.4 There is no evidence of tasting influencing swap rates.
Support. The swap rate for the control group is 0.42 compared to 0.46 for the tas-
ters. The size of the difference is small and is not statistically significant.
Result 2.5 There is evidence that experience of choosing between goods decreases
the endowment effect relative to experience of owning.
Support. The swap rate for the owners is 0.23 compared to 0.35 for the choosers.
This means that experience of choosing between the goods made subjects (0.350.23 −
1)×100= 52% more likely to trade. Table 2.4 reveals, however, that this difference
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Table 2.3: Swap Rate by Treatment
Treatment n Swaps Swap Rate P-Value for Fisher’s Exact Test
1-step Control 50 21 0.42 0.198
Taster 56 26 0.46 0.418
Total 106 47 0.44 0.170
2-step Owner 52 12 0.23 0.000
Chooser 52 18 0.35 0.029
Total 104 30 0.29 0.000
All 210 77 0.37 0.000
P-values are from testing the null hypothesis that endowment and final allocations are independent
against the one sided alternative that subjects tend not to swap.
Table 2.4: Testing Hypotheses about Differences
in Swap Rates between Treatments
H0 H1 P-Value
Scontrol = STaster Scontrol < STaster 0.397
SOwner = SChooser SOwner < SChooser 0.140
S1−Step = S2−Step S1−Step 6= S2−Step 0.022
S1−Step = S2−Step S1−Step > S2−Step 0.014
is not statistically significant.10 The higher swap rate among the choosers relative
to the owners could be explained in terms of cognitive dissonance as discussed in
section 2.3.1. However, an explanation of why the choosers’ swap rate is less than
the ones in both the tasters treatment and the control group is needed.
2.4.3 Comparisons within Treatments
Why are the swap rates for the two step treatments lower? One explanation is that
subjects have held part of their endowment for a longer period of time. Perhaps the
longer someone has possessed an item the more attached to it they become. If this is
true, we would expect that subjects from the owners group who were initially given
10The comparison between the owners and choosers is based on 104 observations while the com-
parison (above) between the one and two step treatments is based on all 210 observations. If the
trading rates of the choosers and owners were observed in a sample of 210 observations they would
be statistically significant.
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Table 2.5: Order in which Items Were Acquired and Swap
Rates for the Owners Treatment.
Endowment Sequence n Swaps Swap Rate
ccl c + cl 12 5 41.7
l +cc 14 1 7.1
either 26 6 23.1
cll c + ll 17 4 23.5
l + cl 9 2 22.2
either 26 6 23.1
all 52 12 23.1
An endowment of ccl means an endowment of two packets of crisps(c)
and one bottle of lemonade(l).
A sequence of c + cl means the subject got a packet of crisps in the
first step and then was given an additional packet of crisps and bottle
of lemonade in the second step.
c11 and then had their endowment topped-up to ccl would be less likely to swap to
cll than those who were given l and then topped up to ccl.
Result 2.6 When the endowment was acquired in two steps, the order in which the
goods were acquired does not appear to influence the swap rate.
Support. Table 2.5 shows swap rates against the order in which items were acquired
for the owners treatment. Although it appears that sequence may influence swap
rate, the variations in swap rate are not statistically significant (a χ2 test gives a p-
value of 0.188 of obtaining these results under the null hypothesis that swap rate is
independent of sequence). Hence on the balance of evidence, it appears that it is the
acquiring the endowment in several steps, not what is involved in these steps that
causes the lower swap rates in the two-step treatments. There are, however, only
on average 524 = 13 observations per sequence, so the result should be treated as
tentative.
11c = crisps, l = lemonade
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2.4.4 Comparisons with Other Studies
Result 2.7 Swap rates were much higher than in earlier studies.
Support. In this study the swap rate in the control group was 2150 = 0.42 compared
to just 10163 = 0.10 in Knetsch’s study.
What explains the high swap rate? There are several possible explanations. First,
the most obvious difference between the studies is that Knetsch endowed subjects
with one unit of a good whereas I endowed subjects with a bundles of goods. In
Knetsch’s study, subjects were swapping their only mug or only chocolate bar; in
this study, subjects were swapping one of their two packets of crisps or one of their
two bottles of lemonade. This suggests loss aversion may be more acute when one
is faced with giving up the last unit of a good than when faced with giving up one
of several units. Note that if this interpretation is right, it is somewhat surprising
since Prospect Theory, where the concept of loss aversion has its origin, suggests
that ‘the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states’
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Second, in this study when subjects swapped, they were gaining an additional
unit of a good they already possessed. Perhaps subjects valued the item they were
gaining more because they already owned one just like it.
Third, how the subjects were recruited differed between studies. In Knetsch’s
study, subjects were students attending a class. In this study, subjects were students
who had registered themselves in a database of people interested in taking part in
paid economics experiments, then they had accepted an email invitation to take part
in the experiment. The differences in recruitment method could affect behaviour in
two ways. First, the type of people who volunteer to take part in experiments and
those who attended Knetsch’s class might have different behavioural characteristics.
Second, the different recruitment methods could create different expectations among
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subjects, which in turn might influence behaviour.
Fourth, in this study, there were two experimenters. The first experimenter en-
dowed the subjects with the goods, then the subject carried the goods to the second
experimenter, who was separated from the first experimenter by a screen. Perhaps
reluctance to exchange is in part driven by a reluctance of subjects to return what
they have been given, but this reluctance is reduced by moving to a different location
and dealing with a different person. Note that Plott and Zeiler (2005) suggest that
anonymity is one of the set of controls that together cause the endowment effect not
to occur.
Result 2.8 The swap rate in the control group exceeded that in the choosers group,
the reverse of the pattern found by Lindsay 2004.
Support. In this study, 2150 ≈ 0.42 of the control group swapped; in the earlier study,
10
33 ≈ 0.30 of the control group swapped. In this study,
18
52 ≈ 0.35 of the choosers
group swapped; in the earlier study, 1430 ≈ 0.47 of the choosers group swapped. The
difference in the control group swap rates between studies is not statistically signifi-
cant. The difference in chooser group swap rates, however, is statistically significant.
What could account for these differences between the studies? Differing experi-
mental procedures is one explanation. In this study, subjects in the chooser group
made their choice of goods in the presence of one experimenter and later decided
whether or not to swap in the presence of another experimenter. In the earlier study,
both decisions were made in the presence of the same experimenter. Perhaps in
the earlier study, subjects did not want to be seen to make inconsistent choices (e.g.
choose a can of coke but then decline to swap if their endowment is topped up to one
can of coke and two chocolate bars). In this study however, similar inconsistency
in choices would not be apparent to the experimenter recording the swap decision
since a different experimenter observed the earlier choice.
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2.5 Interpretation
2.5.1 The Two-System Hypothesis (TSH)
Imagine a subject faced with deciding whether to swap a bottle of lemonade for
a packet of crisps. There are at least two ways they could approach the decision.
First, they could ask themselves whether the pain from giving up the lemonade will
be made up for by the pleasure of gaining the crisps. Second, they could assess
various aspects of the two goods and ask themselves which is better? E.g. which
will be easier to carry home? Which is better for my health? Etc. There is some
grounding in the recent literature that decisions are not always made in the same
way. For instance, Kahneman (2003) distinguishes between two modes of thinking
and deciding: intuition (System 1) and reasoning (System 2).
The operations of System 1 are fast, automatic, effortless, associative,
and difficult to control or modify. The operations of System 2 are slo-
wer, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively
flexible and potentially rule-governed. . . . the operating characteristics
of System 1 are similar to the features of perceptual processes. On the
other hand . . .the operations of System 1, like those of System 2, are
not restricted to the processing of current stimulation. Intuitive judge-
ments deal with concepts as well as with percepts, and can be evoked
by language.
Suppose the endowment effect occurs when subjects use system 1 but not when they
use system 2. Further, suppose we can influence which of the two systems a subject
uses when deciding whether or not to swap in an experiment. It follows that if
we influence subjects differently in each treatment, then we could observe different
swap rates in each treatment. Once again, we can define a swap function, this time
fts : X
2,S 7→ {swaps, indeterminate, sticks} such that
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fts(e,a,s) =


swaps f or κ > v
indeterminate f or κ = v
sticks f or κ < v
where S = {System 1, System 2} and s ∈ S, and
v =


λ f or s = System 1
1 f or s = System 2
How might the different experimental treatments influence which system sub-
jects use? Perhaps it is by changing the relative accessibility of the two systems.
Kahneman (2003) writes:
The core idea of prospect theory is that changes and differences are
much more accessible than absolute levels of stimulation.
The quote suggests that if we could reduce the accessibility of changes relative to
outcomes, we could change how subjects make decisions. Perhaps using bundles
of goods rather than single items made subjects more likely to think in terms of
outcomes than changes. Likewise, perhaps acquiring an endowment in two steps fo-
cused subjects on their endowment and its composition more than if it were acquired
in one step, hence making them more likely to view the swap decision in terms of
changes than outcomes.
2.5.2 Varying Loss Aversion
Alternatively, we may view the imagined subject’s decision as restricted to weighing
the pain of the loss against the pleasure of the gain, but allow the intensity of the pain
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to vary. This could be modelled as λ varying across decision problems. Recall from
section 2.2.2 that the swap rate was given by 12
[
1−F(λ )+F( 1
λ
)
]
. The differences
in swap rates between treatments and studies could be explained by differences in
experimental procedures affecting the value of λ .
2.5.3 Varying Reference Point
Another explanation for the differences between treatments is that subjects might not
always take their current endowment as the reference point. Suppose subjects have
reference dependent preferences, but on being endowed with items in the experiment
update their reference point to include the items with probability p. The swap rate
will be 12
[
1−F(λ )+F( 1
λ
)
]
when they update their reference point and 12 when they
do not. Hence, the swap rate will be p.12
[
1−F(λ )+F( 1
λ
)
]
+(1− p).12 . Notice that
the swap rate is a decreasing function of p. A possible explanation of the lower swap
rate among those who acquired their endowment in two steps is that they were more
likely to update their reference point to their new endowment and hence less likely
to swap.
2.6 Secondary Results
The incentivised choices presented in the previous section are the main focus of this
chapter. In addition to making choices subjects also completed a number of surveys,
the results of which are reported in this section. The analysis of survey responses
is more exploratory in nature. Nevertheless, subjects’ responses to the attitude to
risk and debrief surveys provide some illuminating insights. Furthermore, survey
responses can predict some of the incentivised behaviour.
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Table 2.6: Participants’ Fields of Study
Faculty Frequency
Arts 45
Engineering 13
Law and Social Science 64
Medicine & Health Sciences 36
Natural Sciences 39
Business School 13
The data are from the demographics survey, which is
in appendix C.2.
Table 2.7: Subject’s Attitudes at the End of the Experiment
Agree Disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Was enjoyable 34 78 65 22 5 3 2
Compensation Sufficient 50 64 47 21 11 15 1
The data are from the debrief survey, which is in appendix C.5.
2.6.1 Subjects
The demographics survey (appendix C.2) recorded subject’s characteristics. There
were 210 subjects: 52.9 percent were female, 49.1 percent had taken part in experi-
ments before, and their ages ranged from 19 to 26 with a mean of 19.7. They studied
courses in a range of fields as shown in table 2.6. The distance from each subject’s
home address to the building where the experiment took place was calculated using
the address subjects supplied. The values ranged from 0.06 to 11 miles with a mean
of 1.1 miles.12
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to indicate whether they en-
joyed taking part and whether they felt the compensation was sufficient. The answers
they gave are shown in table 2.7.
12The bottles of lemonade were significantly heavier than the packets of crisps, so the distance the
subject had to carry to goods could be a factor influencing their choice.
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Table 2.8: Percentile Figures for the Coefficient of Loss
Aversion
Loss n λ at Percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
£100 209 1.20 1.50 2.00 3.00 10.00
£240 209 1.25 1.33 2.00 2.92 8.33
£580 208 1.12 1.34 1.72 3.10 9.48
£1,400 202 1.29 1.43 2.14 3.57 10.71
£3,300 200 1.21 1.51 2.02 3.64 12.12
£7,900 196 1.14 1.52 2.03 3.67 12.66
£19,000 190 1.32 1.58 2.63 5.26 26.32
The value of λ were calculated using responses to the attitude to risk
survey in appendix C.3. Subjects were faced by a series of 50-50 lose
X/win Y bets. Values of X were as shown in the Loss column of the
table. Subjects reported the lowest value of Y where they would still be
willing to play the bet. Some subjects indicated that they would not play
some of the bets whatever the value of Y. This explains why the number
of observations, n, varies and is less than the number of participants in
the experiment.
2.6.2 Attitude to Losses and Gains under Risk
The first attitude to risk survey (the form that subjects completed is in appendix C.3)
aimed to estimate a coefficient of loss aversion, λ . The coefficient measures the
extent to which losses loom larger than gains. Subjects were shown a series of 50/50
lose X/win Y bets with the win figure, Y, left blank. They were asked to specify the
minimum value for Y where they would still be willing to play the bet.
Result 2.9 The median coefficients of loss aversion estimated from subjects’ res-
ponses to the attitude to risk survey ranged from 1.7 to 2.6.
Support. Subjects’ responses are summarised in table 2.8. The distributions of
responses featured considerable skewness, ranging from 9.2 to 12.9, and kurtosis,
ranging from 94 to 176, making values of the means and variance hard to interpret.
For this reason, percentile figures are reported.
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Result 2.10 Subjects who swapped goods were also less loss averse when faced
with 50-50 win/lose bets.
Support. We are confronted by several problems. First, how to combine the ans-
wers to the various questions into a single measure of loss aversion. Second, how to
deal with subjects who indicated that they would not play some of the bets whatever
the win figure without discarding data. Third, how to prevent outliers distorting the
results given that the distributions of responses feature heavy skewness and kurtosis.
I ranked the answers for each of the seven 50/50 lose X/win Y bets according to the
figure specified for Y. Answers indicating the bet would be rejected however large Y
were assigned the highest rank. Then I constructed an overall rank by summing the
rank values for the seven answers. The higher the rank value of a subject, the more
loss averse they are. I ran a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test comparing the
rank of subjects who swapped to those who did not. It indicated that subjects who
swapped had lower ranks than those who did not. That is, on average, those who
swapped were less loss averse than those who did not. The p-value for obtaining the
result under the null hypothesis of no difference in ranks is 0.092. The magnitude of
the difference in loss aversion between those who swapped and those who did not is
relatively small. For example, the median value of λ calculated from responses to
the 50/50 lose £580/win Y question was 1.72 for those who swapped and 1.90 for
those who did not.
Result 2.11 Subjects’ attitudes to risk cannot be explained by an expected utility of
wealth model with diminishing marginal utility.
Support. See appendix E.2
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Table 2.9: Swap Decisions and the Ratio of Valuations (κ)
1
λ
≤ κ ≤ λ 1
λ
> κ or κ > λ All
Sticks 88 45 133
Swaps 36 41 77
All 124 86 210
2.6.3 Predicting Swap Rates
Result 2.12 Subjects’ answers to the surveys can predict whether the subject swap-
ped.
Support. We can use theWTP figures from the debrief survey and λ figure from the
risk survey to predict swaps. Recall from section 2.2.2 that RDT predicts the swap
rate will be zero if 1
λ
< κ < λ and 12 if
1
λ
> κ or κ > λ . NT predicts that the swap
rate will be 12 for all values of κ . In order to test these predictions, a value of κ for
each subject was calculated. This was done using the WTP figure they specified in
the debrief survey and estimating the WTP figure for the other good using the model
described in appendix E.2. It is assumed that the ratio of WTP figures approximates
κ , which in fact is a ratio of utility values. Table 2.9 shows the outcome of the swap
decision against the two relevant intervals for κ . Running a two-sided Fisher’s exact
test gives a p-value of 0.009 for the null hypothesis that swap decision is independent
of κ . The data in the table fits neither the prediction of NT or RDT. It appears some
but not all subjects are influenced by loss aversion. One interpretation is that the TSH
is right and some of the subjects for whom 1
λ
≤ κ ≤ λ are using System 2 to make
their swap decision so are not influenced by loss aversion. Another interpretation is
that the appropriate coefficient of loss aversion λ for the swap decision is lower than
that for the risk task.
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2.6.4 How Subjects Explained Their Decisions
If the two system hypothesis is right, is there any way we can tell which system an
individual subject used? Sloman (2002) suggests the following.
One rule of thumb to help identify the source of an inference has to do
with the contents of awareness. When a response is produced solely by
the associative system [System 1], we are conscious only of the result
of the computation, not the process. In contrast, we are aware of both
the result and the process in a rule based computation [System 2].
After the subjects decided whether or not to swap, they were asked what factors
influenced their decision. The frequencies of the more common responses are shown
in table 2.10. I have calculated a measure that I have called ‘decisiveness’ for each
of the reasons such that d = |l− c|/(l+ c), where d is decisiveness, l is the number
of subjects who cited the reason and chose lemonade, and c is the corresponding
number who chose crisps. If d = 0 for a reason, it means that among those who
cited the reason, equal numbers chose lemonade and crisps. Conversely, if d = 1, it
means everyone who cited the reason chose the same item.
Result 2.13 Subjects who had a decisive reason for their choice of goods did not
exhibit the endowment effect
Support. I divided the reasons into two groups. Decisive reasons are those where
decisiveness > 0.5; indecisive reasons are those where decisiveness ≤ 0.5. One
interpretation is as follows. The first group, the decisive reasons, includes the res-
ponses that most clearly suggest that the subject used System 2 to make their deci-
sion. That is suggest that the subject was fully aware of how they made their choice.
The second group, the indecisive reasons, is made up of the remaining responses.
These responses typically involve a more subjective weighing of the goods. Of the
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Table 2.10: How Subjects Explained Their Choice of Goods
Reason Chose Total Decisiveness
Lemonade Crisps (d)
Decisive
Can reuse bottles 3 0 3 1.00
Easy to carry 2 23 25 0.84
Health 22 6 28 0.57
Goods in cupboards 10 3 13 0.53
Indecisive
Quantity per unit 6 2 8 0.50
Taste of item 30 11 41 0.46
Appearance 3 7 10 0.40
Estimated monetary value 30 14 44 0.36
Positive preference 57 40 97 0.18
Current hunger or thirst 8 10 18 0.11
Negative preference 18 15 33 0.09
Good to share 9 9 18 0.00
Indifferent 1 1 2 0.00
Table 2.11: Swap Rate and Type of Explanation
Subjects Gave.
Sticks Swaps Swap Rate Total
Indecisive 101 45 0.308 146
Decisive 32 32 0.500 64
All 133 77 0.667 210
210 subjects, 64 gave at least one decisive reason. Table 2.11 shows the swap rates
for those who cited a decisive reason is 0.5, the neoclassical prediction, compared
to 0.308 for the rest. Running Fisher’s Exact Test produces a p-value of 0.007 of
obtaining these results under the null hypothesis that swap rate is independent of
whether a subject cites a decisive reason.
2.7 Discussion
Several studies have suggested that experience causes phenomena that are anoma-
lies for NT (such as the endowment effect) to disappear, however, it is not clear
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from these studies what aspects of experience matter. The experiment reported in
this chapter explored how different types of experience might influence the endow-
ment effect. It had four treatments. The behaviour of subjects in a control group
was compared to that of subjects with experience of consuming, owning, and choo-
sing goods. An endowment effect was observed but it was not as strong as those
reported by earlier studies and its strength differed between treatments. Notably,
the effect was significantly stronger in the two treatments in which the endowment
was acquired in two steps (the choosers and owners) rather than one step (the tasters
and control group). The strength of the effect differed little between the tasters and
control group. It was weaker among the choosers than the owners.
There are a number of possible explanations for why the strength of the en-
dowment effect varied between treatments and differed compared to earlier studies.
First, when people are faced with an option to swap, they can make their decision in
different ways. They can (a) either think about the problem in terms of (i) outcomes
or (ii) losses and gains. They can (b) either use (i) intuition or (ii) reasoning to make
the decision. How they make decisions determines whether an endowment effect
occurs, and how they make their decision is influenced by experimental procedures.
Second, loss aversion is a factor in all decisions but the degree to which losses weigh
heavier than gains varies between decision problems and can be influenced by expe-
rimental procedure. The high overall swap rate in the experiment could be explained
by loss aversion being weaker when a person is not giving up their last unit of a good
or when they already own a good like the one being gained. Third, people do not al-
ways immediately update their reference point when their endowment changes. The
differences in swap rates between treatments could be caused by differences bet-
ween treatments changing the likelihood that subjects updated their reference point.
Fourth, other effects in addition to loss aversion are involved. The higher swap rate
of the choosers relative to the owners could be explained in terms of the choosers
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being committed to the choice they made before the endowment occurred.
Survey data was collected in addition to the data on choices. The responses to
the attitude to risk surveys suggest that subjects had reference dependent preferences
and were loss averse. Swap decisions could be predicted to a degree using the survey
responses. Subjects who swapped also gave responses to the risk survey that showed
less loss aversion. Furthermore, the swap rate varied with the type of reason subjects
gave to explain their decision.
This study found significant variation in the strength of the endowment effect.
This has several broader implications. One should be cautious not to prematurely
generalise the predictions of NT or RDT since this study suggests human behaviour
is richer than simple forms of both these theories imply. Furthermore, the results
cast doubt on some other explanations of why the endowment effect occurs. Plott
and Zeiler (2005) argue that the endowment effect in the form of a gap between
willingness to pay and willingness to accept is a symptom of subject’s misconcep-
tions about experimental tasks. They support their claim by presenting experiments
with and without controls for misconceptions. They find that the WTA/WTP gap is
not observed when a certain set of controls for misconceptions is used. In the ex-
periment presented in this chapter, the set of controls for misconceptions is constant
across treatments but the degree to which the endowment effect occurs varies bet-
ween treatments. Therefore, subject’s misconceptions cannot account for whether
or not the endowment effect is observed.
The following are possible extensions. Exploring whether using bundles of
goods rather than single items weakens the endowment effect. Testing whether ac-
quiring an endowment in several steps rather than one step strengthens the endow-
ment effect. Using an incentivised design to explore the link between risk aversion
over modest stakes and the endowment effect (loss aversion has been cited as an
explanation for both). Further tests of whether experience of choosing and tasting
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influence the endowment effect. A sharper test of whether the TSH can explain
differing swap rates under different experimental settings.
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Appendix B
Experimenter Scripts
B.1 First Experimenter
The text in italics was read out by the experimenter. Some parts of the script differed
between treatments. The labels in bold indicate which treatments each part of the
script applied to.
All: The subject was invited to take a seat opposite the experimenter. This is
an experiment looking at how people make decisions. During the experiment you
will be asked to make decisions and answer some questions on paper forms. De-
pending on which of the four treatments the subject was assigned to, the experiment
proceeded as follows.
Control Group: To start with, please could you complete this form. The expe-
rimenter handed the subject the demographic survey and a pen.
Taster:To start with, please could you taste these two items. The experimenter
poured the subject a small cup of lemonade and offered them a small bowl containing
some vegetable crisps. The packaging of the two items were in front of the subject
so they could examine them if they wished. When the subject had tasted both items,
the experimenter handed the subject the demographic survey and a pen, and said
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Then could you complete this form
Owner: To start with, please could you pick an envelope and look inside. The
experimenter offered the subject a basket containing a number of envelopes. The
subject picked an envelope and looked inside. It contained a paper token for either
one bottle of lemonade or one packet of crisps. Depending on what the token was
for, the experimenter handed the subject either a bottle of lemonade or packet of
crisps and said This is yours to keep. Then the experimenter handed the subject the
demographic survey and a pen, and said Then could you complete this form
Chooser: The experimenter placed a bottle of lemonade and packet of crisps in
front of the subject and said Please could you look at these two items and choose
one of them: you get to keep the one you choose. The subject chooses one of the
items. Then the experimenter handed the subject the demographic survey and a pen,
and said Then could you complete this form
All: The experimenter then presented the subject with a basket of envelopes and
said please could you pick an envelope and look inside. Inside the envelope was a
token for several units of the two goods. The experimenter handed the subject the
goods specified by the token.
The experimenter then asked the subject to complete the two attitude to risk sur-
veys. The order in which the two surveys were given to the subject was randomised.
Once the subject had completed the two surveys the experimenter said The first part
of the experiment is complete. Drawing the subject’s attention to the items they have
been given: These are yours to keep. Please could you take them around the corner
and [Name of second experimenter] will complete the second part of the experiment
with you.
64
Appendix C
Instructions and Forms Completed
by Subjects
C.1 Instructions
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C.2 Demographics Survey
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C.3 Attitude to Risk Survey 1: Losses and Gains
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C.4 Attitude to Risk Survey 2: Small and Large Stakes
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C.5 Debrief Survey
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Appendix D
Original Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Original Prospect Theory (OPT) was presented as
a theory of choice under risk not a theory of riskless choice, but it is significant
because it incorporates loss aversion. In their exposition of the value function, they
write:
...the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final
states.
A salient characteristic of attitudes to change in welfare is that losses
loom larger than gains. The aggravation that one experiences in losing
a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with
gaining the same amount..
They observe that most people are averse to symmetric 50-50 bets. That is, gi-
ven the option to either play a bet of the form (a,0.50;−a,0.50) or abstain, most
people will abstain. Further they observe that this aversion increases with the size
of the stakes. That is, if a > b > 0, then (b,0.50;−b,0.50) will be preferred to
(a,0.50;−a,0.50). In OPT, the overall value of the regular prospect (x, p;y,q) is
calculated by combining the probability weighting function pi and the value func-
tion v as follows. V (x, p;y,q) = pi(p)v(x) + pi(q)v(y). When we compare the va-
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lue of the two symmetric bets above, the probability weights cancel out, leaving:
v(b)+v(−b) > v(a)+v(−a). If we set b = a−h, then we can write v(h−a)−v(−a)h >
v(a)−v(a−h)
h and letting h → 0 gives v
′(−a) > v′(a) provided the derivative exists.
What this means is that the value function for losses is steeper than the value func-
tion for gains. A measure of the strength of this effect can be defined as follows:
λ = v
′(−a)
v′(a) . When λ is constant for all losses and gains, it follows that
λv′(x) = v′i(−x)
λ
ˆ
v′(x)dx =
ˆ
v′(−x)dx
λ
ˆ x
0
v′(x)dx =
ˆ 0
−x
v′(x)dx
λv(x) =−v(−x)
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Appendix E
Additional Results
E.1 Subject’s Willingness to Pay for Crisps and Le-
monade
At the end of the experiment subjects completed a debrief survey (see Appendix
C.5). In this survey they were asked to specify a hypothetical Willingness To Pay
(WTP) figure for one of the two goods. They were not asked to specify figures for
both goods because it was thought they might attempt to rationalise their earlier de-
cision to swap or not. Since it would be useful to have both WTP figures, the WTP
figure for the good the subject did not specify was estimated using the coefficient es-
timates calculated from those subjects who did specify a WTP figure for that good.
Then the value of the ratio WTP LemonadeWTP Crisps was calculated using the WTP figure speci-
fied by the subject and the estimated WTP figure. Table E.1 shows some summary
statistics for the WTP figures. It shows there is significant variation between sub-
jects and that subjects tend to assign a higher value to lemonade. Table E.2 shows
estimates of how demographic properties and being assigned to the tasters treatment
influence the WTP figures. It suggests that tasting the items increased the amount
subjects would be willing to pay for both goods although the results are not statisti-
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Table E.1: Willingness to Pay for Crisps and Lemonade
WTP Crisps WTP Lemonade WTP Lemonade
WTP Crisps
Obs 100 110 210
Mean 120 186 3.13
Variance 4013 15242 203.05
Min 1 1 0.14
Max 350 800 165.29
Percentiles
25% 70 100 0.57
50% 100 155 0.95
75% 150 200 1.61
Table E.2: What Determines WTP Values?
WTP Crisps WTP Lemonade WTP Lemonade
WTP Crisps
Obs 100 110 210
Female 26.5∗∗ 5.5 −1.4
(12.9) (23.5) (2.0)
Taster 23.2 18.3 −2.1
(15.7) (25.7) (2.3)
Age 0.5 −11.0 0.5
(4.4) (7.0) (0.6)
Constant 89.3 397.3∗∗ −4.9
(86.5) (141.2) (12.5)
R2 0.081 0.005 0.011
The table shows coefficient estimates calculated by running a linear re-
gression
Standard errors are shown in parentheses
** indicates estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level.
cally significant at standard levels. Further, it suggests that tasting reduces the ratio
WTP Lemonade
WTP Crisps which implies, all else equal, that tasting would make one more likely
to prefer the crisps to the lemonade.
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Table E.3: Attitudes to Hypothetical High and Low Stakes Bets
Bet A: 50/50 Bet B: 50/50 Accepts A Rejects A
lose £100 or
win...
lose £2000 or
win...
Accepts
B
Rejects
B
Accepts
B
Rejects
B
101 2,320 12 13 31 154
105 69,930 21 9 162 18
110 12,210,880 34 9 159 8
150 850,000,000,000 92 5 105 8
The table reports the responses to the attitude to risk survey, which is shown in appendix C.4.
E.2 Subject’s Attitude to Risk over Small and Large
Stakes
At stage 1.4 (see table 2.1) subjects completed two surveys intended to assess their
attitude to risk. The first survey tested whether their attitudes were consistent with
expected utility theory (EUT). Subjects were presented with a list of hypothetical
50/50 bets and asked to indicate whether they would accept or reject each one. Ra-
bin’s (2000) Calibration Theorem allows low stake and high stake bets to be paired
so that the pairs have the following property. If an expected utility maximiser rejects
the low stakes bet (Bet A) over a range of wealth levels, then they must also reject
the high stakes one (Bet B). Table E.3 shows the responses that subjects gave to four
such pairs of bets. The figures in the ‘Reject A, Accept B’ column show a significant
number of subjects gave answers inconsistent with expected utility theory. In total,
163 of the 210 subjects (77.6 percent) gave at least one pair of answers that was in-
consistent with EUT. Prospect Theory, in contrast, can explain subjects rejecting Bet
A but accepting Bet B in terms of a kink in the value function about the reference
point.
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Appendix F
The Goods Used in the Experiment
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Chapter 3
How Asymmetric Information
Affects the WTA/WTP Gap in
Repeated Markets: The Spinning
Arrow Experiment
3.1 Introduction
There is a large body of research that investigates willingness-to-accept (WTA) and
willingness-to-pay (WTP). Chapter 1 summarised this research. Among the findings
were (a) that a gap between WTA and WTP regularly appears in experimental and
field data and (b) that this gap often but not always decays in repeated markets. One
explanation for the decay is that the gap is caused by people making errors and that
in repeated markets people tend to correct these errors. Another explanation is that
the gap is caused in part by heuristic driven behaviour. On this view, the decay could
be interpreted as a change in the heuristic used1. If people typically face asymme-
1See chapter 1 section 1.10 for a summary of the literature on heuristics.
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tric information in naturally occurring markets, then using a caution heuristic that
involves setting WTP<WTA may produce higher payoffs than setting WTA=WTP.
This chapter explores the heuristic based explanation. I argue that observed WTA
and WTP gaps may be the result of people using a caution heuristic that causes
them to make costly errors in the lab but protects them from costly errors in natu-
rally occurring markets. I explore the hypothesis that if using the heuristic causes a
person to repeatedly make costly errors, they will stop using it. Specifically, I show
that setting WTP below WTA can be optimal when faced with asymmetric informa-
tion. I present an experiment in which subjects participate in repeated markets with
symmetric and asymmetric information designed to test these hypotheses and whose
results support this caution heuristic explanation.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced the concept of loss aversion and mo-
delled it using a value function that is steeper for losses than gains. Thaler (1980)
applied loss aversion to riskless choice. He introduced the term endowment effect to
identify a tendency to over weigh out of pocket costs relative to opportunity costs.
The endowment effect has been frequently observed as a gap between WTP and
WTA: even when valuations are elicited using incentive compatible mechanisms,
WTA is often significantly higher than WTP. As discussed in chapter 1, under the
standard theory of choice preferences are independent of current entitlements and
so, under perfect information and in the absence of wealth effects, the maximum
amount a person is willing to pay to gain an item is equal to the minimum they are
willing to accept as compensation for giving it up: observing a gap is an anomaly.
There are, however, many studies that have found a gap.
Some may argue that while a WTA/WTP gap is commonly observed in the lab,
the incentives and experience provided by natural markets would eliminate it. Fur-
thermore, as discussed in chapter 1, some experimental studies find the gap decays
in repeated markets. But if the WTA/WTP gap quickly decays in repeated markets
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in the lab, why has not the experience of markets that subjects receive outside the lab
already eliminated the tendency to set WTA above WTP? One plausible explanation
is that experience only effects relevantly similar tasks; another is that experience
outside the lab does not punish setting WTA > WTP. List (2003) ran an experiment
with participants recruited at a sportscard and memorabilia show. He found that sub-
jects with relatively more intense trading experience did not set WTA > WTP while
those with relatively less intense experience did. This evidence suggests that ex-
perience gained in naturally occurring markets can influence behaviour in the tasks
which produce the WTA/WTP gap in the lab. The puzzle is why does a few minutes
experience in the lab appear to have a greater effect than the sum of all experience
outside the lab? A possible explanation is that outside the lab, setting WTA above
WTP is more often than not actually optimal.
Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information about the quality of a good
can reduce the amount a buyer is willing to pay for it and even lead to an equilibrium
at which no trade occurs. Dupont and Lee (2002) argue a variation of this process
can provide a rational explanation for the WTA/WTP gap:
With asymmetric information, the uninformed trader thinks that the in-
formed trader with whom he might trade has private information about
the true risks. When communicating the prices at which he is willing
to trade, the agent takes into account that the informed trader will trade
assets only at a profit. This leads to a wedge between the uninformed
trader’s buying and selling prices.
This could explain a gap between WTA and WTP when people are faced with asym-
metric information. It does not explain, however, why we observe a gap in the
lab when people are faced with symmetric information. In order to explain the
WTA/WTP gap in the lab in terms of asymmetric information we need to make
further assumptions, such as the following three.
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1. Behaviour is determined by some type of heuristic rather than reacting opti-
mally to each decision problem.
2. Given a set of potential heuristics, the ones used will be those that tend to
produce better outcomes.
3. Most people face asymmetric information in naturally occurring markets, so
the heuristic that on average produces the best outcomes is a caution heuristic
that involves setting WTA above WTP.
If people have no tendency to change the heuristic used in response to incentives,
then the theory cannot account for changes in behaviour in repeated market expe-
riments. More importantly, the theory cannot explain or predict which heuristics
will be used. For these reasons, assumption (2) is required. Turning to assump-
tion (3), one might question what the natural market analogues of WTA and WTP
tasks actually are. One can imagine that when a consumer is deciding whether to
buy a good they ask themselves whether they are willing to pay the good’s price.
The natural analogues of WTA tasks are less obvious. Most people’s income comes
from selling labour or renting out capital and expenditure goes on buying goods and
services. Accordingly, it is likely that most people execute a greater number of tran-
sactions as buyers than sellers. However, the aggregate value of a person’s buying
and selling transactions will balance (assuming zero net transfers and saving), and
across the economy, for every buyer in a transaction there is a corresponding sel-
ler. Whether most potential transactions involve asymmetric information is hard to
judge. It seems plausible that most transactions could involve a degree of asymme-
tric information.
What determines which heuristic is used? A possible explanation is evolution.
Heifetz and Segev (2004) argue the WTA/WTP gap is an example of toughness and
that a toughness bias may be evolutionary viable. They show how in an evolutionary
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model toughness can emerge in bargaining with asymmetric information. Further
more, Chen et al. (2006) ran experiments using capuchin monkeys and find evidence
of loss aversion, which suggests it may have an evolutionary origin.
Another possible explanation of which heuristics get used is learning. Friedman
(1953) compared the economic agent to an expert billiard player who played shots as
if they had calculated the outcome using the laws of Physics. Now, imagine a billiard
player who has been practising on a table with a slight slope, they learn to hit shots
harder when playing up the slope and softer when playing down it. If they switch to
a perfectly flat table, we might expect them to initially hit shots as if they were still
playing on the sloped table and then after a certain amount of practice correct the
error. We might expect analogous behaviour from someone who is used to trading
in the face of asymmetric information where setting WTA >WTP is optimal. If they
switch to facing symmetric information decision problems in the lab, at first they
might continue setting WTA > WTP. After the decision problem is repeated a few
times, they might correct the error and start setting WTA = WTP.
We can use the theory above to reinterpret List’s result that traders with relatively
intense market experience do not set WTA > WTP. Perhaps these traders not only
had more market experience but also had a different type2. That is, their experience
is not just of taking part in a market: it is of taking part in a market and being
better informed than their trading partners. Hence, they are less likely to have faced
asymmetric information as the less informed party, so for them setting WTA >WTP
is less likely to have been optimal, so they are less likely to have adopted it as a
heuristic.
This chapter presents an experiment that investigates the interaction of asym-
2In fact, List (2004b) speculates that asymmetric information could explain why those with more
market experience do not exhibit the endowment effect. His argument, however, differs from the
one here. He suggests that the more experienced traders are less uncertain about the value of the
auctioned item in his experimental tasks. In contrast, I suggest that experienced traders are used to
being better informed, although in the experimental tasks have no informational advantage.
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metric information and the WTA/WTP gap in repeated markets for lotteries. The
research question addressed is (a) does experience of markets with symmetric and
asymmetric information have different effects on behaviour and (b) can theWTA/WTP
be explained as a caution heuristic that protects against being exploited by better
informed traders. The existing literature investigates the WTA/WTP gap under sym-
metric information. The novel feature of the experiment reported in this chapter
is that it compares the gap under symmetric and asymmetric information. I use a
2× 2× 2 design: buying/selling, first part symmetric/asymmetric information, se-
cond part symmetric/asymmetric information. This permits the following compari-
sons. First within treatment comparisons, for example does the gap close under sym-
metric information; does it persist or widen under asymmetric information? Second,
investigation of spillovers: does experience under one regime improve performance
under another. The market institution used is a computerised one sided auction, run
for ten repetitions per part.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes how setting
WTA above WTP can be optimal when bidding in a Vickrey Auction and faced
with asymmetric information. Section 3.3 presents the experimental design, the
hypotheses tested, and the details of how the experiment was implemented. Section
3.4 analyses the experimental results. Section 3.5 discusses the results and their
implications.
3.2 Optimal Behaviour in a Vickrey Auction with Asym-
metric Information
I have suggested above that asymmetric information could explain a gap between
WTA and WTP under the standard theory. I now present a concrete example. It is
intended to capture the key features of trading under asymmetric information in a
81
way that can be implemented in an experiment. Suppose that there is an item that is
worth 30 in one state of the world (the low state) and 70 in another (the high state).
Three people are bidding to buy the item in a second price sealed-bid auction (the
highest bidder receives the item and pays the second highest bid). All three are risk
neutral expected utility maximisers. The two states of the world are known to obtain
with equal probability. For all three bidders, it is a weakly dominant strategy3 to bid
50, the expected value of the item 4.
Now suppose that one of the bidders (call this bidder the informed) observes
which state of the world obtains before placing his bid. It is a weakly dominant
strategy for the informed to bid 30 in the low state and 70 in the high state. The
other two bidders (call them the uninformed) know the informed will observe the
state of the world before bidding but cannot observe it themselves. There are no
weakly dominant strategies for the uninformed. For example, if the informed player
bids 40 in both states and the other uninformed player bids 41, the best response for
the remaining uninformed player is to bid > 41 whereas if the informed bids 30 in the
low state and 70 in the high state and the first uninformed player bids 41, the second
uninformed player’s best response is to bid < 41. However, we can predict how the
uninformed will bid using iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. For the
informed, bidding 30 in the low state and 70 in the high state weakly dominates all
other strategies, so all other strategies can be removed. In the resulting game, it is
3Strategy A weakly dominates strategy B if and only if there is at least one set of opponents
strategies for which A gives a higher payoff than B and for all other sets of opponent’s strategies, A
gives a payoff at least as high as B. Strategy A is weakly dominant if and only if it weakly dominates
all other strategies.
4Consider an auction for a lottery with expected value 50 from the point of view of bidder 1, who
submits bid b. Suppose the highest competing bid is p. Since bidder 1 is risk neutral, the value of the
lottery to them is 50. Bidder 1’s payoff is 50− p if b > p and zero otherwise. By bidding 50, bidder
1 will win if p < 50 and not if p > 50. Suppose bidder 1 bids b < 50. When b > p, then they still
win and their profit is 50− p. If p > 50 > b, they still lose. However, if 50 > p > b, they lose but
would have made a positive profit had they bid 50. Thus, bidding b < 50 never increases profits and
in some cases decreases it. A corresponding argument applies to bidding b > 50.
A more detailed discussion of bidding behaviour in second price auctions can be found in Krishna
(2002, p15)
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a weakly dominant strategy for the uninformed to bid 30. See Marx (1999) for a
discussion of iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
Conversely, in a second price sealed-bid selling auction, after the informed’s
weakly dominated strategies are deleted, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the
uninformed to bid 70. So the uninformed have a reason to bid lower in buying
auctions than they do in selling auctions.
3.3 The Spinning Arrow Experiment
3.3.1 Outline of Design
The following is an outline of the experiment’s design. Subjects faced a variant of
the decision problem described above in section 3.2. The full details of how the
experiment was implemented are described in section 3.3.3. Each subject was as-
signed to a trading group. Members of a trading group bid against each other in a
series of 20 auction rounds. Each round consisted of an auction to buy or sell lotte-
ries after which the lotteries were played out and subjects told how much they had
made or lost in the round. Each trading group and hence each subject was assigned
to one of eight treatments. The organisation of the treatments is shown in table 3.1.
In one half of the treatments, subjects were endowed with credits5 and took part in
auctions to buy lotteries from the experimenter; in the other half they were endo-
wed with lotteries and took part in auctions to sell lotteries to the experimenter. The
auctions occurred under two market regimes: symmetric information and asymme-
tric information. Under symmetric information, everyone had the same information
when they were placing their bids. Under asymmetric information, a minority of the
members of each trading group were given extra information about which lottery
outcome would occur before they placed their bids. The experiment was divided
5The credits were exchanged for cash at the end of the experiment.
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Table 3.1: The Treatments
Treatment Regime Type Subjects Trading
Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 Groups
SS Symmetric Symmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 29 5
SA Symmetric Asymmetric Buying 22 4
Selling 31 5
AS Asymmetric Symmetric Buying 27 5
Selling 31 5
AA Asymmetric Asymmetric Buying 24 4
Selling 22 4
Each row on the table represents a treatment. Each trading group consisted of 5 or 7 sub-
jects.
into two parts each consisting of ten rounds. Table 3.1 shows that some treatments
switched between symmetric and asymmetric information after ten rounds while
others did not. In the rest of this chapter, the abbreviations SS, SA, AS, and AA
shown in the first column of the table are used to refer to the treatments.
3.3.2 Hypotheses and Predictions
The experiment involves repeated markets under two regimes. We can make hypo-
theses about behaviour in at least three settings: the first round, the last round, and
spillovers (when subjects move from one market regime to another). There is also
the question of what the null hypothesis should be. If we are interested in anoma-
lies for the standard theory of choice, it seems natural to take the standard theory as
the null hypothesis, which in this case I take to be Expected Utility Theory. What
exactly this theory is, is open to some debate. First, does the theory allow any
stochastic component in behaviour? For the purposes of this chapter I allow for a
stochastic component as long as the expected error in valuations is zero6. Second,
what is the domain of the utility function used in expected utility theory? Rabin
6There are several ways the stochastic component in valuations can be modelled. See Loomes
and Sugden (1995), Loomes (2005) and Hey (2005) for discussions of the issues involved.
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(2000) argues that under expected utility theory, we should expect approximate risk
neutrality over modest stakes, since even a small degree of risk aversion over small
stakes would imply an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes. Cox and
Sadiraj (2006) object that the result only holds if the domain of the utility function
is final wealth; it does not hold if income and wealth enter the utility function sepa-
rately. For the purposes of this chapter, I take the domain of the utility function to
be final wealth. As argued in appendix A, if income and wealth are allowed to enter
the utility function separately, then preference ordering of final allocations can vary
with the demarcation between income and wealth. I take this to be an anomaly in the
same way that preferences over final allocations varying with current entitlements is
an anomaly.
First Round Data from the first round will be used to test the null hypothesis of no
WTA/WTP gap against the alternative hypothesis that there is a gap.
Last Round Data from the last round will be used to test the null hypothesis of no
WTA/WTP gap against the alternatives hypotheses (a) that there is a gap of
the same size as in the first round and (b) that there is a gap, but it is smaller
than in the first round.
Spillovers Three hypotheses about spillovers are considered. First, no spillovers,
that is experience of one market regime only affects behaviour under that re-
gime. Second, positive spillovers, that more market experience (of any market
regime) reduces anomalies (including the WTA/WTP gap). Third, negative
spillovers, that experience of one market regime can increase the size of ano-
malies that occur when the regime is changed. The caution heuristic theory
described above predicts the third type of spillover effects. Participating in
a market with symmetric information where setting WTP = WTA is optimal
will cause subjects to tend to set WTP = WTA. When the regime switches to
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asymmetric information, where setting WTP < WTA is optimal, subjects who
tend to set WTP = WTA will not be behaving optimally. Conversely, partici-
pating in a market with asymmetric information where setting WTP < WTA
is optimal will cause subjects to tend to set WTP < WTA. Again, when the
regime switches, this time to symmetric information, a tendency to set WTP
< WTA will cause non optimal behaviour.
3.3.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment is designed to discriminate between three sets of hypotheses using
a variant of the decision problem described above.
Subjects were divided into trading groups of 5 or 7 and traded in one sided
buying or selling markets for lotteries. The markets were one sided in the sense that
all the subjects were buying (selling) lotteries from (to) the experimenter. This is
an important feature of the design since it prevents the market disappearing under
asymmetric information in the way Akerlof (1970) described. Market prices were
generated using median price auctions as used by Loomes et al. (2003). In the
buying auctions, subjects completed the sentence ‘I am willing to buy the lottery
from the experimenter if the price is less than __ credits’ by typing a value. When all
subjects had entered bids, the computer selected the median bid as the market price,
p. Everyone who bid above p paid p and received the lottery; everyone who bid p or
less did not trade. In the selling auctions, subjects completed, ‘I am willing to sell
the lottery to the experimenter if the price is more than __ credits’. The median ask
was selected as the price p. Everyone who asked less than p received p credits and
gave up the lottery; everyone who asked p or more did not trade. The median price
auction is a form of Vickrey auction and it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid ones
true valuation. There are two reasons for using a median price auction. First, for a
given set of bids, the price produced by a median price buying auction will be the
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same as the one produced by a median price selling auction. This allows meaningful
comparisons between buying and selling prices. Second, as argued by Loomes et al.
median price auctions control for shaping effects. This is because if bidders in a
repeated market adjust their bids towards the previously observed market price, they
will be adjusting their bids towards the median. This means that if buying and selling
prices converge, it is not because of shaping effects.
The novel feature of the experiment is that markets with symmetric and asym-
metric information are investigated. Table 3.1 shows the organisation of treatments.
The lotteries used are shown in table 3.2. The lotteries labelled high state and low
state have two possible outcomes. For instance, the low state lottery pays out zero
with probability 0.63 and 31 with probability 0.37. The composite lottery (shown
on the last row of the table) is constructed by combining the low state and high state
lotteries. We can think of the composite lottery as a lottery with two outcomes which
are themselves lotteries. With probability 0.43 the outcome of the composite lottery
is the low state lottery; with probability 1− 0.43 = 0.57 it is the high state lottery.
The low state lottery pays out 31 with probability 0.37, so the composite lottery will
pay out 31 with probability 0.37×0.43≈ 0.16. The probability values for the other
payouts are calculated in the same way.
In rounds with symmetric information, the composite lottery was traded. In
rounds with asymmetric information, the minority were informed i.e. 2 in trading
groups of 5, 3 in trading groups of 7. The informed traders were told whether it was
a high or low state before bidding; the uninformed traders were not. So effectively,
the informed were trading either the high or low state lotteries while the uninformed
were trading the composite lottery. The uninformed were told that there were infor-
med subjects in the trading group and told what the informed would have been told.
Figure 3.1 shows how the lotteries were presented to the subjects when they
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Figure 3.1: The Spinning Arrow
(a) Unresolved Lottery (b) Resolved Lottery
(c) High State (d) Low State
were prompted to place bids. Figure 3.1a, was shown to (a) everyone in symmetric
information auctions and (b) the uninformed in asymmetric information auctions.
Figure 3.1c, was shown to the informed in asymmetric information auctions when
the high state occurred; figure 3.1d, was shown to them, when the low state occurred.
The lottery outcomes were determined by computer generated random numbers.
There was one lottery outcome per trading group per round. The outcomes were
revealed to subjects after the outcome of each auction. An animated spinning arrow,
figure 3.1b, was used to present the lottery outcomes. The animation lasted three
seconds, initially the arrow span quickly but its speed gradually decreased until it
stopped revealing the lottery payout. Examples of the complete screens subjects
saw are shown in appendices H.1 to H.5.
Why is it important that only a minority of subjects in rounds with asymmetric
information were informed? Suppose all the informed bid bI and all uninformed
bid bU and bI 6= bU . Since the median bid is the price and the majority of bids are
placed by the uninformed, the price will be bU . That is the price will be determined
by the uninformed. If this were not the case, then the price would be determined
by the informed and the price under asymmetric information would be no different
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Table 3.2: The Lotteries Used
Name Lotterya Expected
Valueb
Low state l (0,0.63;31;0.37) 11.5
High state h (63,0.40;97;0.69) 83.3
Composite (l,0.43;h,0.57) (0;0.27;31,0.16;63,0.23;97,0.34) 47.8
a Each lottery is a list of consequences (x1, . . . , xn) and the associated probability of the consequence
occurring (p1, . . . , pn) written in the form (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn) where n is the number of possible out-
comes of the lottery. For instance, the lottery low state pays out zero with probability 0.63 and pays
out 31 with probability 0.37. Probability figures are rounded to two decimal places.
b The expected value figures are calculated as ∑ni=1 pixi and rounded to one decimal place.
to what the price would be if everyone was informed. By setting the relative num-
ber of informed and uninformed so that the uninformed set the price, the effect of
asymmetric information on prices can be studied.
A paper copy of the instructions was given to the subjects (see appendix G). Be-
fore the experiment started the experimenter read the instructions aloud, then gave
subjects the opportunity to ask questions. All subjects were told about symmetric
and asymmetric information even if they did not participate in auctions under both
regimes. The motivation for this was to isolate the effect of knowing about asym-
metric information from actually experiencing it.7
3.4 Results
A total of 208 people participated in the experiment. They were divided into 36
trading groups. Table 3.1 shows how the subjects and trading groups were divided
among the 8 treatments. Several types of data are reported: prices, valuations, and
costly errors.
7This approach is similar to the one used by Andreoni andMiller (1993) in their experiment where
in some treatments there was a 50% chance of meeting a computer opponent and in others a 0.1%
chance. In both treatments subjects knew about the chance of meeting a computer, but only in one
was there a realistic chance of this happening.
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3.4.1 Prices
In each auction the median bid or ask determined the price at which lotteries were
bought or sold. There was one auction per trading group per round giving a total of
36×20 = 720 observations across all treatments. The advantage of studying prices
is that they have an obvious economic meaning. If the price changes, then so do the
payoffs of the subjects who traded. In contrast, if one of the bids changes without
influencing the price, then the payoffs of the subjects who traded are unchanged.
The subject who submits the bid that determines the price is at the margin between
trading and not trading, hence there is a greater incentive for them than for non
marginal bidders to bid carefully. Furthermore, since a median price auction is used,
prices in buying and selling treatments are comparable. A disadvantage of studying
prices is it does not allow questions about individual behaviour, e.g. do the informed
and uninformed behave differently.
The evolution of prices in each of the treatments is shown in figure 3.2. The
graphs show the weighted mean price. For the rounds with symmetric informa-
tion, the graphs simply show the mean price across all the trading groups in the
treatment. For the rounds with asymmetric information, two means were calculated
separately. First, the mean price for groups where the informed traders knew the
lottery was going to give a high payout, p¯H . Second, the mean, where they knew
the lottery was going to give a low payout, p¯L. The weighted mean was then calcu-
lated as p¯ = wH p¯H +wL p¯L where the weights are the probabilities of the high and
low payout states occurring. Why is the weighted rather than simply the arithme-
tic mean shown? The number of trading groups with high and low payouts varies
randomly between rounds. Using the weighted rather than arithmetic mean removes
this random noise, making any patterns more likely to be visible.
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Figure 3.2: The Evolution of Prices by Treatment
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3.4.2 Valuations: Bids and Asks
In each auction, every subject submitted a bid or ask. Every subject completed 20
auctions giving a total of 208×20 = 5600 observations. The advantage of studying
bids and asks is that all the data is used and questions about individual behaviour
can be addressed. The disadvantage is that in most cases a subject can adjust their
bid up or downwards and it will have no consequences for their payoff. Consider a
trading group of 5 completing a buying auction. The third highest bid X3 determines
the price and the two bidders who bidder above X3 buy the lottery (assuming no
ties). Payoff are the same whatever value the two lowest bids take provided they
are below X3 and whatever value the two highest take provided they are above X3.
Hence, there can be patterns in the values of bids and asks that have no economic
consequence.
The evolution of bids and asks in each of the treatments made by uninformed
subjects is shown in figure 3.3 and the evolution of those made by informed subjects
is shown in figure 3.4.8
3.4.3 Costly Errors
If a subject changes their bid or ask, some changes affect their payoff while other
changes have no economic consequences. The market discipline hypothesis posited
by Loomes et al. (2003) suggests that people have stable underlying preferences
but make errors when acting on them in markets. Furthermore, people alter their
behaviour if and only if they make an error which proves costly. The following
definition of a costly error is intended to identify bids and asks which are costly
errors for the subject who submitted them9. In a buying auction (a) a bidder is
8A subject is classed as ‘informed’ if for at least one part of the experiment they were an informed
trader. A subject is classed as ‘uninformed’ if they were never an informed trader.
9For the purpose of defining the errors, it is assumed the subjects are expected utility of wealth
maximisers. Since the stakes a low, subjects are assumed to be approximately risk neutral.
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Figure 3.3: The Evolution of Bids by Treatment: Uninformed Subjects
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Figure 3.4: The Evolution of Bids by Treatment: Informed Subjects
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judged to have made a costly error if either (i) they bought the lottery for more than
its expected value (EV) or (ii) they missed a chance to buy the lottery for less than
EV; in a selling auction (b) a bidder made a costly error if either (i) they sold the
lottery for less than EV or (ii) they missed a chance to sell it for more than EV. The
magnitude of the error is the amount they need to adjust their bid by to avoid making
the error when the bids of other subjects are held constant. A negative error indicates
they bid too low; a positive error indicates they bid too high.
Costly errors are only reported for rounds with symmetric information. This
is because under asymmetric information, the uninformed submit their bids before
they are told whether it is a high or low payout state. In order to judge whether they
made an error we need to know what their payoff would have been in both states. To
determine their payoff in both states, we need to know how the informed would bid
in both states, but we only observe how the informed bid in the state that occurs.
A further limitation on the use of costly errors in analysis is that they have com-
plex statistical properties. In a given auction round, either all the errors are positive
or all the errors are negative. For instance, in a buying auction where the price is
less than EV, everyone who bid at or below the price made a negative costly error;
everyone who bid above the price buys at less than EV so does not make an error.
As a result, standard statistical tests cannot be reliably used.
3.4.4 First and Final Round Behaviour
Result 3.1 The size of the WTA/WTP gap decreases in a repeated market with sym-
metric information.
Support. Table 3.3 shows the mean buying and selling price in the first and last
rounds under symmetric information. The columns labelled gap report the diffe-
rence between mean selling and buying prices. The first row pools observations
from the SS and SA treatments. Rounds 1-10 of these treatments had symmetric
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information, so the reported figures are from round 1 and round 10. The second
row only reports data from the SS treatment where subjects traded under symmetric
information for 20 rounds, so the reported figures are from rounds 1 and 20. In a
given treatment, subjects were either buying for the whole experiment or selling for
the whole experiment. Each subject only took part in one treatment. As a conse-
quence, the buying and selling figures are produced by different sets of subjects but
corresponding first and last round figures are produced by the same set of subjects.
In the first round there is a statistically significant gap. In the final rounds the gap is
smaller and not statistically significant, but still present. The Round 1 ratio of selling
to buying price is 55.047.9 = 1.15 when data from the SS and SA treatments are pooled.
The expected value of the lottery is 47.8. Buying prices are close to expected value
whereas selling prices are a few points above it. There is little if any evidence of risk
aversion.
Table 3.4 shows similar data for individual bids rather than market prices. The
same pattern emerges: a statistically significant gap partially closes.
Table 3.5 shows costly errors (as defined in section 3.4.3). Again a similar pat-
tern emerges: in the first round there is a gap that closes. In buying treatments
subjects who made errors tended to bid too low; in selling treatments, they bid too
high. Note the magnitude of the first round mean errors is greater in buying than
selling. This can be interpreted as the error being the result of two causes: (i) the
endowment effect causing a reluctance to trade and (ii) risk aversion causing a re-
luctance to finish the round holding a lottery. In buying rounds these two factors
are pulling in the same direction while in selling rounds they are acting in opposite
directions so tend to cancel each other out.
Result 3.2 The WTA/WTP gap persists and increases slightly in size in a repeated
market with asymmetric information.
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Table 3.3: Mean Market Price under Symmetric Information
First Round Last Round
Rounds buying selling gap buying selling gap
1-10 47.9 55.0 7.1∗∗∗ 49.8 53.6 3.9
1-20 43.8 56.8 13.1∗∗∗∗ 46.0 55.2 9.2
The rounds 1-10 row pools the data from the SS and SA treatments; the rounds 1-20 row
just includes data from the SS treatment. The null hypothesis gap = 0 is tested against the
alternative gap > 0. Significance levels: *** denotes 1 percent; **** denotes 0.1 percent.
Table 3.4: Mean Individual Bids under Symmetric Information
First Round Last Round
Rounds buying selling gap buying selling gap
1-10 48.4 54.2 5.8∗∗ 50.7 53.2 2.5
1-20 46.8 55.0 8.2∗∗ 48.0 52.3 4.3
The rounds 1-10 row pools the data from the SS and SA treatments; the rounds 1-20 row
just includes data from the SS treatment. The null hypothesis gap=0 is tested against the
alternative gap > 0. Significance levels: ** denotes 5 percent.
Table 3.5: Mean Individual Costly Errors under Symmetric Information
First Round Last Round
Rounds buying selling gap buying selling gap
1-10 −9.4 2.5 11.9 −0.6 1.9 2.4
1-20 −13.1 4.6 17.7 −1.7 −1.7 0.0
The figures reported are the mean errors made by those subjects who made a costly error
(see definition in 3.4.3).
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Table 3.6: Weighted Mean Market Price under Asymmetric Information
First Round Last Round
Rounds buying selling gap buying selling gap
1-10 43.9 56.3 12.4∗∗∗ 41.4 56.1 14.7∗∗
Data from the AS and AA treatments are pooled. The null hypothesis gap ≤ 0 is tested
against the alternative gap > 0. Significance levels: ** denotes 5 percent; *** denotes 1
percent.
Support. Table 3.6 shows the weighted mean first and last round prices under asym-
metric information. The table pools the round 1 and round 10 data from the AA and
AS treatments.10 The reported weighted mean11 values are calculated as
weighted mean=mean high stated× p(high state)+mean low state× p(low state)
where high state is when the lottery pays out 63 or 97 and low state is when it pays
out 0 or 31. The figures in the gap columns are the difference between the weigh-
ted mean selling and buying prices. First round behaviour is similar to that under
symmetric information: there is a statistically significant gap in the predicted direc-
tion. However the gap persists and marginally increases in size. Note, that iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies suggests that the buying price should fall to
11.5 (the expected value of the lottery in the low state) and the selling price should
rise to 83.3 (the expected value of the lottery in the high state). Instead, although
the gap persists, buying and selling prices remained relatively close to the expected
value of the lottery across both states which is 47.8.
Table 3.7 shows mean bids under asymmetric information. Under asymmetric
information, the uninformed did not know whether it was a high or low payout state
when placing their bids but the informed did know. The bids are disaggregated
10The only figures reported are for rounds 1-10 unlike symmetric information where figures for
rounds 1-10 and 1-20 were reported. This is because calculating the weighted figures requires at
least one observation for the high and low state in both buying and selling and in both the first and
last round. The data from rounds 1 and 20 of the AA treatment do not include all the required
observations.
11Weighted means rather than arithmetic means are reported to control for variation in the fre-
quency of high and low states between buying and selling treatments and between rounds. This was
discussed in more detail in section 3.4.1.
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Table 3.7: Mean Individual Bids under Asymmetric Information
Round 1 Round 10
buying selling gap buying selling gap
Uninformed 39.1 57.2 18.1 46.3 58.3 12.0
Informed
high state 71.7 64.0 −7.7 60.5 78.2 17.7
low state 26.5 28.7 2.2 14.9 14.5 −0.4
The low state is when the lottery paid out 0 or 31; the high state when it paid out 63 or
97. The informed traders were told whether it was a high or low state before they bid; the
uninformed were not. No hypothesis testing is reported on this table.
accordingly into those made by the uninformed, the informed when they knew it
was a high state, and the informed when they knew it was a low state. For the
uninformed, there is a gap between buying and selling bids in round 1 and round
10. The informed take advantage of the extra information they possess and bid
considerably higher when they know it is a high state.
3.4.5 Between Round Spillovers
The last two sections found that the WTA/WTP gap closes under symmetric infor-
mation but persists under asymmetric information. What causes the changes over
successive rounds, and why do they differ between symmetric and asymmetric in-
formation? In this section I assess whether previous successful trades influence
behaviour in later rounds?
Result 3.3 Propensity to trade increases with previous trading success.
Support. I estimate the following equation12:
bidit = αi +βSi,t−1 + γDit +ψt + εit (3.1)
12The equation is a two-way fixed effects model. It has a similar form to the one used by List and
Shogren (1999) to determine whether previous observed market prices influence bidding in repeated
second price auctions.
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The variables are defined as follows: bidit is the bid or ask submitted by subject
i in round t of the experiment. Fixed effects are captured by αi and ψt : αi repre-
sents characteristics of subject i that influence bids but whose effects are constant
across rounds; ψt represents factors that vary across successive auction rounds but
are constant across subjects. Si,t−1 is a measure of the relative number of profitable
and loss-making trades subject i made before round t; β is the corresponding coef-
ficient. Dit is a vector of dummy variables specifying the decision problem subject
i faced in round t; γ is a vector of corresponding coefficients. The final term, εit
captures errors, the variation in bidit not accounted for by the preceding variables.
How is trading success measured? Buying the lottery is profitable if and only if
the lottery payout exceeds the price. Selling the lottery is profitable if and only if
the lottery payout falls short of the price. Let piit indicate the outcome of subject i’s
trading in round t as follows:
piit =


+1 i f traded and pro f ited
0 i f did not tradeor traded and exactlybrokeeven
−1 i f traded andmadealoss
(3.2)
I measure subject i’s relative success trading in all rounds up to and including t
as follows.
Si,t =
t
∑
k=1
piik
t
(3.3)
The measure has the following properties. If the majority of trades have been
profitable, then S > 0. If the majority of trades have been loss making, then S < 0.
If subject i does not trade in round t, then |Si,t |< |Si,t−1|, that is the magnitude of S
decreases. The motivation for this measure is that people might use a variant of the
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availability heuristic to judge how likely it is they will make a profit from trading.
The more often they have traded and made a profit in previous auctions, the easier it
will be for them to imagine that trading in the next auction will be profitable, hence
they will judge that trading is more likely to be profitable13 and accordingly they
will be more willing to trade.
Table 3.8 shows the results of estimating equation 3.1 for (a) a pool of the 4
buying treatments, (b) a pool of the 4 selling treatments, and (c) each of the 8
treatments. Whichever set of bids the estimation is estimated on, increased tra-
ding success (i) increases bids in buying treatments but (ii) decreases bids in selling
treatments. Bidding higher in a buying auction increases the likelihood of trading;
bidding lower in a selling auction does the same. Hence the results suggest propen-
sity to trade increases with previous trading success.
3.4.6 Spillovers between Markets with Symmetric and Asymme-
tric Information
Table 3.9 reports buying and selling prices for all treatments. The reported values are
averages over two rounds. The reason for this is to allow meaningful comparisons
of prices between treatments with asymmetric information. To calculate a weighted
average price across the high and low states, in every asymmetric information round
reported there must be at least one buying and at least one selling auction in both
of the high and low states. In some rounds this condition is not met so averages
over two rounds are used. Note, there is a lot of noise in the data with the size and
sign of the gaps sometimes not being as expected. This is not surprising since the
buying and selling price figures reported are the mean of just 8 or 10 observations.
13Kahneman and Tversky (1973) give the following example of the availability heuristic: “one
may assess the divorce rate in a given community by recalling divorces among ones acquaintances.
If subjects in the experiment use a similar heuristic, they may assess the probability that the next
trade will be profitable by recalling what happened in previous trades.
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Table 3.8: Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimates of the Relation between Amount Bid and Previous Trading
Success
Pooled SS SA AS AA
buying selling buying selling buying selling buying selling buying selling
β 4.7 −7.1 4.3 −3.9 5.1 −5.1 0.8 −6.8 7.4 −14.7
(2.1) (1.8) (4.4) (2.3) (4.8) (3.1) (3.5) (4.2) (3.9) (5.1)
p(β |H0) 0.012 0.000 0.165 0.047 0.147 0.051 0.410 0.052 0.030 0.002
F(αi = 0) 11.2 7.8 14.7 10.1 5.9 6.4 16.9 5.6 8.7 8.2
p(F |αi = 0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F(ψt = 0) 1.9 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 2.8 1.1 1.1 1.2
p(F |ψt = 0) 0.012 0.000 0.047 0.091 0.302 0.853 0.000 0.401 0.356 0.245
N 1805 2147 418 551 418 589 513 589 456 418
The table shows the results of estimating equation 3.1. β is the coefficient on the measure of previous trading success. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses. p(β |H0) is the p value for the obtained results under the null hypothesis that (i) β ≤ 0 for buying
and (ii) β ≥ 0 for selling. F(αi = 0) is the F statistic for the null hypothesis that αi = 0 all for i, that is the hypothesis that there are
no subject fixed effects. p(F |αi = 0) is the p value for the F statistic. F(ψt = 0) and p(F |ψt = 0) are the corresponding figures for
the fixed effects due to the number of rounds completed. N is the number of observations where each bid counts as one observation.
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Recall that table 3.1 shows the number of trading groups and subjects in each of the
treatments.
How do subjects with experience of trading under symmetric information behave
under asymmetric information compared to (a) those with no experience and (b)
those with experience of asymmetric information?
Result 3.4 The effect of experience of markets with symmetric information spills
over into markets with asymmetric information and reduces the size of the WTA/WTP
gap.
Support. From table 3.9 we see that when the regime is switched from symmetric
to asymmetric information the gap is 4.7. This is (i) smaller than the gap for those
with no experience (the rounds 1 & 2 gaps for the AS and AA treatments are 15.7
and 16.0) and (ii) smaller than the gap for those with experience of asymmetric
information (the rounds 11 & 12 gap for the AA treatment is 8.4). Under asymmetric
information, optimal behaviour results in a large gap. Hence it appears that when the
regime switches to asymmetric information, experience of symmetric information is
worse than experience of asymmetric information or no experience at all.
Conversely, how do subjects with experience of trading under asymmetric infor-
mation behave under symmetric information compared to (a) those with no expe-
rience and (b) those with experience of symmetric information?
Result 3.5 The effect of experience of markets with asymmetric information spills
over into markets with symmetric information but its effect is similar to the effect of
experience of symmetric information.
Support. From table 3.9 we see that when the regime switches from asymmetric to
symmetric information the initial gap is 11.1. This is (i) bigger than the gap for those
with no experience (the rounds 1 & 2 gaps for the SS and SA treatments are 10.3 and
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Table 3.9: Weighted Mean Market Price under All Treatments
Rounds 1 & 2 Rounds 9 & 10 Rounds 11 & 12 Rounds 19 & 20
Treatment buying selling gap buying selling gap buying selling gap buying selling gap
SS 47.6 57.9 10.3 45.0 59.5 14.5 46.0 58.3 12.3 45.6 56.4 10.8
SA 52.4 52.9 0.5 55.0 49.6 −5.4 49.3 54.0 4.7 40.9 50.0 9.1
AS 43.3 59.1 15.7 36.9 53.1 16.1 44.6 55.7 11.1 55.8 48.2 −7.6
AA 39.7 55.7 16.0 42.6 61.0 18.3 43.2 51.6 8.4 51.2 54.5 3.3
The weighed mean prices are calculated as in previous tables. No hypothesis testing is reported on this table.
1
0
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0.5) but (ii) smaller than the gap for those with experience of symmetric information
(the rounds 11 & 12 gap for the SS treatment is 12.3). Under symmetric information,
optimal behaviour results in no gap. Hence, when the regime switches to symmetric
information, it appears experience of asymmetric information is marginally better
than experience of symmetric information but worse than no experience at all.
Does the presence of informed subjects and the resulting asymmetric informa-
tion cause the uninformed to behave differently? If so, when the market regime
changes between symmetric and asymmetric information, do those without the in-
formational advantage adapt their behaviour immediately or is the change gradual?
Result 3.6 The uninformed do not immediately change their behaviour when they
switch between facing symmetric and asymmetric information.
Support. I estimate the two following equations:
bidit = αi +δ0AIi,t +ψt + εit (3.4)
bidit = αi +δ0AIi,t +δ−1AIi,t−1 + . . .+δ−4SAI+ψt + εit (3.5)
where bidit is the bid or ask submitted by subject i in round t. As in equation 3.1,
αi and ψt capture fixed effects of individuals and experiment round number. AIi,t is
a dummy variable: AIi,t = 1 if subject i faced asymmetric information in round t of
the experiment; AIi,t = 0 if they faced symmetric information. Table 3.10 shows the
estimated parameters. The equations were estimated for buying and selling auctions
separately. Equation 3.4 is estimated using all bids from the SS treatments plus all
the bids made by the uninformed from the AS, SA and AA treatments (i.e. bids
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made by the informed are excluded). Equation 3.5 is estimated using a subset of the
bids used to estimate equations 3.4: the bids that are not used are those where t < 5
since the dummy variable AIi,t−4 does not exist for these bids.
Table 3.10 reports the results of estimating equations 3.4 and 3.5. The estimates
of the coefficients for the dummy variables show how bids are adjusted relative to
bids placed under symmetric information. For instance, the estimates of equation
3.4 suggest when the uninformed face asymmetric information, they bid 12 points
lower in buying auctions and 2.3 points higher in selling auctions. If the uninformed
adjusted their behaviour immediately when they faced asymmetric information, we
would expect (a) the AIt coefficients to be equal in the simple model and the model
with lags and (b) the coefficients on the lagged dummy variables to be zero. Ins-
tead, the coefficients on the lagged dummy variables are not zero. This indicates
that the value of a bid is influenced by whether there was asymmetric information
in previous rounds. Hence, it appears the uninformed do not adjust the bidding
strategy immediately when the regime switches between symmetric and asymmetric
information.
We can also analyse how the informed and uninformed behave after the regime
switches from asymmetric to symmetric information.
Result 3.7 After the market regime switches from asymmetric to symmetric infor-
mation, the previously informed traders have a higher propensity to trade than the
previously uninformed.14
Support. Table 3.11 reports behaviour at the level of the individual for rounds 11
to 20 of the AS treatment (i.e. the behaviour under symmetric information of those
14Notice there is a contrast between result 3.5 and result 3.7. There is little difference between the
round 11-20 prices under symmetric information when rounds 1-10 occurred under (a) asymmetric
information and (b) symmetric information (see figure 3.2). Result 3.7, however, suggests that ex-
periencing asymmetric information as an uninformed trader makes subjects less willing to trade. All
else equal, this should lead to a larger WTA/WTP gap in round 11-20 prices in the AS treatment than
the SS treatment.
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Table 3.10: Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimates of the Relationship between
Value Bid and Asymmetric Information
Buying Selling
Simple Spillovers Simple Spillovers
Equation Estimated 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.5
AIt −12.0∗∗∗∗ 1.3 2.3∗∗ 1.1
(1.3) (3.1) (1.0) (2.4)
AIt−1 −9.5∗∗ −0.4
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−2 −4.8 2.6
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−3 0.6 −0.6
(4.1) (3.2)
AIt−4 −2.2 0.1
(3.1) (2.4)
4
∑
k=0
AIt−k −14.5 2.7
subjects N 65 65 78 78
rounds Ti 10 or 20 6, 10 or 16 10 or 20 6, 10 or 16
Observations ∑
N
i=1Ti 1300 1040 1560 1248
The table shows the results of estimating equations 3.4 and 3.5. The dependent variable
is bidit , the bid made by subject i in round t. The equations were estimated using all bids
from the SS treatments and the bids of the uninformed in the other treatments. The repor-
ted figures are coefficients for dummy variables indicating whether round t− x had asym-
metric information. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: ** denotes 5 percent; **** denotes 0.1 percent.
Table 3.11: The Effects of Experience of Asymmetric Information
on Behaviour under Symmetric Information
Experience Bid Error Trading Rate Plays Lottery Rate
Uninformed
buying 47.6 2.2 0.33 0.33
selling 52.0 −7.3 0.39 0.61
all 49.9 −2.4 0.36 0.47
Informed
buying 53.3 −1.1 0.46 0.46
selling 50.9 0.2 0.38 0.62
all 52.0 −0.5 0.42 0.55
The table reports data from rounds 11 to 20 of the AS treatment (the rounds
with symmetric information).
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with experience of asymmetric information). The behaviour of the subjects who
were previously uninformed traders is compared to the behaviour of those who were
previously informed (rounds 1-10 of treatment AS had asymmetric information).
The Bid column shows the mean bids. The Error column shows the mean costly
error (as defined in section 3.4.3). The Trading Rate is the proportion who either
buy or sell the lottery. The Plays Lottery Rate is the proportion of subjects who
hold a lottery at the end of the round (i.e. those who buy the lottery or do not
sell it). We can see that the uninformed made larger errors both when buying and
selling. We see that the uninformed trade at lower rates than the informed and are
less likely to finish the round holding a lottery. This can be interpreted as experience
of being the uninformed party under asymmetric information having two effects:
first, it increases aversion to trading (the endowment effect); second, it increases risk
aversion. In buying auctions, these two factors act in the same direction; in selling
auctions, they act in opposite directions. So we see a large difference between the
informed and uninformed in buying auctions.
To test hypotheses about the relative trading rates of the informed and uninfor-
med it does not make sense to look at individual level data since whether a given sub-
ject trades in an auction is not independent of whether the others trade. For example,
in a trading group of 5 (and assuming no ties) exactly two members trade; in a group
of 7, three trade. To get around this difficulty, we can take each auction as one ob-
servation and ask the following. Is the number of trades by informed traders more or
less than expected? Is the number of informed traders holding a lottery at the end of
the round more or less than expected? The expected number of trades by previously
informed traders is calculated as expected trades = total trades× in f ormed tradersall traders .
Table 3.12 reports the number of auctions in which the informed traders traded more
and less than expected. If there were no difference in the behaviour of the previously
informed and uninformed, then we would expect the informed to trade more than
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Table 3.12: The Trading Rate of Previously Informed Traders under Symmetric
Information
Selling Buying Total
Number of auctions previously informed traders:
trade less than expected 23 14 37
trade more than expected 26 36 62
Total 49 50 99
The table reports the trading rates during rounds 11-20 of the AS treatment of those who were
informed traders during rounds 1-10. There were 10 trading groups in the AS treatment and
each trading group completed 10 rounds under symmetric information giving 100 auctions. In
one auction there were zero trades, this auction is omitted from the analysis. In each of the re-
maining auctions, the expected number of trades by previously informed traders is calculated
as expected trades = total trades× in f ormed tradersall traders .
expected and less than expected with equal probability. In fact the informed traders
traded more than expected in 6299 of the auctions.
Consider (i) the null hypothesis that in each auction informed traders are equally
likely to trade more than expected as they are less than expected and (ii) the al-
ternative hypothesis that informed traders trade more than expected. To test the
hypotheses, I estimate the following fixed effects Probit model:
Pr(in f ormed tradesit > total tradesit×
in f ormed tradersi
all tradersi
) = Φ(β + γi +uit)
(3.6)
where in f ormed tradesit is the number of trades by previously informed traders
in trading group i and round t, in f ormed tradersi is the number of informed traders
in trading group i etc. The coefficient β is positive if informed traders on average
trade more than expected. The coefficient γ i captures trading group fixed effects. It
is positive if informed traders in trading group i trade more than expected more often
than informed traders in the other trading groups. Finally, uit is the residual. Since
the model controls for trading group fixed effects, it allows meaningful hypothesis
testing even though there is more than one observation per trading group. The null
hypothesis β = 0 was tested against the alternative β > 0. The test produced a
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p-value of 0.018 for obtaining the observed results under the null hypothesis.
The same method can be used to test the hypothesis that the informed were
more likely to hold a lottery after the auction. Using values from table 3.12 we
can deduce that in 23+3699 =
59
99 of the auctions, more than the expected number of
informed played the lottery. Estimating an equation equivalent to 3.6 and testing
corresponding hypotheses gave a p-value of 0.071 for obtaining the observed results
under the null hypothesis that the previously informed are no more likely to end a
round holding a lottery.
3.5 Discussion
The experimental results are consistent with previous studies in that I find that un-
der symmetric information (a) an initial gap between buying and selling prices for
lotteries and (b) that this gap decays in a repeated market. The novel findings are
as follows. First, under asymmetric information a gap between buying and selling
prices persists in a repeated market. Second, there are spillover effects. At the level
of market prices, the gap between buying and selling prices under symmetric infor-
mation is greater if the subjects in the market have just been trading in a market with
asymmetric information than if they have not been trading at all. Conversely, the gap
under asymmetric information is smaller if the subjects have just been trading in a
market with symmetric information than if they have not been trading at all. These
results could be interpreted in terms of a heuristic based model of decision making
in which people do not immediately adjust their behaviour when the market regime
changes, although at the level of prices, the evidence is mixed. Notably, when the
regimes switches from asymmetric to symmetric information, the prices observed
under symmetric information are similar to those in treatments that have only traded
under symmetric information. Third, there is additional evidence of spillover effects
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when the behaviour of previously informed and uninformed traders under symme-
tric information is compared. The previously uninformed are less likely to trade and
less likely to end an auction holding a lottery than the previously informed traders.
These results provide stronger evidence in favour of the caution heuristic based in-
terpretation: the uninformed adopt a caution heuristic that protects them from costly
errors under asymmetric information and when the regime is switched to symmetric
information, they do not immediately adjust their behaviour.
One might wonder why, if using a heuristic causes suboptimal behaviour as des-
cribed above, people would solve decision problems using a heuristic rather than
deliberately solving each one. A possible explanation is that determining the op-
timal behaviour under asymmetric information is hard. For instance consider the
asymmetric information problem subjects faced in the experiment. Iterative deletion
of weakly dominated strategies suggests an equilibrium where the selling price is
83.3 and the buying price 11.5. Even when the same problem is repeated 10 times,
the market prices were no where near these values. If people can not solve a rela-
tively simple asymmetric information problem in the lab, even when it is repeated,
can we expect them to do better in naturally occurring markets where the problems
are likely less well specified and successive problems are unlikely to be identical?
The most likely answer is no. Hence there is a role for heuristics.
What are the wider consequences of people using a caution heuristic? The direct
consequence is that the decision of whether or not to trade is not fully determined by
preferences. There will be some potential trades that will make both parties better off
but will not be executed. This means that welfare gains from trade will not be fully
realised. Furthermore, there are consequences to spillover effects, i.e. making a loss
on a trade causes a person to be more cautious and generally more reluctant to trade.
For instance, institutions that protect buyers from making losses on purchases will
reduce the number of buyers suffering losses and so cautiousness among buyers.
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Examples of such institutions include legal rights for buyers of goods, additional
guarantees offered by some sellers, financial redress for people who were miss-sold
financial products. Notice, however, if both buyers and sellers are equally prone to
use a caution heuristic, institutions that transfer risk between them will not increase
the gains from trade if transferring the risk makes one party less cautious but the
other more cautious.
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Appendix G
Instructions
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment investigating how people make decisions in 
markets.  During the session, please do not talk or communicate with any of the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk 
to answer it. 
 
Payment 
 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.  The amount you receive will 
depend on the decisions you and other participants make and the outcome of random 
events.  During the course of the experiment you will gain or lose credits.  At the end of 
the experiment, the credits you have accumulated will be exchanged for real money.  You 
will receive £1 for every 250 credits. 
 
Outline 
 
The experiment involves buying lotteries.  The experiment is divided into two parts: A 
and B.  There are 10 rounds in each part, so there are 20 rounds in total.  In each round 
you will be allocated 100 credits and have the chance to buy a lottery from the 
experimenter.  The price of the lottery will be determined by a special type of auction 
(how the auction works is described in detail later).  At the end of each round you will be 
told the result of the auction and how much the lottery paid out.  How much you earn 
from each round is affected by some or all of the following factors: whether you buy the 
lottery, the price of the lottery, and how much the lottery pays out.  If you do not buy the 
lottery, the amount you earn from the round is simply the 100 credits you were allocated 
at the start of the round.  If you buy the lottery, your earnings are 100 credits plus 
whatever the lottery pays out minus the amount you paid for the lottery.  
 
After each round your earnings from the round are banked.  At the end of the experiment 
you will be paid based on the number of credits you have banked over the 20 rounds. 
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 Lotteries 
 
The lotteries will be shown to you in the following format. 
 
 
The lottery shown above pays out 0 credits with probability 27%, 31 credits with 
probability 16%, 63 credits with probability 23%, and 97 credits with probability 34%. 
 
The lottery result is determined by a computer simulated spinning device as illustrated 
below.  The amount that the lottery pays out depends on what colour the arrow is pointing 
to after it has been spun.  In the screenshot below, the arrow is pointing to region D, so 
the lottery would payout 97 credits.  There are no tricks.  The probability figures for each 
of the regions are accurate.  We have determined all of the lottery outcomes in advance, 
so we do not have to do this during the experiment.  However, we can assure you that the 
outcomes of the lotteries were resolved in a genuinely random way.  If you wish, after the 
experiment is over you can request a printout showing all the lottery outcomes for the 
session you took part in to verify this. The outcomes are then revealed to the participants 
in the experiment at the appropriate stage in the experiment 
 
 
 
Auctions 
 
As stated above, during the experiment you will participate in a series of auctions to buy 
lotteries.  You will be told how many other participants are bidding in the auctions.  It 
will be the same people bidding against you in every auction. 
 
During the auction, you and the other participants are bidding to buy a lottery from the 
experimenter.  Each participant can only buy one lottery per auction.  However, in most 
auctions more than one participant will buy a lottery.  The price and who buys will be 
determined as follows. 
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 (1) How are bids entered?  Each participant will be prompted to type a bid into the box 
shown on the screenshot below. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
(2) How is the price determined?  The computer will record the bids made by each of 
the participants and arrange them in order from lowest to highest.  Suppose, for example, 
the bids were: 
35, 36, 56, 68, 72 
 
The middle value (median) determines the price.  So in this case the price would be 56. 
 
(3) Who buys the lotteries and how much do they pay? 
Each of the participants who bid above the price buys a lottery.  They pay the price, not 
the amount they bid.  So, if (as in the above example) the bids were 35, 36, 56, 68 and 72, 
the price would be 56 and the participants who bid 68 and 72 would each pay 56 and play 
the lottery. 
 
(4) Who gets told what?  After the auction, you won’t be told the value of other 
participants’ bids and they won’t be told the value of your bid.  However, you and the 
other participants will be told the price and who bought lotteries. 
 
Informed Traders 
 
As noted above, the experiment will be divided into two parts: A and B.  Each part will 
consist of 10 rounds.  Before the experiment starts you will be assigned to a group of 5 or 
7 participants who you will play against in the auctions.   
 
In some groups 2 or 3 participants will be selected to be Informed Traders in one or both 
parts of the experiment.  Whether you are assigned to a group with Informed Traders and 
if so, whether you are selected to be an informed trader is determined at random.  
Everyone in the group will be told whether the group contains Informed Traders.  If the 
group does contain Informed Traders, everyone in the group will be told how many 
Informed Traders there are in the group and whether or not they are an informed trader. 
  
The Informed Traders will be given extra information about where the spinner that 
determines the lottery outcome stopped before they enter their bid.  The screenshot below 
shows an example of what the informed traders might see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
 
The other members of the group (The Uninformed) will be told that there are Informed 
Traders in the group, but The Uninformed will not be given any extra information about 
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where the spinner stopped before they make their bids. The screenshot below shows an 
example of what they might see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
How you will be told the results of the auction and the outcome of the lottery 
 
Once you and the other participants in your group have submitted their bids, you will be 
told the result of the auction and the outcome of the lottery.  The screenshot below shows 
and example of what you might be shown.  (The numbers are just examples and contain 
no significance beyond this.) 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
When you click continue on the ‘Round Results’ screen, you will be shown a summary of 
the results of the experiment so far.  The screenshot below shows an example of what you 
will see. 
 
[Screen shot appeared here] 
 
It shows that in round 1, you and Player #2 bought a lottery for 48 credits and it paid out 
63 credits, so you both made a profit of 15 from buying the lottery.  Likewise in round 2 
you made a profit of 35 credits from buying the lottery.  In round 3 you did not buy the 
lottery.  Finally, in round 4 you bought the lottery for 40 credits but it paid out zero, so 
you made a loss of 40 credits.  (These numbers are just examples and contain no 
significance beyond this.) 
 
 
When you click continue on the ‘Results so far’ screen you will begin the next round. 
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Appendix H
Screenshots
H.1 Enter Bid: Symmetric Information
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H.2 Enter Bid: Asymmetric Information Informed
118
H.3 Enter Bid: Asymmetric Information Uninformed
119
H.4 Results: Current Round
120
H.5 Results: All Rounds Completed
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Chapter 4
How the Presentation of Odds and
Feedback Affect Anomalies in
Repeated Markets for Lotteries: The
Drawing Balls from Urn Experiment
4.1 Introduction
In the experiment described in the previous chapter, I found that whether theWTA/WTP
gap persisted in a repeated market depended on the market regime. Under symme-
tric information, the gap decayed; under asymmetric information, it persisted. When
people behave optimally, we would expect no gap under symmetric information but
a gap under asymmetric information, and this pattern of behaviour was observed in
the later rounds of the experiment although the WTA/WTP gap under asymmetric
information was smaller than standard theory predicts. There was some evidence
that subjects adjusted their bids in response to previous trading success. Whether a
trade was profitable depended on the price and the resolution of the lottery. There is
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evidence from other studies that lottery feedback plays a role in reducing anomalies.
Braga et al. (2008) find that preference reversals persist in a repeated market without
lottery feedback. In a repeated market with lottery feedback, the relative number of
standard preference reversals decreases. With just enough feedback, standard and
non standard preference reversals are equally common. With extended feedback,
non standard reversals become more common.
Why might lottery feedback matter? Braga et al. propose the loss experience
hypothesis that people will reduce their valuation of lotteries following experience
of losing (playing a lottery and receiving a payout of zero or less). They find that ex-
periment subjects reduce their valuation of lotteries in a repeated market following
experiencing a loss. Another explanation is that the way probability information
is presented influences valuations of lotteries. Likelihood information presented in
the form of probabilities and payoffs might not give subjects a sufficient understan-
ding of the lottery. Perhaps observing a lottery being resolved in successive rounds
of a repeated market gives subjects a better understanding of the lottery. There is
some experimental evidence that supports this view. Bleaney and Humphrey (2006)
find that subjects assign higher values to lotteries when they are shown a repre-
sentative sequence of outcomes rather than just being told the probabilities of each
outcome. Furthermore, Humphrey (2006) finds that showing subjects a represen-
tative sequence of lottery outcomes makes violations of expected utility theory go
away in some cases but emerge in others.
This chapter presents an experiment that investigates how lottery feedback and
the presentation of likelihood information influence anomalies in a repeated market.
A 2×2 design is used. Lottery feedback is varied by in some treatments resolving
the lottery after each round while in others resolving the lottery at the end of the
experiment. The presentation of likelihood information is varied by in some treat-
ments informing the subjects of the exact probability figures while in others letting
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the subjects estimate the odds. In the first case, the lottery has known odds (a risky
lottery) while in the second it has unknown odds (an uncertain lottery).
The experiment uses a novel auction mechanism designed to control for com-
mon value effects. Why might common value effects occur? First, if, as suggested
above, stating probabilities and payoffs as figures does not give people sufficient
information to understand lotteries, there could be common value effects even when
people are trading risky lotteries. Second, in the unknown odds treatments, unless
subjects correctly estimate the odds, there will be common value effects. If common
value effects occur, then the standard theory no longer rules out a WTA/WTP gap.
The experiment primarily investigates preference reversals and the WTA/WTP
gap. First it tests whether Braga et al.’s result is robust to changing the auction
mechanism and varying the presentation of odds. Second, it tests whether the condi-
tions that determine whether or not preference reversals get eliminated in a repeated
market have the same effect on the WTA/WTP gap. Although not the main focus of
the study, the experimental design also allows investigation of two other anomalies:
ambiguity aversion and probability weighting effects.
There have been a number of other studies that investigate anomalies in repeated
markets. Among the novel features of this study are (1) four anomalies are studied
simultaneously, (2) the evolution of buying and selling prices with and without lot-
tery feedback are compared, (3) a new auction mechanism is used to elicit buying
and selling prices which controls for winners curse type effects.
The main findings are, first, that different anomalies persist and decay under dif-
ferent market regimes and, second, that valuations in the final rounds of the markets
and choices at the end of the experiment vary considerably between treatments.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 argues that
the second price and median price auctions used in previous repeated market stu-
dies might not produce meaningful results when the item traded has an uncertain
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common value. Section 4.3 presents a new auction to control for common value
effects. The experiment is presented in section 4.4, the results in section 4.5, and the
discussion in, 4.6.
4.2 CommonValue Effects in Second andMedian Price
Vickrey Auctions
As outlined above, in two of the treatments lotteries with unknown odds are traded.
In these treatments market participants are given a private signal that is correlated
with the odds and hence the expected value of the lottery. Under these conditions,
there is the potential for a winner’s curse problem to occur. Consider the following
stylised model. Five people are bidding to buy a box containing an unknown amount
of money V . Each of them receives a private signal Xi such that Xi ∈ {V − 2,V −
1,V + 1,V + 2}. For simplicity, assume each of the signals is received by at least
one bidder (and one of them is received by two bidders) and all mappings of bidders
to signals that satisfy this are equally likely. Assume V is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 100. This means that Xi is in the range -2 to 102. When Xi is in
the range 2 to 98, E[V |Xi = xi] = xi (appendix I shows how E[V |Xi = xi] and Xi are
related). That is, the expectation of the amount of money in the box V conditional
on observing one of the signals is equal to the observed signal. For the remainder of
this section, assume Xi falls within this range.
What happens in a sealed bid second price buying auction (where the highest
bidder buys the item for the second highest bid; ties are resolved by tossing a coin)?
If each bidder simply bids their expectation of V , the highest bid will be V + 2. A
bidder who observed the signal V +2 will win the auction. If two bidders observed
the signalV +2, the second highest bid and hence the price will beV +2. Otherwise,
it will be V +1. In both cases, the amount of money in the box will be less than the
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amount the winning bidder expected and less than the amount they paid for the box.
They have suffered from the winners curse! They have failed to account for the fact
that winning the auction reveals that the signal they observed was one of the highest
of the five signals.
In a second price selling auction (where the lowest bidder sells the item for
the second lowest bid; ties are resolved by tossing a coin), the converse occurs. If
bidders simply bid their signal, they will sell for V −2 or V −1. In both cases, the
amount of money in the box will be more than the selling bidder expected and more
than the amount they sold the box for. They have suffered from the selling version
of the winners curse.
A similar effect occurs in median price auctions, although the intuition is more
subtle. In a median price auction with five participants, the median bid is the price
and the bidders with the two highest valuations each buy an item (again, ties are
resolved by tossing a coin). What happens when bidders bid signal? The median of
the signals will beV −1 orV +1 with equal probability, so the mean price will beV .
On average, the amount of money in the box will be less than the winning bidders
expected but equal to the amount they paid. The winners curse has not occurred in
the same way as under the second price auction. However, everyone bidding signal
is not a Nash equilibrium. If bidder 1 bids x1− 1.5 and the others bid xi, bidder
1 now only trades at a profit. The cases where bidder 1 had previously traded at a
loss were as follows: when the median bid was V +1 and bidder 1 observed signal
V +1 or V +2 and bid signal. When they bid x1−1.5, they no longer trade in either
of these cases. The cases where bidder 1 had previously traded at a profit were as
follows: when the median bid was V − 1 and bidder 1 observed signal V + 1 or
V +2. Shading their bid by 1.5 in these cases does not reduce it enough to stop them
trading.
The consequence of the winners curse is as follows: in buying auctions, bidders
126
have a reason to bid below their expectation of the item’s value conditional on their
private signal; in selling auctions, they have a reason to bid above it. Notice that
there now is a reason for buying and selling bids to diverge in the same direction as
there is when bidders exhibit the endowment effect.
How should one bid in a common value auction? In a symmetric equilibrium for
a common value auction, on observing a signal x you should bid an amount b such
that if you were to just win the auction (i.e. the highest competing bid and hence the
price were also b) then you would just break even. If the highest competing bid is
equal to your bid, then by symmetry you can deduce that the bidder who placed the
bid observed the same signal as you, and you should update your estimation of the
object’s value conditional on this new piece of information.
What information does just winning the auction reveal? Consider the problem
from bidder 1’s perspective. Let Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4 be the largest, second largest, ..., smal-
lest from among the signals received by the other four bidders, X2,X3,X4,X5. If
bidder 1 just wins a second price buying auction, then y1 = x1. If they just win a
second price selling auction, then y4 = x1. Just winning the buying auction does
not reveal the same information as just winning the selling auction. The same is
true of median price auctions. If bidder 1 just wins a median price buying auction,
then y2 = x1; if they just win the corresponding selling auction, then y3 = x1. For
both second and median price auctions, just winning the buying and selling auctions
reveals different information. Consequently, the expectation of the object’s value
conditional on observing a particular signal and just winning the auction will differ
between buying and selling, as will the optimal bids.
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4.3 A New Pair of Auctions to Control for Common
Value Effects
I have argued that the claim that buying and selling auctions should produce the same
bids does not hold for second and median price auctions when the object traded has
an uncertain common value and traders receive private signals of its value. For
buying and selling auctions to produce the same pattern of bids, the information
revealed by winning the auction must be the same for both auctions. If the pair
of auctions used comprises (a) second price buying and selling auctions or (b) and
median price equivalents, this condition does not hold. It does hold, however, if
the pair of auctions used comprises a kth price selling auction and a (k+ 1)th price
buying auction (see proof in appendix J). This is because for bidder 1 just winning
the selling auction reveals that yk = x1 (where yk is the k
th highest signal among those
observed by the other bidders). In a (k+1)th price buying auction, just winning also
reveals yk = x1. Hence, the expected value of the item conditional on just winning is
the same in both auctions, so both auctions should produce the same pattern of bids.
What value of k should be chosen? Since the winner’s curse is not the pri-
mary focus of this chapter, we should choose a value that minimises its possible
effect. Ideally, we would choose k so that E[V |X1 = x1] = E[V |X1 = x1 = yk]. When
this condition holds, bidder 1’s expectation of the auctioned object’s value is inde-
pendent of whether they win the auction, so it is optimal to simply bid expected
value conditional on the observed signal. For an experiment, this is desirable for
two reasons. First, we can meaningfully interpret bids as private valuations. Se-
cond, even participants who do not understand the winners curse and bid expected
value given their signal will behave the same as those who do understand it. What
value of k is most likely to have this property? Suppose V is uniformly distributed
over some interval and signals are symmetrically distributed about V . Further, sup-
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pose that for some range of values, X1 and the median of {X1, ...,XN}, X˜ , are both
unbiased estimators ofV . That is E[V |X1 = x1] = x1 and E[V |X˜ = x˜] = x˜. For signals
within this range, the auction has the desirable property if just winning the auction
implies x˜ = x1. This is satisfied by auctions with the property N = 2k.
An auction with four participants (i.e. N = 4) is used in the experiment. It has
the desirable property when k= 2. This means that in the selling auction, the second,
kth, highest bid is the price and the two participants with the two lowest bids sell at
the price. In the buying auction, the price is the third highest bid, (k+1)th, and the
participants with the two highest bids buy at the price.
4.4 The Experiment
A total of 268 people took part in the experiment. They were recruited1 from the
student population at the University of Nottingham. For each of the four treatments
four sessions were run giving a total of 16 sessions. The sessions for the treatments
with unknown odds were run before those for treatments with known odds to prevent
knowledge of the odds leaking. Each session had either 16 or 20 subjects who were
randomly assigned to trading groups of four. The subjects were given a paper copy of
the instructions (see Appendix K.1) and then the experimenter read the instructions
aloud. Then the subjects completed a comprehension test (see Appendix K.2) which
was checked by the experimenter before proceeding.
The two following lotteries were used: a $-bet offered a 19% chance to win £17
(and a 81% chance of receiving nothing); a P-bet offered a 81% chance to win £4
(and a 19% chance of receiving nothing).2The expected value of the $-bet is £3.23
and the P-bet, £3.24. The random device used to resolve the lotteries was an urn
containing 100 balls: in some sessions 19 were orange and 81, white; in others, 19,
1The online recruitment management system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) was used.
2Note this pair of lotteries is similar to those used by Loomes et al. (2007) in a related experiment.
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white and 81, orange. The subjects were shown the balls separated by colour in two
transparent containers. This let the subjects in the treatments with unknown odds
arrive at a private estimate of the number of balls of each colour. The balls were
then placed in a non transparent urn placed in the centre of the room and mixed
thoroughly.
Each subject participated in four markets: buying and selling each of the two lot-
teries. After all the markets had been completed, subjects were faced with a choice
between the P and $ bets. Table 4.1 shows the four possible sequences of tasks
followed by subjects in the experiment. In all sessions at least one trading group
followed each sequence (in sessions of 16 exactly one followed each sequence; in
sessions of 20 one sequence was followed by two groups).
Each of the four markets had 10 trials.3 Bids were entered via a computer termi-
nal (appendix L.1 shows an example of the screen subjects saw). In selling markets,
subjects were endowed with the lottery and asked to state the minimum they would
be willing to accept to sell the lottery to the experimenter. In buying markets, sub-
jects were endowed with the maximum the lottery could pay out and asked to state
the maximum they would be willing to pay to buy the lottery.4When all subjects
in a trading group had entered their bids, the market price for the round was deter-
mined. Subjects were told onscreen the outcome of the auction and whether they
had traded (appendix L.2 shows an example of the screen subjects saw). In the no
feedback treatments, subjects proceeded directly to the next round of the market.
In the feedback treatments, once all trading groups had completed the auction, the
experimenter drew a ball from the urn in the centre of the room. The result of the
3 In some earlier studies investigating whether anomalies decay in repeated markets there were
fewer than 10 trials and typically 5 or 6 e.g (Loomes et al., 2003, 2007; Grether and Cox, 1996) while
others had 10 or more e.g. (Shogren et al., 2001; Braga et al., 2008). Having 10 trials provides a
more rigorous test of the hypotheses.
4Schmidt and Traub (2006) argue that with this pattern of endowments under standard utility
theory and when the degree of absolute risk aversion is non-increasing, if income effects occur at all,
they will result in WTP exceeding WTA.
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Table 4.1: How Tasks Were Ordered
Sequence
Part A B C D
1 Buy P Sell P Buy $ Sell $
2 Buy $ Sell $ Buy P Sell P
3 Sell P Buy P Sell $ Buy $
4 Sell $ Buy $ Sell P Buy P
5 Choice Task
The columns - labelled A, B, C, and D - represent sequences in which tasks could be com-
pleted. Each trading group followed one of these four sequences. In each treatment, trading
groups were distributed evenly between the four sequences.
draw was recorded and subjects were shown the consequences of the draw for them
on screen (see appendix L.3).
After subjects had completed each of the four markets, they faced a choice bet-
ween the two bets (see appendix L.4). In the feedback treatments, once everyone
had made a choice, the lottery was resolved. At this point, subjects had finished all
the decision tasks in the experiment. One task (either one of the 40 auction rounds or
the choice task) was selected at random to be the task for which subjects were paid.
In the no feedback treatments the lottery was resolved to determine payouts in the
selected task (in the feedback treatments, the lottery had been resolved immediately
after each task, so the payout in the selected task was already determined). Each
experimental session lasted about 70 minutes. The payments receive by subjects
ranged from £0 to £33.30 with a mean of £7.12 .
4.5 Results
Section 4.5.1 describes what data was collected and then sections 4.5.2 to 4.5.5
analyse the data with respect to specific behavioural anomalies.
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Figure 4.1: The Evolution of Bids: All Treatments
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4.5.1 The Data Collected
Valuations Each of the 268 subjects took part in four markets (buying and selling
the P-bet and $-bet). Each market consisted of an auction that was repeated
10 times. This gives a total of 10720 bids. The mean of bids across rounds are
shown in figure 4.1. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the mean first and last round bids
by treatment. Figure 4.8 shows mean last round bids by treatment graphically.
Choices The final task in the experiment was a choice between the P-bet and the
$-bet. The results by treatment are shown in figure 4.2.
Time taken to make decisions As well as the actual decisions made by subjects,
the time taken to make decisions was also recorded. This was done by recor-
ding the time (in milliseconds) at which information was displayed on subjects
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Figure 4.2: Choices and Final Round Valuations by Treatment
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computer screens and the time at which subjects’ clicked on onscreen buttons.
For example, the time taken to enter bids was recorded as time between when
the enter bid screen (L.1) for a given round was displayed and when the sub-
ject had entered a valid bid and clicked on submit bid. Figure 4.3 shows how
the mean time to enter bids varied across the 40 auction tasks completed by
each subject. Task 1 was the first auction subjects completed. Tasks 11, 21,
and 31 are where subjects changed between trading P-bets and $-bets. Task
21 is where they changed between buying and selling as well as changing
lotteries.
Comprehension Test and Debrief Survey Subjects answers to the comprehension
test K.2 and debrief survey were collected. The only data reported are the
estimates of the odds stated by subjects in the unknown odds treatments. Table
4.2 shows that mean estimates were close to the true value (the probability of
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Figure 4.3: The Time Taken to Enter Bids in Successive Tasks
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the $-bet paying out was 19100 ).
4.5.2 WTA/WTP Gaps
Result 4.1 In the first round of the markets, there was a WTA/WTP gap.
Support. In the first round of the markets for the P-bet and the $-bet bids in selling
auctions exceeded those in buying auctions. Table 4.3 shows that for the P-bet, on
Table 4.2: Subject’s Estimates of the Odds of Winning the $-Bet
Treatment N mean
estimate
Std. Dev. Min Max
Unknown odds 64 22.5% 8.5 10.0 50.0
Unknown odds & Feedback 60 19.6% 4.6 10.0 33.3
All 124 21.1% 7.0 10.0 50.0
The reported figures are subjects’ responses to the debrief survey, which is shown in ap-
pendix K.3.
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average across the four treatments bids in selling auctions were 32 credits higher
than in buying auctions; table 4.4 shows that for the $-bet, on average, they were 82
credits higher. In both cases the difference is statistically significant.
Result 4.2 In the treatments without lottery feedback, the gap tended to close over
successive rounds; in the treatments with lottery feedback, it did not.
Support. When the results of the four treatments are pooled, mean bids in buying
and selling converge over successive rounds. Figure 4.1 shows this convergence.
Although the gap decays, it does not close completely. The final rows of tables 4.3
and 4.4 show the size of the gap and that it was statistically significant in markets
for both bets. Table 4.5 shows the correlation between the gap size and the number
of rounds completed. For each subject in each of the ten rounds a measure of the
gap was calculated as follows. gap = bid selling$+ bid sellingP− bid buying$−
bid buyingP The resulting figures were then ranked from highest to lowest and the
coefficient of correlation ρ between rank and round number calculated (the second
column of the table). The null hypothesis of no correlation was tested against the
alternative of either positive or negative correlation. The p-values reported in the
last column of the table are the probability of obtaining correlation at least as strong
as the observed results under the null hypothesis. The last row of the table reveals
that the obvious convergence we see in figure 4.1 is statistically significant.
When the results of the four treatments are disaggregated, two patterns emerge.
Figure 4.4 shows that on average in treatments without feedback, the buying-selling
gap completely closes after 5-6 rounds. In contrast, figure 4.5 shows, in treatments
with feedback, the gap persists over all 10 rounds. Returning to table 4.5, we see
a similar pattern. In all treatments there is some degree of negative correlation bet-
ween the gap size and round number. The correlation is stronger and statistically
significant in treatments without feedback.
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Table 4.3: Mean Bids in P-Bet Auctions
First Round Last Round
Treatment buy sell gap buy sell gap
No feedback, unknown odds 187 219 32∗∗ 180 176 −4
No feedback, known odds 174 219 44∗∗ 223 206 −17
Feedback, unknown odds 189 221 33 248 290 42∗∗
Feedback, known odds 193 213 20 274 298 24
All 186 218 32∗∗∗ 229 240 10∗∗
The null hypothesis of gap = 0 is tested against the alternative hypothesis gap > 0 using a
one sided t-test. Significance levels: *:10 percent; **: 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 4.4: Mean Bids in $-Bet Auctions
First Round Last Round
Treatment buy sell gap buy sell gap
No feedback, unknown odds 360 503 143∗∗ 316 388 72
No feedback, known odds 409 386 −24 348 227−121
Feedback, unknown odds 361 445 84 116 269 153∗∗
Feedback, known odds 331 454 123∗∗ 220 326 106∗∗
All 366 448 82∗∗∗ 253 304 50∗∗
The null hypothesis of gap = 0 is tested against the alternative hypothesis gap > 0 using a
one sided t-test. Significance levels: *:10 percent; **: 5 percent; *** 1 percent.
Table 4.5: WTA/WTP Gap Trends across Rounds
Treatment n Spearman’s ρ p value
Unknown odds 720 -0.10 0.009
Known odds 680 -0.10 0.008
Unknown odds & feedback 640 -0.02 0.557
Known odds & feedback 640 -0.05 0.254
All 2680 -0.07 <0.001
Spearman’s ρ is non-parametric measure of correlation. The p-values are
the probability of obtaining ρ under the null hypothesis that there is no cor-
relation between the size of the WTA/WTP gap and number of rounds com-
pleted.
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Figure 4.4: The Evolution of Bids: Treatments without Lottery Feedback
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Figure 4.5: The Evolution of Bids: Treatments with Lottery Feedback
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Figure 4.6: The Evolution of Bids: Treatments with Known Odds
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Figure 4.7: The Evolution of Bids: Treatments with Unknown Odds
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Figure 4.8: Round 10 Bids by Treatment
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4.5.3 The Effect of Ambiguity
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the evolution of bids in treatments with known and unk-
nown odds respectively. Do subjects value lotteries with known odds higher than
those with unknown odds?
Result 4.3 There is evidence of ambiguity aversion in buying but not selling.
Support. If we just consider either the P or $ bet alone and find that valuations are
higher when the odds are known, we can not distinguish between two competing
explanations. Maybe the difference is due to ambiguity aversion; maybe it is due
to underestimating the odds of winning the lottery with unknown odds. To isolate
the effect of ambiguity the following procedure is used. Suppose a subject in the
unknown odds treatment estimates that the $-bet will pay out with probability pˆ,
and hence the P-bet pays out with probability (1− pˆ). If they are an expected utility
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maximiser with utility function u(•) and u(0) = 0, then the expected utility of the
P and $ bets are (a) 0.81u(4) and 0.19u(17) when the odds are known and (b) (1−
pˆ)u(4) and pˆu(17) when the odds are estimated. We can write
v = 0.19×
pˆu(17)
0.19u(17)
+0.81×
(1− pˆ)u(4)
0.81u(4)
and for an expected utility maximiser whatever value pˆ takes, v = 1. Hence, if
v < 1, it is due to ambiguity aversion not miss-estimating the odds.
The following was used as an estimate of v (the assumptions are that bids are
certainty equivalents and the ratio of certainty equivalents approximates the ratio of
utilities).
vˆ = 0.19×
BidUncertain$Bet
MeanBid Risky$Bet
+0.81×
BidUncertainPBet
MeanBid RiskyPBet
For each subject in the unknown odds treatments, vˆ was calculated for rounds
1-10 of buying and selling giving a total of 20 observations per subject. Since these
subjects only completed markets for lotteries with unknown odds, the mean of bids
from the same round of the corresponding markets in treatments with known odds
was used in calculating vˆ.
Figure 4.9 shows the mean of vˆ for buying and selling across rounds 1-10 with
and without feedback. The graph shows that subjects are ambiguity averse in buying
auctions but not in selling auctions. This could be interpreted in terms of a caution
heuristic having two effects. First people dislike ambiguity so value ambiguous lot-
teries less than risky ones. Second, when faced with uncertainty, people become
more averse to trading. In buying auctions, these two effects act in the same direc-
tion, resulting in lower prices; in selling auctions, they act in opposite directions, so
tend to cancel each other out.
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Figure 4.9: Value of Bids for Uncertain Lotteries relative to Bids for Risky Lotteries
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Table 4.9 shows the result of testing for trends in vˆ across rounds. Ambiguity
aversion increases in buying auctions but remains approximately constant in selling
auctions. This is evidence against the hypothesis that anomalies decay in repeated
markets.
Table 4.6: Testing for Trends across Rounds in the Valua-
tions of Uncertain Lotteries relative to Risky Lotteries
Treatment Np-trend z statistic Prob[Z > |z|]
Selling -0.89 0.373
Buying -2.15 0.032
Selling + Feedback -0.88 0.376
Buying + Feedback -2.31 0.021
A negative z statistic indicates that valuations of uncertain lotteries rela-
tive to risky ones decrease as the number of rounds completed increases.
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4.5.4 Preference Reversals
Under standard theory, if someone prefers the P-bet to the $-bet, they should do so
however the preference is elicited. There are two ways this proposition is tested.
First, within subject tests: testing whether the lottery a subject valued highest is also
the one they chose. This type of test allows preference reversals to be identified
even when there is no systematic pattern to the reversals (i.e. the number valuing
the $-bet highest and choosing the P-bet equals the number valuing the P-bet hi-
ghest and choosing the $-bet). Second, between subject tests: testing whether the
proportion choosing the $-bet is the same when preferences are elicited differently.
Differences in proportion (beyond that which can be reasonably accounted for by
random variation) imply the revealed preference depends on how it is elicited. The
absence of differences in proportion, however, does not imply revealed preference
are independent of the elicitation method.
Result 4.4 Standard preference reversals are more common in the early rounds;
non standard ones in the later rounds.
Support. Figure 4.7 shows the number of preference reversals in rounds 1 and 10.
Figures for buying and selling are reported. The figures for selling are arguably
more meaningful since in buying auctions one could in theory explain the reversals
in terms of income effects. In round 1, standard reversals (valuing the $-bet higher
but choosing the P-bet) are at least twice as frequent as non standard ones. By round
10, the number of standard reversals has decreased and non standard reversals are
more common.
Figure 4.10 shows how the proportions of the two types of preference reversal
changed over rounds 1-10. Information is disaggregated into treatments with and
without feedback. The lightest shaded regions show the proportion of subjects who
valued the P-bet highest and chose the P-bet at the end of the experiment. The region
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above this, shaded the second lightest, shows those who valued the P-bet highest but
chose the $-bet, so the sum of these two regions is the proportion who valued the
P-bet highest. Similarly, the sum of the two darker shaded regions above are those
who valued the $-bet highest. In round 1 (as we saw in table 4.7) the proportion who
valued the P-bet highest is less than the proportion who eventually chose it over the
$-bet. By round 3, the two proportions are equal. At round 10, more subjects valued
the P-bet highest than chose it. Over the 10 rounds, the total number of reversals, the
sum of the middle two regions remains approximately constant. The trend is that the
proportion who value the P-bet highest increases over successive rounds. The trend
described above is apparent in both graphs but more pronounced in the treatments
with feedback.
Result 4.5 Final choices and valuations vary across treatments suggesting exposure
to a repeated laboratory market is not sufficient for people to discover their true
preferences.
Support. Figure 4.2 shows preferences implied by final round valuations and the
choice task by treatment. Figure 4.8 shows final round valuations by treatment.
Within treatments, the valuations and choices produce similar proportions favouring
each bet. However, there are large differences between treatments. In treatments
with feedback, a much larger proportion chose the P-bet and valued it highest. Under
the hypothesis that experience of a repeated market causes behaviour to converge on
the optimal, we should not expect any differences between treatments. Table 4.8
shows the results of testing a series of hypotheses concerning the differences in
choices and valuations between treatments. In 6 of the 7 cases, we can reject the
null hypothesis of no difference between treatments at the 0.1 percent level.
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Table 4.7: Within Subject Choice-Valuation Preference Reversals
Reversals Standard Reversals Proportion P-value
Round 1 Buying 118 78 0.66 0.001
Round 1 Selling 123 87 0.71 0.000
Round 10 Buying 101 43 0.43 0.163
Round 10 Selling 106 51 0.48 0.771
A preference reversal is said to occur if in a given round the lottery that a subject values hi-
ghest is not the same as the one they chose at the end of the experiment. A standard reversal
is when the $-bet is valued highest but the P-bet is chosen. The null hypothesis that standard
and non-standard reversals are equally likely is tested against the two sided alternative that
they are not equally likely. The P-values are the probabilities of observing the obtained or a
more extreme result under the null hypothesis.
Table 4.8: Testing for Differences in Choice and Final Round Valuations across
Treatments
Hypothesis that the following is equal
across treatments
Test P value
Prob[Choose $-bet] Pearson’s chi-squared 0.000
Prob[Value $-bet highest in buying ] Pearson’s chi-squared 0.000
Prob[Value $-bet highest in selling ] Pearson’s chi-squared 0.000
Mean bid buying $-bet Analysis of Variance 0.001
Mean bid buying P-bet Analysis of Variance 0.000
Mean bid selling $-bet Analysis of Variance 0.071
Mean bid selling P-bet Analysis of Variance 0.000
The p values are the probability of observing the obtained statistic under the null hypothesis
of no differences between treatments.
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Figure 4.10: Preference Reversals without Feedback and with Feedback
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4.5.5 Attitude to Risk and Probability Weighting
Result 4.6 Over weighting of small probabilities decays in the repeated markets
with lottery feedback but not those without it.
Support. The P and $ bets used in the experiment had the same expected value.
A risk averse expected utility maximiser should prefer the P-bet; a risk loving one
should prefer the $-bet. Table 4.9 shows implied preferences over the P and $ bets.
In round 1 the majority preferred the $-bet. By round 10, the majority in the treat-
ments without feedback still prefer the $-bet but the majority in the treatments with
feedback have switched to preferring the P-bet. A possible explanation is that sub-
jects have a tendency to over weigh small probabilities. The $-bet pays out a relati-
vely large amount with a small probability. Subjects over weigh this probability and
hence overvalue the $-bet relative to the P-bet. Those in the feedback treatments
repeatedly experience the resolution of the lotteries and this experience reduces the
tendency to over weigh small probabilities. Those in the no feedback treatments do
not have this experience so continue to overvalue the $-bet.
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Table 4.9: First and Final Round P-Bet/$-Bet Preferences
Treatment Prefer Prefer Indif- p given risk
$ P ferent averse loving
Round 1
All 167 79 22 0.000 1.000
Unknown odds 88 40 8 0.000 1.000
Known odds 79 39 14 0.000 1.000
Round 10
All 112 135 21 0.937 0.081
Unknown odds 48 17 7 0.000 1.000
Known odds 30 31 7 0.601 0.500
Unknown odds & feedback 16 43 5 1.000 0.000
Known odds & feedback 18 44 2 1.000 0.001
For each subject in each auction round, implied preferences were calculated by comparing
their bids in selling auctions for the two bets. The table reports the number of subjects with
the specified implied preferences over the P and $ bets. Let diff = value of P-bet - value of
$-bet. The p values were calculated by running one sided sign tests with the null hypothe-
sis that selling bids for the two lotteries are equal. The p | risk averse column shows the
probability of observing the obtained results if the median of diff is more than or equal to
0. We would expect this if subjects were risk averse. The p | risk loving column shows the
probability of observing the obtained results if the median of diff is less than or equal to 0.
We would expect this if subjects were risk loving.
4.6 Discussion
The experiment reproduced several of the results found in previous studies and pro-
vides some new insights into how repeated markets affect the occurrence of anoma-
lies. As numerous other studies have found, a disparity between buying and selling
prices was observed. In a repeated market where the lottery was not resolved after
each round, the disparity decayed and after 5 rounds had been completely elimi-
nated. The first set of novel findings relate to how anomalies decay or persist in
repeated markets. In a repeated market where the lottery was resolved each round,
the disparity persisted. The reverse pattern emerged with probability weighting ef-
fects. The initial anomaly (over valuing the $-bet) persisted in the repeated market
where the lottery was not resolved but was eliminated in the treatments where the
lottery was resolved each round. Feedback in the form of resolving the lottery was
needed to eliminate one anomaly but causes another one to persist.
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The experiment also investigated preference reversals. In line with previous stu-
dies, initially subjects tended to value the $-bet highest but (at the end of the expe-
riment) choose the P-bet. As subjects completed more auction rounds, they tended
to switch from valuing the $-bet highest to valuing the P-bet highest. By the final
round, the number of subjects who valued the P-bet highest actually exceeded the
number who chose it when faced by a straight choice between the two lotteries.
The second set of novel findings is that although the repeated market considera-
bly reduced within treatment preference reversals, it also produced striking between
treatment preference reversals. Subjects in treatments with feedback were conside-
rably more likely to value the P-bet highest and choose it over the $-bet. Subjects in
treatments with unknown odds valued lotteries lower when buying than subjects in
corresponding treatments with known odds. What is more, these effects increased
with the number of rounds completed. As a consequence, which treatment a subject
was randomly assigned to considerably influenced their final valuations of the two
lotteries and their choice between them.
These two sets of novel results provide a compelling reason to reject the hypo-
thesis that exposure to a repeated laboratory market is sufficient to cause behaviour
to converge on that predicted by the standard theory. Furthermore, the results have
implications for the Discovered Preference Hypothesis. Even though the hypothesis
need not assert that ten rounds of a repeated laboratory market are sufficient to elimi-
nate all anomalies, it still does not envisage that experience might actually reinforce
an anomaly, as found by the experiment for the case of the WTA/WTP gap.
How might market experience alter behaviour, then, if it is not through the dis-
covery of preferences? One explanation is that people use a caution heuristic and
the level of cautiousness exhibited is influenced by their recent experience. As a per-
son’s level of cautiousness increases, they become less willing to trade, less willing
to take risks, and more averse to uncertainty. The experiments findings can be inter-
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preted as follows. As subjects repeat the auction, they become more familiar with
it and less cautious (more willing to trade so less likely to set buying prices be-
low selling prices). In the treatments with feedback, subjects experienced playing
the lottery and losing (receiving a payout of zero) and this increased their level of
cautiousness. The effect of this increase in cautiousness was that they became less
willing to trade (so the gap between buying and selling prices persisted) and less
willing to take risks (so they were more likely to choose the P-bet and value it hi-
ghest).
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Appendix I
Example of Calculating Expected
Value Conditional on an Observed
Signal
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Observed Signal
Value V is an integer uniformly distributed on [0,100], so Pr(V = v) = 1/101.
Player i observes one of four possible signals, Xi ∈ {V − 2,V − 1,V + 1,V + 2}.
Pr(Xi = xi|V = v) = 1/4 for each of these signals and Pr(Xi = xi|V = v) = 0 for
all other values of Xi. For a given signal, Pr(Xi = xi) =
1
101 ∑
100
v=0Pr(Xi = xi|V = v).
The figure shows E[V |Xi = xi] against xi. E[V |Xi = xi] =
1
Pr(Xi=xi)
∑
100
v=0V ×Pr(Xi =
xi|V = v)×Pr(V = v). This simplifies to give E[V |Xi = xi] = ∑V ×Pr(Xi = xi|V =
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v)/∑Pr(Xi = xi|V = v). The following is an example of how E[V |Xi = xi] is calcula-
ted. E[V |Xi = 0] = ∑V ×Pr(Xi = 0|V = v)/∑Pr(Xi = 0|V = v). A signal of 0 could
only occur if V = 1 or V = 2, hence ∑V ×Pr(Xi = 0|V = v) = 1×1/4+2×1/4 =
3/4. Similarly, ∑Pr(Xi = 0|V = v) = 1/4+1/4= 2/4. Therefore E[v|Xi = 0] = 3/2.
Values of E[V |Xi = xi] for other values of xi are calculated using the same approach.
When xi is in the range [2,98] then E[V |Xi = xi] = xi; when x is in the range [−2,1]
then E[V |Xi = xi] > xi; when x is in the range [99,102] then E[V |Xi = xi] < xi.
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Appendix J
Interdependent Values in Vickrey
Buying and Selling Auctions
This appendix concerns Vickrey auctions where bidders have only partial informa-
tion about the value of the item auctioned and different bidders have different in-
formation. In particular, each bidder receives a private signal and the value of the
item to the bidder is (a) an increasing function of the signal they observed and (b) a
non decreasing function of each signal observed by other bidders. Assumptions are
made concerning the symmetry of valuations and signals. I derive symmetric equi-
librium strategies for kth price Vickrey buying and selling auctions. The derivations
are an extension of the one for a second-price buying auction presented by Krishna
(2002, p87) and I use similar assumptions and setup.
The Model
1. There are N risk neutral bidders.
2. Each bidder, i observes a private signal Xi ∈ [0,ω]. The joint density function
of the signals is a symmetric function of its arguments.
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3. The signals X = X1,X2, . . . ,XN are positively affiliated.
1
4. The value of the item to bidder i is a function of all bidders’ signals, Vi =
vi(X1,X2, . . . ,XN). vi is non decreasing in all its arguments and increasing in
Xi. Further, valuations are symmetric in the sense that vi(X) = u(Xi,X−i) and
u is symmetric in the last N−1 components. What this means is that among
the other bidders, it does not matter who observed which signal.
5. LetY1,Y2, ...,Yn−1 be the largest, second largest, ..., smallest from among Xm ∈
X−i. Note, X−i is the set of signals observed by the other bidders. Define the
function
v j(x,y) = E[V |X1 = x1,Yj = y]
Assume that v is an increasing function of x and y for all j.
Buying Auctions
In a buying auction the kth highest bid is the price p and all bidders who bid more
than p buy at price p.
Proposition J.1 Symmetric equilibrium strategies in a kth-price buying auction are
given by:
βk(x) = vk−1(x,x)
Proof.
Suppose bidders 2, ..,N follow the strategy of bidding βk. Bidder 1 bids b: he
trades (buys) if and only if b > βk(Yj) where j = k−1. (Given that bidder 1 trades,
the kth highest bid will be submitted by the bidder who observes signal Y j). For
example, in a second price auction he trades if b > βk(Y1)˙. If he does not trade,
1See Krishna (2002, p269) or Milgrom and Weber (1982) for details of the mathematical proper-
ties of affiliated random variables.
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his payoff is zero. If he trades, his expected payoff is the difference between the
expected value of the item and the kth bid. Hence, bidder 1’s expected payoff on
trading given X1 = x and Y j = y, is vk−1(x,y)−βk(y). Now, let g j(·|x) be the density
of Yj conditional on X1 = x. His expected payoff when his signal is x and he bids
an amount b can be found by integrating with respect to y on the interval where
b > βk(y) (that is where β
−1
k (b) > y)
Π(b,x,k) =
β−1k (b)ˆ
0
[vk−1(x,y)−βk(y)] gk−1(y|x)dy
=
β−1k (b)ˆ
0
[vk−1(x,y)− vk−1(y,y) ] gk−1(y|x)dy
Since v is an increasing function of its first argument [vk−1(x,y)− vk−1(y,y)] > 0 if
and only if x > y. Hence Π is maximised when β−1k (b) = x, i.e. when b = βk(x) =
vk−1(x,x).
Selling Auctions
In a selling auction the kth highest bid is the price p and all bidders who bid less
than p sell at price p.
Proposition J.2 Symmetric equilibrium strategies in a kth-price selling auction are
given by:
βk(x) = vk(x,x)
Proof. As above, suppose bidders 2, ..,N follow the strategy of bidding βk. Bidder
1 bids b: he trades (sells) if and only if b < βk(Yk). Given that bidder 1 trades,
the kth highest bid will be submitted by the bidder who observes signal Yk. Notice
this differs from the buying auction: when buying, bidder 1 trades if and only if his
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bid one of the (k− 1) highest bids, so the bid that determines the price will of the
(k−1)th highest bid among the other bids; when selling, bidder 1 trades if and only
if his bid is one of the (N− k) lowest bids, so the bid that determines the price will
be the kth highest bid among the other bids. When bidder 1 trades, his payoff will
be the price p minus the opportunity cost of selling the item. His expected payoff
when his signal is x and he bids an amount b is
Π(b,x,k) =
ωˆ
β−1k (b)
[βk(y) − vk(x,y)] gk(y|x)dy
=
ωˆ
β−1k (b)
[vk(y,y)− vk(x,y)] gk(y|x)dy
Since v is an increasing function of its first argument [vk(y,y)− vk(x,y)] > 0 if
and only if x < y. Hence Π is maximised when β−1k (b) = x, i.e. when b = βk(x) =
vk(x,x).
Comparision
Propositions J.1 and J.2 imply that a bidder’s optimal bid b given signal x will be the
same in a buying and selling auction if kth price selling and (1+ k)th price buying
auctions are used.
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Appendix K
Instructions and Forms
The instructions and forms used in the experiment are shown on the following pages.
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K.1 Instructions
 
 
 
 
[Where the instructions differ between treatments the text is 
highlighted as shown here.  Which treatments saw the text is specified 
in square brackets.] 
 
Instructions  
 
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment investigating how people make decisions 
in markets.  During the session, please do not talk or communicate with any of the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk 
to answer it. 
 
Payment 
 
You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.  The amount you receive will 
depend on the decisions you and other participants make and the outcome of random 
events.  During the course of the experiment you will complete a number of tasks.  In 
each task you will have the chance to gain or lose ‘credits’.  At the end of the experiment 
one of these tasks will be selected at random and you will be paid according to what 
happened in this task.  You will receive £1 for every 100 credits you earned in the 
selected task. 
 
Outline 
 
The experiment is divided into five parts.  Parts one to four involve buying and selling 
lotteries. There are 10 rounds in each of these parts.  Part five involves a simple choice 
between lotteries. 
 
In the parts involving buying, each round the experimenter will endow you with some 
credits (for the purposes of the explanation, call this amount of credits x).  You will have 
the chance to buy a lottery from the experimenter.  In parts involving selling, each round 
the experimenter will endow you with one lottery and you will have the chance to sell it 
to the experimenter.  The price of the lottery will be determined by an auction (how the 
auction works is described in detail later).  At the end of each round you will be told the 
result of the auction [Feedback]  and how much the lottery paid out.  The diagrams 
below show how much you would earn from the round in different cases.  In a buying 
round (figure 1), you start with x credits.  If you buy the lottery from the experimenter, p 
credits (the price of the lottery determined by the auction) are subtracted from the x 
credits you started with and you also receive however many credits the lottery pays out.  
If you don’t buy, you keep all of the x credits.  In a selling round (figure 2), you start 
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with one lottery.  If you sell the lottery, you receive the p credits (the price determined 
by the auction).  If you don’t sell, you receive however many credits the lottery pays out. 
 
Figure 1:  Buying 
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How do the lotteries work? 
 
The lotteries’ payout will be determined by the colour of a ball drawn from an urn.  The 
urn will contain 100 balls: [known odds] 81 are white and 19 are orange. [unknown 
odds] some are orange and some are white.  The number of credits the lottery pays out 
for different colours will change from task to task.  During each task you will be told 
how much the lottery pays out on screen. 
 
[No feedback]At the end of the experiment, (as mentioned above) a task will be selected 
at random by the computer to be the task you get paid for.  After this task has been 
selected, the experimenter will draw a ball from the urn to determine how much the 
lottery pays out in the selected task. 
[Feedback] After each task, a ball will be drawn from the urn by the experimenter to 
determine how much the lottery pays out.  The ball will be put back in the urn so that the 
number of white and orange balls isn’t changed. 
 
How do the auctions work? 
 
As stated above, during the experiment you will participate in a series of auctions to buy 
and sell lotteries.  You and three other participants will be bidding in the auction.  It will 
be the same set of people bidding every auction in the experiment.  After the auction, 
you won’t be told the value of other participants’ bids and they won’t be told the value 
of your bid.  No one will be told who the other participants in their group are.  However, 
you and the other participants will be told the price which the auction produced 
[Feedback] and the outcome of the lottery  before starting the next round. 
 
How does the buying auction work? 
 
At the start of the auction the experimenter will endow you with some credits.  You and 
the three other participants will then bid to buy a lottery from the experimenter.  Two 
lotteries will be available to buy.  Each participant can only buy one lottery per auction.  
The price and who buys will be determined as follows. 
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 (1) How are bids entered?  Each participant will be prompted to type a bid into the box 
shown on the screenshot below.  If you read the text at the bottom of the screen you can 
see that what it is essentially asking you to do is to state the maximum amount that you 
are willing to buy the lottery for.   
 
[A screen shot of the relevant enter bid screen appeared here.] 
 
(2) How is the price determined?  The computer will record the bids made by each of 
the participants and order them from lowest to highest.  Suppose the bids were as given 
in the table below. (The numbers are just examples and contain no significance beyond 
this.) 
 
Participant Bids Buys Lottery Credits from task 
Y 351 - x  
W 367 - x  
Z 560 Yes x – 367 + lottery payout 
X 685 Yes x – 367 + lottery payout 
, 
In all buying auctions, the second lowest bid determines the price.  So in this case the 
price would be 367. 
 
(3) Who buys the lotteries and how much do they pay? 
In buying auctions the participants with the two highest bids buy the lottery.  They pay 
the price, not the amount they bid.  So, in the example above Z and X buy the lottery.  
They each pay 367 (the price) and receive whatever the lottery pays out. 
  
The selling auction 
 
The selling auctions are similar to the buying auctions but have some differences.  The 
experimenter endows you with a lottery instead of some credits.  Two of the group 
members sell their lottery to the experimenter and the other two keep the lottery and 
receive whatever it pays out. 
 
(1) How are bids entered?  Each participant will be prompted to type a bid into the box 
shown on the screenshot below.  If you read the text at the bottom of the screen you can 
see that what it is essentially asking you to do is to state the minimum amount that you 
are willing to sell the lottery for.   
 
[A screen shot of the relevant enter bid screen appeared here.] 
 
 
(2) How is the price determined?  The computer will record the bids made by each of 
the participants and order them from lowest to highest.  Suppose the bids are the same as 
before. 
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Participant Bid Sells lottery Credits from task 
Y 351 Yes 560  
W 367 Yes 560  
Z 560  lottery payout 
X 685  lottery payout 
In all selling auctions, the second highest (not the second lowest) bid determines the 
price.  So in this case the price would be 560. 
 
(3) Who sells the lotteries and how much do they receive? 
In selling auctions the participants with the two lowest bids sell the lottery.  They 
receive the price, not the amount they bid.  So, in the example above Y and W sell the 
lottery.  They each receive 560 (the price).  The others, X and Z keep the lottery and 
receive whatever it pays out. 
 
How you will be told the results of the auction [feedback] and the outcome of the 
lottery 
 
Once you and the other participants in your group have submitted your bids, you will be 
told the result of the auction. [Feedback] When all the groups have completed the 
auction, the experimenter will draw a ball from the urn to determine how much the 
lottery pays out.  Then the experimenter will enter the result into his computer and it will 
appear on your screen.  The screenshot below shows an example of what you might be 
shown.  (The numbers are just examples and contain no significance beyond this.) 
 
[A screen shot of the relevant auction and lottery outcome screen appeared here.] 
 
 
When you click continue you will begin the next task. 
 
Remember that any one of the tasks could be selected to be the one that determines how 
much you get paid, so you should complete all the tasks carefully. 
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K.2 Comprehension Test
Your computer number: ………… 
Questions 
 
Please answer the following questions.  They serve as a test of your understanding of 
how the auctions work and how the payoffs are determined.  Feel free to ask questions 
if there is anything you don’t understand.  The experimenter will collect and check 
your answers before starting the experiment. 
 
 
1. It is a buying task.  Each participant has been allocated 1000 credits. 
 
	 
	 
		 			
M 100 □ ………… 
N 200 □ ………… 
P 350 □ ………… 
Q 620 □ ………… 
 
(a) Circle the bid in the ‘Bid’ column that determines the price. 
(b) In the ‘Buys Lottery’ column indicate which two participants buy the lottery 
(c) How much do they pay?........ 
(d) Suppose the lottery pays out 1000 credits.  Write values in the ‘Credits from 
task’ column for all four participants. 
 
2. It is a selling task.  Each participant has been allocated one lottery. 
 
	 
	 		 			
M 200 □ ………… 
N 340 □ ………… 
P 900 □ ………… 
Q 1000 □ ………… 
 
(a) Circle the bid in the ‘Bid’ column that determines the price. 
(b) Tick the boxes in the ‘Sells Lottery’ column indicate which two participants 
sell the lottery 
(c) How much do they receive?........ 
(d) Suppose the lottery pays out 0 credits.  Write values in the ‘Credits from task’ 
column for all four participants. 
161
K.3 Debrief Questions
 
[Question 5, highlighted, was only asked in treatments with unknown odds] 
 
 
(1) How did you decide how much to bid in the auctions? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(2) Did you change your bidding strategy or use the same strategy for the 
whole experiment?  Why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(3) Did you use different strategies for buying and selling auctions?  Why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(4) For the last task in the experiment, you were asked to choose between two 
lotteries.  What influenced your decision? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(5) The Urn contained 100 balls.  Some were white and some were orange.  
How many do you estimate were orange? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
….. 
 
(6) Any other comments? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix L
Screenshots
L.1 Enter Bid
163
L.2 Auction Outcome
164
L.3 Lottery Resolution
165
L.4 Choice Task
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
There is a large literature on loss aversion and the endowment effect. Early studies
involving hypothetical valuations of environmental goods found that the minimum
amount people were willing to accept in compensation for giving up an entitlement
typically exceeded the amount they were willing to pay for the same entitlement.
Subsequent controlled and incentivised experiments and some field studies produced
similar results. These results are inconsistent with the standard theory of choice used
in Economics. The result have been interpreted as evidence that the preferences
which determine choice are reference dependent. In particular, losses relative to
the reference point carry more weight than corresponding gains. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) called this effect loss aversion.
Is loss aversion a stable feature of preferences? The evidence is mixed. There is
evidence that market experience eliminates the endowment effect. Some, but not all,
studies that have investigated WTA/WTP gaps in repeated markets have found that
while a gap is observed in early rounds, it decays and is eliminated in later rounds.
Furthermore, studies with subjects with different levels of experience of trading in
naturally occurring markets have found that those with more market experience tend
not to exhibit the endowment effect.
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Several theories of how experience affects behaviour have been suggested. Plott
(1996) proposed the ‘Discovered Preference Hypothesis’ and argues that rational
behaviour emerges from a process of reflecting, experience and practice. Plott and
Zeiler (2005) argue that (a) the WTA/WTP gap observed in many studies is not
due to loss aversion being a feature of people’s preferences. Instead, they argue (b)
the gap is due to experiment subjects’ misconceptions about what it is in their best
interest to do and (c) when misconceptions are controlled for, the gap disappears.
Again, however, the evidence is mixed and while many studies find that experience
influences behaviour, it is not clear its influence is to eliminate anomalies for the
standard theory. For example, Braga et al. (forthcoming) investigate preference re-
versals in a repeated market and find that market experience eliminates one anomaly
but creates a new one. As things stand, we know that experience influences beha-
viour but it is not clear what aspects of experience matter and what the mechanisms
are.
This thesis investigated how experience affects loss aversion using three care-
fully designed experiments. The ‘Crisps and Lemonade’ (CL) experiment, chapter
2, investigated how experience of consuming, owning and choosing goods affects
willingness to exchange one good for another. The ‘Spinning Arrow’ (SA) expe-
riment, chapter 3, investigated the WTA/WTP gap in repeated markets with symme-
tric and asymmetric information. In two of the four treatments the market regime
switched between symmetric and asymmetric information after 10 of the 20 rounds
were completed. The experiment investigated the direct effect of asymmetric infor-
mation on the gap and the effect of experiencing asymmetric information on later
behaviour. The ‘Drawing Balls from Urn’ (DBU) experiment, chapter 4, consis-
ted of repeated markets for lotteries. It investigated how lottery feedback and the
presentation of odds affected the evolution of bids in buying and selling auctions.
The design of the experiments followed several patterns. (a) A common task
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preceded by different experiences. This allowed between subject comparisons of the
effect of different types of experience. This was used in the CL and SA experiments.
(b) Repetition of a task. This allowed within subject comparisons of behaviour
in early and later trials. This was used in the SA and DBU experiments. (c) (i)
Repetition with varying feedback. This allowed between subject comparisons of the
effect of different aspects of experience. (ii) Repetition with identical feedback but
varying initial information. This allowed between subject comparisons of the effect
of the same feedback when it carries different levels of new information. These last
two patterns were used in the DBU experiment.
Each of the three experiments reproduced results reported in the existing lite-
rature in addition to their novel findings. The CL experiment found a statistically
significant endowment effect. Subjects tended to stick with the goods they were
endowed with. In the SA experiment, under symmetric information there was a
statistically significant WTA/WTP gap that decayed in later rounds. Similarly, the
DBU experiment results include a WTA/WTP gap that decays with repetition. Mo-
reover, the experiment reproduces the recent finding of Braga et al. that in a repeated
market for P and $ bets, the tendency in early rounds to value the $ bet highest but
choose the P bet is replaced in later rounds by the reverse tendency. Reproducing
the results of previous studies has two implications. First it increases our confidence
that the results of the earlier studies were not due to chance. Second, it shows that
the earlier results are repeatable and robust to minor changes in experimental proce-
dures. Third, it suggests the way I ran experiments was comparable to other studies.
That is, factors such as the clarity of the instructions and the strength of the incen-
tives were not different enough, if at all, to produce markedly different behaviour
among subjects.
The three experiments also produced a set of novel results. In the CL expe-
riment, the proportion of subjects who swapped an item from their endowment for
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an alternative was considerably higher than in previous studies but still below the
rate predicted by the standard theory. One explanation is that loss aversion is wea-
ker when a person owns several identical items and is faced with giving up one than
when a person is faced with giving up their only instance of an item. Another ex-
planation is that when a person takes ownership of an item, all items of that type
become more desirable to the person. Hence, when they are faced with swapping
an item they own for an alternative, they will be more likely to swap if they own
an item of the same type as the alternative. The experiment also found that when a
subject acquired their endowment in two steps, they were less willing to swap items
than if they had acquired the same endowment in one step. Furthermore, among
subjects who acquired their endowment in two steps, those with experience of choo-
sing between the goods prior to owning either of them were less likely to exhibit the
endowment effect than those with just experience of owning one of the goods.
The SA experiment found that the WTA/WTP gap decayed under symmetric
information but persisted under asymmetric information. The standard theory pre-
dicts a gap under asymmetric information but not under symmetric information.
The results suggest that incentives play a role in changing behaviour. There was
also evidence of spillover effects. When the regime switched between symmetric
and asymmetric information, uninformed subjects did not immediately adjust their
bidding strategy. Furthermore, when the regime switched from asymmetric to sym-
metric information, the previously informed subjects traded more intensely than the
previously uninformed subjects, even though all subjects faced the same decision
problem.
The DBU experiment found that different feedback about the consequences of
choices has different effects on behaviour. When the lotteries subjects were trading
were resolved after each round, the WTA/WTP gap persisted; when the lotteries
were resolved at the end of the experiment, the gap decayed. Conversely, the over
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weighting of small probabilities decayed in treatments with lottery feedback but not
in those without.
Several common themes in the results of the experiments were identified. In
the CL experiment, subjects’ attitudes to risk were assessed using two surveys. The
results suggest risk attitudes that are inconsistent with an expected utility of wealth
model but could be described by reference dependent theory and loss aversion. Fur-
thermore, subjects who identified themselves as more loss averse in the attitude to
risk survey were less likely to swap goods when given the option. This suggests loss
aversion is the common cause of both the endowment effect and aversion to 50-50
lose X , win X +Y bets. In the SA experiment, the magnitude of costly errors was
greater in auctions to buy lotteries than auctions to sell lotteries. This can be inter-
preted as loss aversion or a caution heuristic having two effects: causing reluctance
to trade and causing reluctance to play lotteries. In buying, these two effects act in
the same direction; in selling they act in opposite directions. A related effect was ob-
served in the DBU experiment. There was evidence of ambiguity aversion in buying
but not selling. Again, this can be interpreted as ambiguity causing a reluctance to
trade and causing a reluctance to play lotteries.
Another finding repeated across experiments was that choices were sensitive to
experimental procedure, sometimes in unexpected ways. In the CL experiment, the
proportion of subjects willing to swap an item from their endowment was lower if the
endowment had been acquired in two steps. In the DBU experiment, the proportion
of subjects who, at the end of the experiment, chose the dollar bet over the p bet was
higher in treatments where the lottery was resolved after each auction round.
There were also some inconsistencies between the results of the experiments. In
the SA experiment lotteries were resolved after each auction round. Under symme-
tric information, the WTA/WTP gap decayed. In the DBU experiment, in treatments
where the lotteries were not resolved after each round, the gap also decayed. In treat-
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ments where the lotteries were resolved, however, the gap persisted. The puzzle is
why lottery feedback caused the gap to persist in the DBU experiment but not in
the SA one. Perhaps differing behaviour was caused by differences in experiment
design. The DBU experiment differed from the SA one in the following ways. Sub-
jects traded lotteries with two not four outcomes. A physical random device, an
urn of balls, not a computer simulated one was used. Subjects were paid based on
one randomly selected task not based on earnings accumulated over all tasks. A
within subject not a between subject design was used. That is, each subject com-
pleted both buying and selling auctions not one or the other. Finally, the feedback
subjects received was based just on the last round not on all rounds completed. In
the SA experiment, before starting the next round subjects were told how much they
earned from the round and then how much they had accumulated over all previous
rounds. Which of these differences accounts for the differences in observed beha-
viour between the experiments is open to speculation. One plausible explanation is
that the type of feedback caused the differences. Perhaps when subjects are told the
consequences of their choices in one round in isolation, losses and gains relative to
their endowment at the start of the round are salient. So they exhibit the endowment
effect in the form of a WTA/WTP gap. In contrast, perhaps when subjects are also
shown the consequences of the choices they have made in all rounds so far for ac-
cumulated earnings, the relative salience of the loss or gain they made in the round
just completed decreases and that of the accumulated earnings increases. Since, for
accumulated earnings equal sized losses and gains cancel each other out, if subjects
focus on the effect of their behaviour on accumulated earnings, they will be less
likely to weigh losses and gains differently.
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the results of the three experi-
ments. First, experience does change behaviour attributed to loss aversion. In the
CL experiment, swap rates varied depending on experience subjects received before
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making the swap decision. In the SA and DBU experiments, in some but not all
treatments, the WTA/WTP gap decayed. What explains the impact of experience
on loss aversion? Plott and Zeiler suggest the endowment effect is due to subjects’
misconceptions. On this view, the effect of experience could be to correct these
misconceptions. This view, however, is not supported by the experimental evidence.
In the CL experiment, the set of controls for misconceptions was constant across
treatments but the observed endowment effect varied between treatments. Likewise,
in the DBU experiment, the set of controls was constant across treatments but the
WTA/WTP gap decayed in some treatments but not others. Another explanation is
Plott’s ‘Discovered Preference Hypothesis’. Again, however, this is not supported
by the experimental evidence since it cannot explain the results of the DBU expe-
riment.
If the mechanism by which experience influences behaviour is not the reduction
of misconceptions or the discovery of preferences, what is it? The results of the SA
experiment suggest that heuristics play a role in determining behaviour and expe-
rience might change which heuristic gets used. On this view, the endowment effect
can be interpreted as the result of a caution heuristic and changes in behaviour, in-
terpreted as people changing their level of cautiousness based on previous trading
success.
The following are possible extensions of the experiments reported in this the-
sis. First, investigating why the swap rates in the CL experiment were higher than
in earlier studies. Is the endowment effect weaker when giving up one of several
identical items? Is it weaker when a person already owns an item like the one they
are gaining? Why does acquiring the endowment in two steps strengthen the en-
dowment effect? Second, investigating how people with experience of asymmetric
information behave under symmetric information. Will a difference in cautiousness
be present in individual decision making problems? Third, further investigation of
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how lottery feedback affects the WTA/WTP gap. What accounts for the different
results from the SA and DBU experiments?
The findings reported in this thesis have implications for which theory of choice
is selected to analyse economic problems. The results suggest loss aversion should
be taken seriously. First, each of the experiments found evidence of loss aver-
sion. Second, loss aversion persisted in some cases where we might have expec-
ted it not to. Notably, the choosers treatment of the CL experiment and in the
lottery feedback treatments of the DBU experiment. Second, the results are not
consistent with Plott’s ‘Discovered Preference Hypothesis’. This is most striking in
the DBU experiment: with lottery feedback, probability weighting effects decay but
the WTA/WTP gap persists; without lottery feedback, probability weighting effects
decay but the WTA/WTP gap persists. This implies using the standard theory on
the assumption that experience will eliminate any anomalies is not a defensible po-
sition. Third, the results suggest that heuristic driven behaviour can in part account
for (a) the presence of anomalies and (b) changes in behaviour in repeated tasks.
Developing models incorporating heuristics may be a fruitful line of future research.
The broader implications include some for the debate on the justification of pa-
ternalism. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue that the common assumption among
economists that people choose what is in their best interest is false. Further, how
choices are presented influences the option people choose. Consequently, people
can be made better or worse off by varying how choices are presented. The results
of the three experiments show that how choices are presented and what happened
before the choice both affect behaviour. This increases the scope of the type of pa-
ternalism that Thaler and Sunstein propose to include the type of feedback people
receive on past choices.
Finally, if peoples’ choices do not follow their best interest and further if their
best interest is independent of their current endowment, then people who exhibit
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the endowment effect are likely to miss out on advantageous trades. That is, the
endowment effect in the form of a WTA/WTP gap will prevent the potential gains
from trade being fully exploited. If the caution heuristic interpretation is right, then
policy interventions that reduce cautiousness could increase the number of mutually
advantageous trades that are executed, and so increase welfare. The results of the
SA experiment suggest that cautiousness is determined by previous trading success,
which is assessed using an availability heuristic. Two policy interventions that could
reduce cautiousness are (a) reducing cases of asymmetric information and (b) where
the success of a trade depends on the resolution of a risk, giving people feedback on
the aggregate success of their choices not individual successes and failures.
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